Boring's Interesting ARRB Interview By Vince Palamara vmplac@telerama.com With a few notable, albeit largely overlooked exceptions1, Floyd Boring w= as a relatively new name to the research community when this author wrote= a detailed article about this former #2 Assistant-Special-Agent-In-Charg= e (ASAIC) of the White House Detail (WHD) entitled "Boring Is Interestin= g" in the May 1995 "Fourth Decade (based off the author's 9/22/93 & 3/4/9= 4 interviews)."2 In October 1995, this author gave a presentation at the = 2nd annual Coalition on Political Assassinations conference and wrote a f= ollow-up article entitled "More Boring Details" which appeared in the Nov= =2E 1995 "Fourth Decade". However, it was from the author's COPA appearan= ce that the name of Floyd Boring perked the attention of Tom Samoluk of t= he Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)---Samoluk contacted the auth= or, I donated all of my audio tapes and correspondence from all of my Sec= ret Service/ related interviews, and the rest is history.3 Nevertheless, there is a twist: unbeknownst to me until the publication o= f a recent book4, I had no idea that the ARRB actually followed through w= ith one of my suggestions (although they had followed up on two others5) = and interviewed Mr. Boring...but they did. On September 18, 1996, a mere = 2 days after I received the Deed of Gift from the National Archives regar= ding my donations, Dr. Joan Zimmerman and Doug Horne of the ARRB intervie= wed Floyd at his home in Maryland (the interview was even audiotaped with= Floyd's consent, as was his JFK Library Oral History from 2/25/76 [relea= sed Jan. 1998, again largely via the author's persistence], although the = tape turned out badly and was only used for transcription purposes; it is= unavailable. In addition, my two interviews were audio-taped by consent.= ) = "Who? Me? Why?" The interview begins with Boring exclaiming "I didn't have anything to do= with it, and I don't know anything." Let's replay that again: "I didn't = have anything to do with it"---what, the assassination or the Texas trip?= "I don't know anything"---he sure knew enough to tell Chief James Rowley= via a written report 6 months after the assassination 6AND in his 1976 J= FK Library Oral History, as well as his two talks with me! This proclamat= ion reminds one of "Hogan's Heroes" character Sgt. Shultz' catch phrase "= I know nothing", or maybe President Bush's "I was out of the loop" mantra= during Iran/ Contra (Boring also claimed that "he had never spoken with = anyone at all in the Secret Service about any aspect of the Kennedy assas= sination", another statement that is very hard to swallow, especially see= ing that Boring founded the Retired Secret Service Agent's Association in= 1969)7. = Pulling the strings in D.C. In any event, Horne writes "Contrary to his disclaimer, the interview pro= ved to be worthwhile and interesting in a number of respects." Boring con= firmed that he had never been interviewed by the WC, the HSCA, or any oth= er government body in regard to the JFK assassination.8 Boring claimed th= at he was enjoying a day off at his home on 11/22/639 when he heard the n= ews of the assassination on the radio. Whether true or not, there is more= to the story already than meets the eye: Floyd Boring was in charge of p= lanning the Texas trip! First, author Jim Bishop revealed this fact in th= e 1960's: p. 558 [1992 edition] "...(LBJ) called Secret Service Chief James Rowley.= "Rufe did a brave = thing today," he said. "He jumped on me and kept me down. I want you to d= o = whatever you can, the best that can be done, for that boy." He hung up (t= his = was 11/22/63). It had not occurred to him that Rowley, too, was lonely. = If there was any blame, any official laxness, it didn't matter that THE = PLANNING OF THE TEXAS TRIP HAD BEEN IN THE CAPABLE HANDS OF FLOYD BORING.= " (Emphasis added) And, to the JFK Library in the 1970's: "Part of my job at the White House during the entire President Kennedy ad= ministration was to be in charge of the advance work." To the Truman Library in the 1980's: "I was on all the advance work out of there. I was assigned all the advan= ce work, sort of an administrator... I was second in charge [behind Special Agent in Charge J= erry Behn]." Finally, fellow former agent Sam Kinney (the driver of the follow-up car = on 11/22/63): In regard to SAIC Gerald A. "Jerry" Behn's absence from the Texas trip, l= eaving ASAIC (#2) Floyd M. Boring to be the agent in charge of the Texas trip, Kinney said: " I'll tell you how that happened. We got, as agents, federal employees, 30 days a year annual leave, but they couldn't let us off...there was only " x " amount of agents back then in the whole countr= y. Jerry Behn probably worked three years without annual leave so he decided to take some time off...Roy Kellerman was third in charge-he's qualified. Floyd Boring stayed home- he could still handle what ever came about from his house; there was very little correspondence between because Win Lawson had the advance." Back to the ARRB interview: "Boring independently recalled that he was th= e person who assigned Winston Lawson as the S.S. advance agent for the Da= llas leg of the Texas trip10, but could not recall why or how "Win" Lawso= n was given that assignment." So much for Boring's 'disclaimer' "I didn't= have anything to do with it, and I don't know anything." = A curious limousine inspection Boring initially claimed that his activities on 11/22/63 "were limited to= going directly from his home to Andrews AFB to meet the (new) President1= 1---and that he escorted President Johnson on his helicopter from Andrews= to the White House, after which he went directly home"; the latter part = of this statement is NOT backed up by the documentary record, nor by Bori= ng's own admitted actions. Horne wrote: "When asked who directed him to g= o to Andrews AFB, Mr. Boring said that nobody asked him to go there---tha= t he just did it on his own...In about the middle of the interview, Mr. B= oring remembered that he and Mr. [Paul J.] Paterni had inspected the Pres= ident's limousine and the Secret Service follow-up car, but was unsure wh= ether they had inspected them the night President Johnson returned to Was= hington (11/22/63), or the next morning (11/23/63)"---actually, Boring an= d Paterni inspected the limo on the night of 11/22/63 until 12:01 a.m., o= ne minute into 11/23/63 (the FBI inspected the limo afterwards).12 Furthe= rmore, "When asked who directed he and Paterni to search the automobiles,= he said that no one had; he said he thought it might be a good idea and = had suggested it himself to Paterni, and that they undertook this search = as independent action on their own initiative." (Interestingly, they also= beat Chief Rowley and ASAIC Kellerman to the punch, as the record indica= tes that they had also thought of the idea while at AAFB). 13Continuing o= n: "After independently recalling that they had searched the cars, Mr. Bo= ring said that he (Boring) had discovered a piece of skull bone with brai= n attached14 in the rear of the follow-up car (the black Cadillac convert= ible called the "Queen Mary"), in the footwell just in front of the back = seat bench. He said during follow-up questioning that the dimensions of t= his skull bone-brain fragment were approximately 1" X 2". He said that he= never picked it up or touched it himself, but that he simply pointed it = out to Mr. Paterni (Mr. Paterni was Deputy Chief of the Secret Service)15= =2E He said he did not write a report about this, and he did not know whe= ther Mr. Paterni had written a report or not."16 For his part, Sam Kinney= told me: " he found the piece of the back of JFK's head lying in the rea= r seat of the bloody limousine, exactly were Clint Hill told the Warren C= ommission he saw the "right rear" piece at (2H141; fellow agents Roy Kel= lerman [2H85] and Jerry Behn[Sibert & O'Neill interview, 11/27/63] confir= m this fact)! Sam told me it was "clean as a pin" and that it resembled a= "flowerpot" or "clay pot" piece. Kinney added: "It was a big piece-half = his head was gone." When I pressed him on this point and asked him if he = was sure of the skull piece's orientation, he said, " I don't know what e= lse it could have been but the back of his head." Realizing the obvious s= ignificance of this find (made several hours BEFORE the "official" limous= ine inspection instigated by ASAIC FLOYD BORING), Kinney put in a phone p= atch to Admiral George Burkley (unfortunately, like many other events, th= is radio traffic no longer exists on the heavily edited Air Force One rad= io tapes that are available at the present time [I wonder why?]). Kinney = had the piece in his suit pocket during his talk with Burkley and during = the flight back to Washington. Upon landing at Andrew Air Force Base, Bur= kley got a hold of the skull piece Kinney had."17 What makes Boring's recollections of the limo inspection particularly tro= ublesome is the fact that he "made very clear during the [ARRB] interview= that this fragment was in the rear of the follow-up car, not in the rear= seat of the presidential limousine.Initially, ARRB staff members Zimmerm= an and Horne had misunderstood Mr. Boring to mean that the bone-brain fra= gment was in the rear seat of the President's limousine, and Mr. Boring t= ook specific pains to correct our misunderstanding during follow-on discu= ssion of this matter." However, Boring called Horne the next day to place= a correction (and, thus, a retraction) on the record: he now felt that t= he skull bone-and-brain fragment he saw "must have been in the back seat = of the President's limousine, and not the follow-up car. He said that his= stroke may perhaps have had something to do with his error." This may al= so explain why Boring now has NO recollection of finding any bullet fragm= ents at all in the limousine (only the skull fragment), and also may expl= ain why he could not remember, one way or the other, the condition of the= limousine's windshield and chrome strip.18 op-ed about his colleagues "When shown the HSCA summary of its interview with Miami SAIC John Marsha= ll (specifically, Marshall's twice expressed opinion that there may have = been a Secret Service conspiracy19), Mr. Boring expressed surprise at tho= se sentiments and said he had never heard that opinion expressed by SAIC = Marshall (a personal friend of his from their previous association as Pen= nsylvania State Troopers). When shown the HSCA interview summary of its i= nterview with Miami field office SA Ernest Aragon (specifically, Aragon's= allegations of Secret Service security lapses 20), he said he would not = agree with that statement, and expressed the opinion that SA Aragon may n= ot have known what he was talking about... Mr. Boring was asked to read a= nd comment on several pages of the HSCA 6/1/77 interview transcript21 [of= its interview with former graduate student James Gouchenaur, in which Go= chenaur recounted a very long conversation he reportedly had with SA Elme= r Moore in 1970. Mr. Boring examined the portions of the transcript in wh= ich Gouchenaur quoted Moore as saying that Kennedy was a traitor for givi= ng things away to the Russians; that it was a shame people had to die, bu= t maybe it was a good thing; that the Secret Service personnel had to go = along with the way the assassination was being investigated ("I did every= thing I was told, we all did everything we were told, or we'd get our hea= ds cut off"); and that he felt remorse for the way he (Moore) had badgere= d Dr. Perry into changing his testimony to the effect that there was not,= after all, an entrance wound in the front of the president's neck...Mr. = Boring said that it would be just like SA Moore to give such a lengthy in= terview, but that he doubted very much whether agent Moore had really sai= d those things..." In addition, "Mr. Boring was shown the HSCA interview of SA [George] Hick= ey, and was asked to read the portion wherein Mr. Hickey stated that Mr. = Boring came down to the garage and told him statements were being collect= ed in the White House, and directed (or suggested) that he go and write d= own his statement.22 His response to this was that he did not remember ev= en seeing SA Hickey in the White House garage, nor did he remember seeing= SA Kinney, or any other Secret Service agents, or FBI agents, during the= automobile searches [plural]. He did have some vague recollection of Whi= te House police being there."23 Agents off the limo: a JFK order or an anecdote? Regardless, Boring sure had a precedent for telling the agents what to do= : "Mr. Boring was asked to read pages 136-137 of Clint Hill's Warren Comm= ission testimony [Vol. 2], in which Clint Hill recounted that Floyd Borin= g had told him just days prior to the assassination that during the Presi= dent's Tampa trip on Monday, 11/18/63, JFK had requested that agents not = ride on the rear steps of the limousine, and that Boring had also so info= rmed other agents of the White House detail, and that as a result, agents= in Dallas (except Clint Hill, on brief occasions) did not ride on the re= ar steps of the limousine. MR BORING AFFIRMED THAT HE DID MAKE THESE STAT= EMENTS TO CLINT HILL, BUT STATED THAT HE WAS NOT RELAYING A POLICY CHANGE= , BUT RATHER SIMPLY TELLING AN ANECDOTE ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S KINDNESS AN= D CONSIDERATION IN TAMPA IN NOT WANTING AGENTS TO HAVE TO RIDE ON THE REA= R OF THE LINCOLN LIMOUSINE WHEN IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO DO SO BECAUSE OF = A LACK OF CROWDS ALONG THE STREET." (Emphasis added). I find this admissi= on startling, especially because the one agent who decided to ride on the= rear of the limousine anyway---and on at least 4 different occasions yet= ---was none other than CLINT HILL himself! This also does not address wha= t the agents were to do when the crowds were heavier, or even what exactl= y constituted a "crowd", as AGENTS DID RIDE ON THE REAR STEPS OF THE LIMO= USINE IN TAMPA ON NOVEMBER 18, 1963 ANYWAY (agents Donald J. Lawton, And= rew E. Berger, & Charles T. Zboril, to be exact)24! Furthermore, Clint H= ill's written report (as well as his testimony) sure conveys a more stric= t approach than one stemming from an alleged kind anecdote; in fact, Hill= twice stated he DID NOT RECALL who the agent was who told him, and the o= ther agents, not to ride on the rear of the limousine: "I, Special Agent Clinton J. Hill, never personally was requested by Pres= ident John F. Kennedy not to ride on the rear of the Presidential automob= ile. I DID RECEIVE INFORMATION PASSED VERBALLY FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF THE WHITE HOUSE DETAIL OF THE SECRET SERVICE TO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THAT DETAIL THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD MADE SUCH REQUESTS. I DO NOT KNOW FROM WHOM I RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION. It was general knowledge on the White House Detail, how= ever, that President Kennedy has asked Special Agent in Charge Gerald A. Behn, not t= o have Special Agents ride on the rear of the Presidential Automobile [which Behn denied to me and which is NOT borne out by the many films/ photos from 1963 alone]. NO WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THIS WERE EVER DISTRIBUTED. I was informed that on November 18, 1963, in Tampa, Florida, = President Kennedy had requested through Assistant Special Agent in Charge= Floyd M. Boring that Special Agents remove themselves from the rear of the Presidential automobile. I WAS NOT ON THIS SPECIFIC TRIP WITH THE WHITE HOUSE DETAIL AND RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON, D.C. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN BE- WEEN NOVEMBER 19, 1963, AND NOVEMBER 21, 1963 [NOTE TIME FRAME!]. I DO NOT KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHO ADVISED ME OF THIS REQUEST BY THE PRESIDENT" (emphasis added) And, if that wasn't enough, Floyd Boring categorically denied what Willia= m Manchester reports on pp. 37-38 of his book [1988 edition]: "Kennedy gr= ew weary of seeing bodyguards roosting behind him every time he turned ar= ound, and in Tampa on November 18 [1963], just four days before his death= , he dryly asked Agent Floyd Boring to 'keep those Ivy League charlatans off the bac= k of the car.'Boring wasn't offended. There had been no animosity in the = remark." Floyd told me "I never told him that". As far as the merit of the quote, Boring told me: "No, no, no-that= 's not true." When asked, point blank, if JFK had ever ordered the agents= off the rear of the limousine, including in Tampa on 11/18/63, Boring told me "Well, that's not true. That's not true. He was a very ni= ce man; he never interfered with us at all." In regard to Tampa, Floyd sa= id "He actually- No, I told them...He didn't tell them anything...He just- I looked at the back of the car and I seen these fell= ahs (ZBoril and Lawton) were hanging on the limousine- I told them to ret= urn to the (follow-up) car...He (JFK) was a very easy-going guy; he didn'= t interfere with our actions at all". Boring confirmed what he had previously told me on 9/22/93 and 3/4/94 when he wrote that "Presiden= t Kennedy was a very congenial man knowing most agents by their first nam= e. He was very cooperative with the Secret Service, and well liked and admired by all of us.[letter received 11/22/97]" Floyd is in good company---- = Gerald A. Behn, SAIC of WHD "I don't remember Kennedy ever saying that he= didn't want anybody on the back of his car. I think if you watch the new= sreel pictures and whatnot [sic] you'll find agents on there from time to= time". As just one of many examples, Behn cited the June 1963 trip to Be= rlin (there are many others...)25; Arthur L. Godfrey, ATSAIC of WHD: " That's a bunch of baloney; that's not= true. He never ordered us to do anything. He was a very nice man...coope= rative". Asked if whether Aide Ken O'Donnell did any similar ordering, Ar= t said emphatically "he did not order anyone around". As just one example= , Art was on the Italy trip and agents frequently rode on the rear of the= limousine- one of the agents was none other than Winston G. Lawson 26. I= n a letter dated 11/24/97, Godfrey stated the following: "All I can speak= for is myself. When I was working [with] President Kennedy he never ask[= ed] me to have my shift leave the limo when we [were] working it," thus c= onfirming what he had also told me telephonically on two prior occasions.= ; David F. Powers: " Unless they [the Secret Service] were 'running' along = beside the limo, the Secret Service rode in a car behind the President, s= o, no, they never had to be told to 'get off' the limo."27 Samuel A. Kinney, WHD: "That is absolutely, positively false...no, no, no= , he had nothing to do with that (ordering agents off the rear of the lim= o)...No, never- the agents say, 'O.K., men, fall back on your posts'...Pr= esident Kennedy was one of the easiest presidents to ever protect; Harry = S. Truman was a jewel just like John F. Kennedy was...99% of the agents woul= d agree...(JFK) was one of the best presidents ever to control-he trusted= every one of us". In regard to the infamous quote from William Manchester, Kinney said, "That is false. I talked to William Manchester; = he called me on the book [sic]...for the record of history that is false-= Kennedy never ordered us to do anything. I am aware of what is being sai= d but that is false". Finally, just to nail down this issue, I asked Sam = if an exception was made on 11/22/63: "Not this particular time, no. Not = in this case". Sam also told me that JFK had nothing to do with the limiting of motorcycles during motorcades, and tha= t Ken O'Donnell did not interfere with the agents : "Nobody ordered anyon= e around"28; Robert E. Lilley, WHD: "Oh, I'm sure he didn't. He was very cooperative = with us once he became President. He was extremely cooperative. Basical= ly, 'whatever you guys want is the way it will be'." Lilley also refuted= the Bishop and Manchester accounts, adding that on a trip with JFK in Ca= racas, Venezuela, he and "Roy Kellerman rode on the back of the limousine= all the way to the Presidential palace" at speeds reaching "50 miles per= hour" (with the bubble-top on [which Lilley believed "might deflect a b= ullet."])29; Donald J. Lawton: When I told Lawton what fellow agent Kinney told me, th= at JFK never ordered the agents off the rear of the limousine, he said "I= t's the way Sam said, yes". Asked to explain how he dismounted the rear o= f the limousine in Tampa, he said, " I didn't hear the President say it, = no. The word was relayed to us- you know, 'come back to the follow-up car'". = According to Lawton, JFK was "very personable...very warm". Asked about t= he tragedy in Dallas, Lawton said, "everyone felt bad. It was our job to protect the President. You still have regrets, remorse. Wh= o knows, IF THEY HAD LEFT GUYS ON THE BACK OF THE CAR...you can hindsight= yourself to death" (emphasis added). And, from his letter to the author = dated 11/22/97: "Since I am currently employed by the Secret Service I do= not believe it appropriate that I comment on former or current protectee= s of the Service. If you spoke with Bob Lilley as you stated then you can take whatever information he passed on= to you as gospel.30; Robert I. Bouck, SAIC of PRS: confirmed that having agents on the back of= the limousine depended on factors independent of any alleged presidentia= l"requests"31; Rufus W. Youngblood, ASAIC of LBJ Detail: Youngblood confirmed that "ther= e was not a standing order" from JFK to restrict agents from the back of = the limousine - the agents had "assigned posts and positions" on the back of the President's car. On 2/8/94, Youngblood= added: "President Kennedy wasn't a hard ass...he never said anything lik= e that. As a historian, he flunked the course---don't read Manchester!32"; Abraham W. Bolden, Sr., WHD/ Chicago office: In reference to Kennedy's al= leged "requests", Mr. Bolden told the author that he "didn't hear anythin= g about that...I never believed that Kennedy said that"33; John Norris, Uniformed Division: Norris also joined his colleagues in ref= uting the notion that JFK ordered the agents off the rear of the limo34; Maurice G. Martineau, SAIC of Chicago office: During both telephonic inte= rviews, Martineau joined his colleagues in refuting the Manchester story = that JFK ordered the agents off the rear of the car35 = Cecil Stoughton, WH photographer: "I did see a lot of the activity surrou= nding the various trips of the President, and in many cases I did see the= agents in question riding on the rear of the President's car. In fact, I= have ridden there a number of times myself during trips...I would jump o= n the step on the rear of the [Lincoln] Continental until the next stop. = I have made photos while hanging on with one hand...in Tampa [11/18/63], = for example. As for the [alleged] edict of not riding there by order of t= he President- I can't give you any proof of first hand knowledge." Stough= ton went on to write: "I am bothered by your interest in these matters"(!= ). In a later letter, Stoughton merely corroborated his prior written sta= tements: "I would just jump on and off [the limo] quickly- no routine, an= d Jackie had no further remarks to me."36; Martin E. Underwood, DNC advance man: The advance man confirmed to this a= uthor that JFK did not restrict agents from riding on the Presidential li= mousine (He could not believe that Mr. Behn wrote his report with JFK's a= lleged "desires", citing Clint Hill's actions on 11/22/63 as just one of = "many times" that agents were posted on the back of the JFK limousine)37;= Press Secretary Pierre Salinger: JFK had a good relationship with the Sec= ret Service and, more importantly, did NOT argue with their security meas= ures38 Jerry D. Kivett, WHD: "[JFK] was beloved by those agents on the detail an= d I never heard anyone say that he was difficult to protect."39; June Kellerman, the widow of Roy H. Kellerman, ASAIC WHD: "Roy did not sa= y that JFK was difficult to protect."40; Jean Brownell Behn, widow of the late Gerald A. Behn, SAIC WHD (see above= ): Jerry did not like William Manchester's book "The Death of a President= " and confirmed that she also did not believe that JFK had ever conveyed to Jerry the idea of having the agents not ride on = the rear of the limousine.41 In a follow-up letter she stated that "The o= nly thing I can tell you is that Jerry always said 'Don't believe anything you hear and only half of what you read'42; Chief James J. Rowley: "No President will tell the Secret Service what th= ey can or cannot do."43 The only agent I spoke to who did not give me a straight answer, one way = or the other, was Charles T. Zboril, WHD, Lawton's partner on the rear of= the limo in Tampa on 11/18/63: "Well, Don Lawton and I are just sub-notes [sic] because somebody else testified in behalf of u= s about what happened in Tampa"- this was Clint Hill, testifying to Arlen= Specter about why agents were not on the rear of the car during the assassination. When I asked him if it was true that JFK had really or= dered the agents off the limousine four days before Dallas (which I already knew not to be true!),= Chuck got emotional: "WHERE DID YOU READ THAT? I...If-if you read it in = the Warren Report, that's what happened...DO YOU WANT ME COMMENTING OFFIC= IALLY? I'm speaking to someone I don't know... I gave you more than I would give someone else". Zboril then gave me his address= and requested that I send him anything on this matter and he promised to= respond to me...he never did. Jim Bishop sums up the situation best: "no one wanted to weigh the possib= ilities that, IF A SECRET SERVICE MAN HAD BEEN ON THE LEFT REAR BUMPER G= OING DOWN ELM STREET, it would have been difficult to hit President Kenne= dy (emphasis added)44" FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 1:40 p.m., 1= 1/29/63: "You see, there was no Secret Service man standing on the back of the car= =2E Usually the presidential car in the past has had steps on the back, n= ext to the bumpers, and there's usually been one [agent] on either side s= tanding on these steps...[ellipsis in text]...Whether the President asked= that that not be done, we don't know."45 In a letter dated 4/3/64, WC general counsel J. Lee Rankin had written to= Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley "requesting further information concerning expressions by Presiden= t Kennedy regarding the placement of Secret Service agents on or near the= car during the motorcade", obviously meaning THE motorcade of 11/22/63.4= 6 Since JFK was conveniently dead and there was nothing in the record to = indicate that Kennedy had said anything that morning, Rowley mailed back = five reports on 4/22/64 to try to "satisfy" the WC, who obviously were no= t satisfied by the testimonies of Greer, Kellerman, Hill, or Youngblood o= n March 9, 1964.47 These five reports- by agents Boring[dated 4/8/64]48,= Roberts [dated 4/10/64]49, Ready [dated 4/11/64]50, Behn [dated 4/16/64]51 and Hill [und= ated]52- make much of JFK's alleged comments to agent Boring on 11/18/63 = about getting the agents who were riding on the rear of the limo the hell off of there, as well as "general common knowledge" that th= is had happened before. However, as I uncovered during the interviews for= my manuscript, and which has been demonstrated so far, this was totally = fabricated.53 And, again, NOTHING ABOUT WHAT JFK SAID OR "REQUESTED" ON N= OVEMBER 22, 1963, THE CRITICAL DAY IN QUESTION! Item: noisy motorcycles reduced and placed rearward for conversational pu= rposes "When asked whether the Secret Service had any standard procedures regard= ing size and placement of motorcycle escort for the President's limousine= in motorcades, he said that there was no standard protocol for this, sin= ce local resources were different from site to site. He then stated that = the Secret Service would place motorcycles wherever the local authorities= would want them, and that the Secret Service would not try to tell local= law enforcement authorities where to place motorcycles around the limous= ine---he said that if the Secret Service had tried to do such a thing, th= at the local authorities would not have listened anyway. He said that in = regard to matters like this, local authorities wouldn't take orders from = the Secret Service, but instead had to be coaxed. He also stated that pla= cing motorcycles alongside the limousine would not have been a good idea,= since they were so noisy that the President would not have been able to = have a conversation with the car's occupants." Now, for the real story: The day before the assassination, a crucial change was made in the motorc= ycle escort plans. On November 20th, with no secret service men present, it was agreed that eighteen mot= orcycles would be used, some = positioned along side the limousine (similar to the plan used in the prio= r Texas cities of San Antonio, = Houston, and Fort Worth)54. However, according to Captain Perdue Lawrenc= e of the Dallas Police, "...I = heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy did not de= sire any motorcycle officers = directly on each side of him, between him and the crowd, but he would wan= t officers to the rear..." Secret = Service Agent David Grant, who would have known of Kennedy's alleged"desi= res" via Boring (Grant was an advance man for the Florida and Dallas trips), attended this meeting, = along with fellow advance man Win Lawson (who received his assignment from Boring). 55 DPD Captain Perd= ue Lawrence testified that the Secret Service told them to stay to the rear on the evening of 11/21/63.56 DPD Asst. Chief Charles Batchelor wrote in= his report that "[DPD Captain Perdue]Lawrence then said there would be four (4) motorcycles on either s= ide of the motorcade immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle [as borne out by his 1= 1/21/63 report]. MR. LAWSON THE SECRET SERVICE] STATED THAT THIS WAS TOO MANY, that HE thought two (2= ) motorcycles on either side would be sufficient, about even with the rear = fender of the President's car. (emphasis added)"57 DPD Captain Perdue Lawrence's report regarding motorc= ycle distribution DATED = NOVEMBER 21, 1963, the day before the assassination [handwritten = comments from 7/24/64]: In addition to DPD motorcycles officers B.W. Harg= is and B.J. Martin, H.B. = MCLAIN58 AND J.W. COURSON WERE SLATED TO RIDE ON THE LEFT SIDE OF JFK'S = LIMOUSINE. Also, in addition to DPD motorcycle officers D.L.Jackson and J= =2EM. Chaney, C.A = HAYGOOD AND M.L. BAKER WERE SLATED TO RIDE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF JFK'S = LIMOUSINE!59 If that weren't enough, both DPD motorcycle officer's M.L. B= aker60 and B.J. Martin61 testified to the Warren Commission (and stated in private interviews) tha= t there was a last-minute change made at Love Field: they were told to STAY TO THE REAR OF THE LIMOUSINE. DPD Chief Curry testified to the WC62 about the matter---included in the = actual transcript is a bizarre error involving a clumsy edit (in italics)= : Mr. Curry. = In the planning of this motorcade, we had had more motorcycles lined up to be with the President's car, but th= e Secret Service didn't want that many. = Mr. Rankin. = Did they tell you why? = Mr. Curry. = We actually had two on each side but we wanted four on each side and= they asked us to drop out some of them and back down the motorcade, along= the motorcade, which we did. = Mr. Rankin. = How many motorcycles did you have? = Mr. Curry. = I think we had four on each side of him. = Mr. Rankin. = How many did you want to have? = Mr. Curry. = We actually had two on each side side but we wanted four on each sid= e and they asked us to drop out some of them and back down the motorcade, along= the motorcade, which we did. = Mr. Rankin. = So that you in fact only had two on each side of his car? = Mr. Curry. = Two on each side and they asked them to remain at the rear fender so= if the crowd moved in on him they could move in to protect him from the cro= wd. = Mr. Rankin. = Who asked him to stay at the rear fender? = Mr. Curry. = I believe Mr. Lawson. = Mr. Rankin. = The Secret Service man? = Mr. Curry. = Yes, sir. And what did Secret Service agent Winston G. Lawson have to say about thi= s, IN REGARD TO NOVEMBER 22, 1963? DULLES: "...do you recall that any orders were given by or on behalf of the President with regard to the location of those m= otorcycles that were particularly attached to his car?' LAWSON: "NOT SPECIFICALLY AT THIS INSTANCE ORDERS FROM HIM." [emphasis added---Lawson would go on to say "it was my underst= anding that he did not like a lot of motorcycles surrounding the car"= , something not borne out by very recent prior motorcades from 11/18-11/22= /63]63 The HSCA summed up the situation best: = "The Secret Service's alteration of the original Dallas Police Departmen= t motorcycle = deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security precaution= s...Surprisingly, the security = measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit (11/21/6= 3) shows that the deployment of = motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecu= re...The Secret Service knew = more than a day before November 22 that the President did not want motorc= ycles riding alongside or = parallel to the Presidential vehicle...(emphasis added)" 64 = And, as regards the Dallas Police, in keeping with all prior motorcades i= n 1963, DPD Captain Glen King = stated that the Secret Service was primarily responsible for the Presiden= t's security, while the role of the = DPD was a supportive one.65 Other security lapses & last-minute changes Press & Photographers out of the picture (literally): DMN reporter Tom Dillard---"We lost our position at the airport. I = = understood we were to have been quite a bit closer. We were assigned as the prime photographic car which, as you probably know, NORMALLY A TRUCK = = PRECEDES THE PRESIDENT ON THESE THINGS [MOTORCADES] AND CERTAIN = = REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRESS RIDE WITH THE TRUCK. In this = = case, as you know, we didn't have any and this car That I was in was to t= ake photographs which was of spot-news nature." [Emphasis added]. 66Dilla= rd forcefully said the same thing on C-Span on 11/20/93, = telling the TV audience that the flatbed truck was "canceled at the last minute" and they were put in Chevrolet convertibles "which totally put us= = out of the picture." [all previous trips, inc. Florida, has press/ = = photographers very close in front and behind JFK's limousine, inc. WH ph= otographer Cecil Stoughton, who rode in the SS follow-up car from July 19= 63 until 11/21/6367] Henry Burroughs, AP photographer (rode in Camera Car #2)---"I was a membe= r of the White House pool aboard Air Force One when we arrived with JFK in Dallas on that fateful day. We, the pool, were dismayed to find our pool car shoved back to about #11 position in the motorcade. We protested, but it was too= late."68 Cecil Stoughton, WH photographer (rode in Camer Car #2)--- "I did see a l= ot of the activity surrounding the various trips of the President, and in= many cases I did see the agents in question riding on the rear of the President's car. In fact, I have ridden there a number of times myself during trips...I would jump on the= step on the rear of the [Lincoln] Continental until the next stop. I have made photos while hanging on with one hand...in Tampa [11/18/63], fo= r example...I would just jump on and off [the limo] quickly- no routine, an= d Jackie had no further remarks to me."69 Will Fritz's men out of the motorcade: Seth Kantor's notes----"Will Fritz's men called off nite before by SS. Ha= d planned to ride closed car w/ machine guns in car behind Pres." [which = could mean someplace behind JFK's car, as was the case in New York on 11/15/63]70 Other vehicle shuffling: Milton Wright, Texas Highway Patrolman (driver of Mayor Cabell's car)--- = "As I recall, prior to the President arriving at the airport we were alre= ady staged on the tarmac. I do not recall what position I was in at that = time but it was not #1[the number taped to his car's windshield]. At the = last minute there was a lot of shuffling and I ended up in the 5th vehicle. My vehicle was the last to l= eave downtown after the shooting because the police set up a road block b= ehind my car."71 Personnel shuffling: General Godfrey McHugh (rode in VIP car)--- was asked to sit in a car far= ther back in the motorcade, rather than "normally, what I would do betwee= n the driver and Secret Service agent in charge of trip"- he admitted this was "unusual";72"Ordinarily McHugh rode in the Presidential= limousine in the front seat. This was the first time he was instructed n= ot to ride in the car so that all attention would be focused on the President to accentuate full exposure."73 Lt. Col. George Whitmeyer (rode in pilot car)--- "Mr. Lawson acknowledged= that Lt. Col. George Whitmeyer, who was part of the Dallas District U.S. Army Command, who Law= son said "taught Army Intelligence" and who rode in the pilot car, "wasn'= t scheduled" to be in the motorcade. [as 17 H 615, Lawson's scheduled mot= orcade list, bears out]. Mr. Lawson denied that the presence of Col. Whi= tmeyer had anything to do with Lawson's prior service in the CIC."74; "My= father passed away in 1978 and therefore the answers to your questions a= re somewhat based on personal recollection of his information given to me= =2E In regards to your first question, my father was invited by Col. Geor= ge Lumpkin (ret.) (deceased) to ride in the point [sic] car of the motorcade= =2E He was not a scheduled participant. I think that Col. Lumpkin was wit= h the Dallas Police Department at the time."75 Motorcade route: DPD Chief Jesse Curry---testified that he was not even consulted about th= e motorcade route!76; learned of the route 11/21/63 via agents' Win Lawso= n and Forrest Sorrels77 DPD Asst. Chief Charles Batchelor---"From an administrative standpoint, (= DPD's Charles) Batchelor Believed that the failure of the Secret Service to inform the police adeq= uately in advance of the exact route to be taken by the president prevent= ed them from adequately organizing their men and taking the necessary sec= urity precautions."78 DPD Sergeant Samuel Q. Bellah, one of the three advance motorcycle office= rs in motorcade---"On the night before his assignment, Bellah reviewed th= e planned route with his captain. The route was not the original that was= to go straight through Dealey Plaza, but a revised route. The original p= lan would have skirted the Texas Book Depository building by a block, but= the altered plan turned to pass directly in front of the building."79 Governor John Connally---Stated that he was never informed about the exac= t route to be used on 11/22/63.80 SAIC Jerry Behn---(regarding his unpublished, executive session testimony= before the HSCA) Behn told the author that he was asked two things: fir= st, the details about the Florida trip of November 18, 1963; second, why = the motorcade route was changed for the Dallas trip! When the author inq= uired about the second point since it is another crucial matter of securi= ty, Behn responded: "I know it was changed but why - I've forgotten comp= letely - I don't know."81 Overpass not cleared/ protected properly: Winston G. Lawson----"I recall thinking we were coming to an overpass now= , so I glanced up to see if it was clear, the way most of them had been, = THE WAY ALL OF THEM HAD BEEN UP UNTIL THAT TIME ON THE WAY DOWNTOWN, AND = IT WAS NOT...And I was looking for the officer WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN THERE= , HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO BE THERE...and I made a kind of motion through th= e windshield trying to get his attention to move the people from over our= path THE WAY IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN...we were just approaching this overpas= s when I heard a shot." [emphasis added].82 The common links? The advance team of Secret Service agents' Winston G. Lawson (a former CI= C agent who is still listed as a member of the AFIO)83 and David B. Grant= (went on to do advance work for President Nixon)84, who worked hand-in -= glove with ASAIC Floyd Boring (the primary advance agent and the planner = of the Texas trip, at least from the Secret Service's point-of-view), wer= e the in-the-field architects for the planning and implementation of secu= rity concerns in Dallas. In fact, although Grant physically joined Lawson= on 11/18/63, fresh from his participation (with Boring) on the Florida t= rip (inc. the controversial Tampa stop)85, he was actually working with L= awson and Boring earlier: Lawson's Final Survey Report of 11/19/63, which includes this statement: = "This survey was conducted by SA Winston Lawson and SAIC Forrest Sorrels= , and assisted by SA David Grant, from November 13 through November 22, 1= 963..."86 Agent Roger Warner stated in his report that, while at Love Field during = the forming of the motorcade, "I undertook duties to aid SA Lawson...in l= ining up cars for the motorcade, passing out numbers for the automobiles,= and other general duties..." During an interview conducted on 9/27/92, = Lawson confirmed his handling of the automobile numbers and identificatio= n pins in Dallas on 11/22/63. When we consider that a number of the vehi= cles - including the Presidential limousine - were out of their original,= numerical order, the trail of suspicion leads to these two men.87 Lawson= was in charge of the "car numbers for the windows" at Love Field. 88Rega= rding the detective's squad car, the Secret Service "also prevented the D= allas Police Department from inserting into the motorcade, behind the Vic= e-Presidential car, a Dallas Police Department squad car containing homic= ide detectives...(Agent Lawson) didn't know who canceled the Dallas Polic= e Department car..." If Lawson himself can be trusted, that leaves Grant= as the most likely candidate. 89 Lawson handled the "identification pins= ", "lapel clips", "badges", and "pictures" of these documents90---as we k= now, illicit Secret Service identification made its way into Dealey Plaza= =2E91 Also, Lawson told both the Warren Commission and the House Assassin= ations Committee that he could not recall giving instructions to watch bu= ilding windows, "although it was his usual practice to do so" (Dallas pol= ice Captain Lawrence confirms that no instructions were given).92 And, as= we know, Lawson and Grant had a hand in the motorcycle depletion and rea= lignment, the overpass security (or lack of it), the press' and photograp= hers (dis)placement, and the planning of the motorcade route.93 Final Verdict? "Mr. Boring made clear during the [ARRB] interview that he felt Lee Harve= y Oswald had shot President Kennedy acting alone, and that there was no s= hot from the grassy knoll." "...I concur 100 % with the Warren Report."94 "...I would go with the Warren Commission's report."95 At least on THAT point, Mr. Boring is remarkably consistent. 1 18 H 803-809; "The Death of a President" by Wiliam Manchester (Perennia= l, 1988 edition), p. 37 2 See also "The Third Alternative-Survivor's Guilt: The Secret Service & = The JFK Murder" by Vince Palamara (1993/1997, Lancer), pp. 77-80. This ar= ticle / chapter has since been expanded upon: see the "1999 update" at "T= he Vince Palamara Webpages": http://www.njmetronet.com/palamara/ 3 See pages xvii and 138 of ARRB's Final Report 4 1998 edition of "High Treason" by Harrison Edward Livingstone & Robert = Groden, pp. 432-433 = 5 DNC advance man Marty Underwood, interviewed by the author on 10/9/92, = and author William Manchester: see the ARRB's Final Report, pp. 112, 117,= and 135 http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/arrb98/index.html 6 18 H 806 7 see also pp. 66-67 of Boring's Truman Library Oral History. Readers wil= l recall from my May 1995 article "Boring Is Interesting" that Gerald Po= sner contacted Boring during the writing of "Case Closed", although this = was not revealed in any way in the book (Boring told me that he merely re= layed him on to Hamilton Brown, the Executive secretary of the Former Age= nts' Assoc.---this is duly noted on p. 503. For more on this matter, see = the author's article in the April 1998 issue of "JFK/ Deep Politics Quart= erly." http://www.njmetronet.com/palamara/posner.html 8 Although he did speak to Chief U.E. Baughman for "Secret Service Chief"= (1962/1963, pp. 68-69), and David McCullough for "Truman" (1992, pp. 364= , 385, 434-435, 802, 808-810, and 908) regarding Pres. Truman. Other than= to the JFK Library (2/25/76 [released 1/98], the Truman Library (9/21/88= ), the Discovery Channel program "Inside The Secret Service" (1995), PBS'= "Truman", and this author, noone else has ever interviewed Boring befor= e (and only the JFK Library, myself, and the ARRB went into any detail re= garding the JFK admin. and the assassination). Despite Manchester's QUOTE= attributed to Boring on p. 37 of his book (see above), Boring confirmed = to me twice that he NEVER spoke to Manchester. 9 Boring said basically the same thing in both his presidential Oral Hist= ories cited above 10 see also 4 H 336, 337, & 342 11 see Manchester, p. 389 = 12 CD 80; RIF# 180-10001-10041 13 "The Day Kennedy Was Shot" by Jim Bishop (Perennial 1992 edition), pp.= 511-512; Manchester, 1988 edition, p. 390 14 Sam Kinney found a piece of skull in the rear of the presidential limo= usine while still on board the C-130 on the flight back to AAFB: see "The= Third Alternative-Survivor's Guilt: The Secret Service and the JFK Murde= r" 15 Paterni was also a former member of the O.S.S., the predecessor of the= CIA, and was involved in other matters related to 11/22/63: see the auth= or's article "The Secret Service: In Their Own Words", Spring 1998 "Kenne= dy Assassination Chronicles" journal (also available at "Vince Palamara's= Secret Service & General Research Files": gopher://freenet.akron.oh.us:70/11/SIGS/JFK/Only/VP 16 see footnote 12: Washington Field Office SAIC Harry Geglein did write = a report about the limo inspection, mentioning Boring, Paterni, and Kinne= y, among others. 17 See also RIF#180-10078-10493: 2/26/78 interview of Kinney. The releva= nt portion is as follows: "Inside the aircraft [the C-130 transport plane] during flight, the loadi= ng sergeant, who had been in the rear compartment where the cars were sto= red, entered the forward cabin and said, "I can't stand to be back there.= " SA Kinney gave him his seat and returned to the rear compartment. At th= is point he discovered in the Presidential limousine (1) a skull fragment= under the jump seat where Connally had been seated, and (2) a bullet fra= gment in the front seat between the driver's and passenger's seat. He rem= arked that the bullet fragment "looked like it had hit the windshield fra= me above the windshield." SA Kinney put on a radio patch to Presidential = Physician Admiral Burkley to inform him that he had discovered the skull = fragment. Chief Petty Officer Tommy Mills, an aide to Burkley, received t= he message. SA Kinney then announced that he was going to go directly to = the White House non-stop. The Washington Field Office learned of this and= sent 6 or 7 Park police to escort SA Kinney to the White House Garage. I= n the garage they were met by FBI agents."" 18 2 H 90 (Kellerman); 5 H 67(Frazier); 7 HSCA 389; the two bullet fragme= nts retrieved from the front seat of the limousine and turned over to FB= I SA Frazier by Paterni & Boring were designated CE567 & CE 569 19 RIF#180-10074-10393: 2/22/78 HSCA interview of Marshall 20 RIF#10078-10450: 3/25/78 HSCA interview of Aragon 21 RIF#180-10109-10310 22 18 H 761-765 (Hickey); see also 18 H 722-802 and 25 H 786-788: these a= re all the Secret Service reports submitted to the WC 23 see footnotes 12 & 16 24 The "Tampa Tribune", 11/19/63 (downtown area picture w/ agents Lawton = & Zboril holding onto the rear handrails); Cecil Stoughton photo, taken f= rom the follow-up car, 11/18/63 (suburban area picture depicting same); s= hort clip in David Wolper's 1964 film "Four Days In November" depicting t= he start of the Tampa trip: agent Zboril is running on the left-rear end = of the limo, holding onto the handrail, while agent Berger is riding on t= he opposite side; agent Lawton is seen running along Berger's side; B & W= photos discovered by Ian Griggs and Frank Debenedictis 25 interview with author 9/27/92; see footnotes 41 and 51 26 interviews with author 5/30/96;6/7/96;11/24/97-letter 27 letter to author 9/10/93 28 interviews with author 10/19/92, 3/5/94 and 4/15/94 29 interviews with author 9/27/92;9/21/93;6/7/96 30 interview with author 11/15/95; 11/22/97-letter 31 interview with author 9/27/92 32 interviews with author 10/22/92 and 2/8/94 33 interviews with author 9/16/93 and 4/10/94; 9/10/93, 10/30/93, 12/13/9= 3, 12/31/93, 8/94, and 1/97: letters and correspondence 34 interview with author 3/4/94 35 interviews with author 9/21/93 and 6/7/96; However, in his 11/23/97 le= tter to the author, he stated: "I have heard RUMORS as to his Dallas trip in which he declined to use his a= rmored car and/ or agents on the car's rear platform (emphasis added)." 36 12/2/95 and 11/20/97 letters to author; rode close to Kennedy's car fr= om July 1963 until November 22, 1963, authorized by a specific request fr= om MRS. Kennedy [The Memories, 1961-1963, by Cecil Stoughton w/ Ted Clift= on and Hugh Sidey (1973), p. 160; see also Stoughton's motorcade films of= the trip to Italy (July 1963), as well as his still photos taken from th= e follow-up car in Tampa, FL (11/18/63) and in Houston, TX (11/21/63) via= the JFK Library [unpublished; in author's collection] 37 interview with author 10/9/92 38 author's correspondence with Roger Peterson, 2/99 (based off Peterson'= s very recent conversations with Salinger). 39 letter to author dated 12/8/97 40 letter to author dated 12/2/97 41 However, William Manchester's notes regarding his 12/18/64 interview w= ith Jerry Behn have recently been released. In Manchester's notes, he sta= tes that Behn told him that "Floyd Boring was in charge of the New York a= nd Florida trips the weekend before the assassination. In Tampa the Presi= dent had asked that agents not be on the back of his car. That had happen= ed before. The first time I [Behn] remember it happening was when I was w= ith him in the fall of 1961 in the west or midwest[a full 2 years before = Dallas]. The President asked me to get the agents off the back of the car= =2E However, that happened more than once." So, Behn seemingly corroborat= es his own report dated 4/16/64 [18 H 804-805]. However, as author David = Lifton remarked to the author, "it's possible Kennedy DID say it, [but] i= t was used (in spades) to justify "security stripping" the car for that p= articular motorcade, and then years later, the agents are equivocating [t= o the author] for God knows what reason (Maybe guilt? Who knows)." If tru= e, this means that isolated incidents---over a period of 3 years---were u= sed, after-the-fact, to "justify" no agents being on the limousine on Elm= Street during the assassination (DESPITE Clint Hill's actions on mountin= g the back of the car 4 times, Emory Roberts' different excuse for why Re= ady did not do what Hill did [see footnote 50], Roberts' recall of Rybka = at Love Field, Roberts' order not to move after the first shot sounded, a= nd, most important of all, NOTHING in the record--or in testimony---demon= strating that JFK had said anything about not having the agents on the re= ar of the car ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963). 42 interview with author 11/18/95; letter to author dated 11/28/97 43 5 H 470 44 Bishop, 1992 edition, p. 558 45 "Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964" by Michael R= =2E Beschloss, editor, (Simon & Schuster), pp. 56-57 46 18 H 803-809 47 2 H 61-155 48 The ARRB's Doug Horne writes: "Mr. Boring remembered preparing his wri= tten statement, and verified that the copy shown to him was indeed his st= atement." Although primarily about the 11/18/63 Tampa trip, Boring also m= entions another time---the July 1963 Italy trip---where JFK had also made= an alleged request to not have the agents ride on the rear of the limous= ine. However, as with the Tampa trip, agents DID ride on the rear of the = limousine, as recently discovered film from the JFK Library, obtained thr= ough my efforts, reveals (this footage was shown at COPA 1996). 49 Now deceased, Roberts was the commander of the 7 other agents who rode= in the follow-up car with him. Roberts had, according to the driver of = the follow-up car, Samuel A. Kinney, ORDERED THE AGENTS NOT TO MOVE AFTER THE FIRST SHOT SOUNDED (author's interviews with Sam Kinney, 3/5/94 and 4/15/94)! Roberts had recognized the first sh= ot as a RIFLE blast (18H734-735), yet recalled agent John D. "Jack" Ready= who had begun to move in JFK's direction. Ready was the agent who was AS= SIGNED to JFK's side of the limousine (as Clint Hill was assigned to Jack= ie's side[18H749-750]). As for Roberts' report, it is merely a confirmati= on of hearing BORING over the radio telling the agents to get off the rea= r of the limousine-it says nothing of JFK's alleged"desires". Interesting= ly, in viewing slow motion video footage of the Love Field departure [WFA= A/ABC TV video], one can see agent Henry J. Rybka [25H787]attempt to get = on the back of the limousine only to be recalled by none other than Emory= P. Roberts, who rises in his seat in the follow-up car and hand-gestures= Rybka to cease and desist. Giving Roberts the benefit of the doubt, it a= ppears that Borings' orders to not have any agents ride on the back of th= e limousine were well taken. 50 See footnote #49; Roberts came to Ready's rescue in another report: "S= A Ready would have done the same thing (as Agent Hill did) if motorcycle = was not a President's corner of car"(!) [18 H 738]---- Strange, but this = posed no problem at all for Agent Don Lawton on November 18, 1963, in Tam= pa (but unfortunately, like Rybka, Lawton was left at Love Field and was= not in the motorcade detail). And, last but not least, Ready mentions th= e 11/18/63 Florida trip in his report but HE WASN'T EVEN THERE! 51 STAMPED (stamp pad) signature (similar to other reports contained in t= he WC volumes and elsewhere; not hand-written). When one considers the fa= ct that a subordinate agent from the Miami office, SA Robert Jamison, sig= ned a vital Secret Service document as if he were the SAIC (in this case,= John Marshall), the possibility that someone else merely stamped this ty= pe-written report with Behn's stamp pad signature is certainly not above = the realm of possibility (Behn's office was shared with ASAIC's Kellerman= and Boring) [RIF # 1801007410393]. On the other hand, see footnote 41. 52 see above; why Hill's report is undated remains unknown 53 Palamara, numerous 54 RIF#154-10002-10424: Survey report, San Antonio (11/21/63); NBC video,= Houston motorcade (11/21/63)+still photo; "Texas News" newsreel, Fort Wo= rth motorcade (11/22/63) 55 18 H 789;"JFK Assassination File" by DPD Chief Jesse Curry (1969), pp.= 15-16 56 7 H 580-581 57 21 H 571 58 see also "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed (1998), p. 162 (based off in= terview with McLain) 59 20 H 489 (same as the HSCA's JFK Exhibit F-679) 60 3 H 244; 10/98 letter to the author; "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed = (1998), p. 123 (based off interview with Baker); 11 HSCA 528 61 6 H 293; "Murder From Within" by Fred Newcomb & Perry Adams (1974), p.= 33 (based off interview with Martin); 11 HSCA 528 62 4 H 171; see also Curry, pp. 15-16 63 4 H 338 64 11 HSCA 527 & 529 65 20 H 453, 463-465; see also Curry, p. 9 66 6 H 163 67 "The Memories, 1961-1963" by Cecil Stoughton w/ Ted Clifton and Hugh S= idey (1973), p. 160; see also Stoughton's motorcade films of the trip to = Italy (7/63), as well as his still photos from the follow-up car in Tampa= , FL (11/18/63) and in Houston, TX (11/21/63) via the JFK Library (shown = by the author at COPA 1996) 68 letter to the author dated 10/14/98 = 69 letters to author dated 11/30/95 & 11/20/97 70 20 H 391; see also 4 H 171-172 (Curry); 11 HSCA 530 71 9/3/98 e-mail to the author 72 CFTR radio (Canada) interview 1976 73 5/11/78 interview with the HSCA's Mark Flanagan (RIF#180-10078-10465 [= see also 7 HSCA 14]) 74 1/31/78 HSCA interview of Secret Service agent Winston Lawson (RIF#180= -10074-10396) 75 letter to author from George Whitmeyer, Jr. dated 9/28/98 76 4 H 169 77 CD 5, p. 4 78 WC document---Griffin to Rankin re: Dallas PD 79 "Fairfield (TX) Recorder", 11/17/88: based off interview with Bellah [= provided to the author by Bellah] 80 "NY Herald Tribune", 11/29/63 81 author's interviews with Behn, 9/27/92 82 4 H 351; see also 4 H 327 and 21 H 564 83 4 H 318 84 "20 Years in the Secret Service" by Rufus Youngblood (1973), p. 233. I= nterestingly, Grant's partner, Bill Livingood, is now the Sgt. at Arms of= the House of Representatives---it was his voice that cried out, "Mr. Spe= aker, The President of the United States" before President Clinton's Stat= e of the Union speech! 85 18 H 789 86 17 H 601 87 25 H 786; "Murder from Within" by Fred Newcomb and Perry Adams (1974) = , pp. 37 - 39 88 17 H 618; 4 H 322 89 11 HSCA 530 90 17 H 618, 625; 4 H 322 91 see the author's articles on this issue at "The Vince Palamara Webpage= s": http://www.njmetronet.com/palamara/ 92 11 HSCA 526 93 4 H 326; author's interviews with Sam Kinney 94 Boring's JFK Library Oral History, 2/25/76, RELEASED JAN. 1998 via eff= orts from the author 95 "Mortal Error" by Bonar Menninger, 1992, page 233