JFK's motorcycle escort: the changes on 11/21/63 & Love Field, etc.
The Mystery of JFK's Motorcycle Escort (and related matters)
(compiled by Vince Palamara)
"The Secret Service men were not pleased because they were in a
"hot" city and would have preferred to have two men ride the bumper of
the President's car with two motorcycle policemen between him (JFK)..."
["The Day Kennedy Was Shot" by Jim Bishop, p. 134 (1992 edition)]
I. DPD motorcycle officer Marrion L. Baker---
A. To the Warren Commission:
[from 3 H 244; bracketed comments by VP]
Mr. Baker.
At this particular day in the office up there before we went out, I
was, my partner and I, we received instructions to ride right beside the
President's car.
Mr. Belin.
About when was this that you received these instructions?
Mr. Baker.
Let's see, I believe we went to work early that day, somewhere
around 8 o'clock.
Mr. Belin.
And from whom did you receive your original instructions to ride by
the side of the President's car?
Mr. Baker.
Our sergeant is the one who gave us the instructions. This is all
made up in the captain's office, I believe.
[so far, so good]
Mr. Belin.
All right.
Mr. Dulles.
Captain Curry?
Mr. Baker.
Chief Curry; our captain is Captain Lawrence.
Mr. Belin.
Were these instructions ever changed?
Mr. Baker.
Yes, sir. When we got to the airport, our sergeant instructed me
that there wouldn't be anybody riding beside the President's car.
[the change at Love Field]
Mr. Belin.
Did he tell you why or why not?
Mr. Baker.
No, sir. [important to remember: nothing about JFK or even who told
the unnamed sergeant to make this change] We had several occasions where
we were assigned there and we were moved by request.
Mr. Belin.
On that day, you mean?
Mr. Baker.
Well, that day and several other occasions when I have escorted
them.
["them" is probably hyperbole for President's Kennedy AND Johnson: see
"C" below. Baker only escorted JFK once: 11/22/63]
Mr. Belin.
On that day when did you ride or where were you supposed to ride
after this assignment was changed?
Mr. Baker.
They just--the sergeant told us just to fall in beyond it, I
believe he called it the press, behind the car.
Mr. Belin.
Beyond the press?
Mr. Baker.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Belin.
Did he tell you this after the President's plane arrived at the
airport or was it before?
Mr. Baker.
It seemed like it was after he arrived out there.
Mr. Belin.
Had you already seen him get out of the plane?
Mr. Baker.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Belin.
About what time was it before the motorcade left that you were
advised of this, was it just before or 5 or 10 minutes before, or what?
Mr. Baker.
It was 5 or 10 minutes before.
Mr. Belin.
All right.
Then the motorcade left and you rode along on a motorcycle in the
motorcade?
Mr. Baker.
Yes, sir.
B. To the HSCA:
[11 HSCA 528, 536-537, regarding Baker's 1/17/78 interview with the
staff of the HSCA (JFK
document No. 014899)]
JFK did it---
"Baker...stated to the committee that it was at the President's request
that they made no effort to stay in close formation immediately to the
rear of the Presidential limousine...[Baker] asserted that the President
was responsible for [his] position near the press bus."
C. "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed (1998), p. 123:
The truth comes out---
"I think that morning we were already assigned locations when we arrived
at headquarters. They didn't want anyone around the Presidential car, so
they told us to follow in behind the news media. We didn't know whose
instructions those were; it might have been from the Secret
Service. I know [Pres.] Johnson didn't want anyone around him,
especially a motorcycle
officer."
D. 10/98 letter to Vince Palamara:
Palamara: "Are you aware of any orders not to have the motorcycles ride
right beside JFK's limousine?"
Baker*: "Yes."
II. DPD motorcycle officer Billy Joe Martin----
A. To the Warren Commission:
[6 H 293; bracketed comments by VP]
Mr. Ball: Did you at any time come abreast of the President's car in the
motorcade?
Mr. Martin: No, sir.
Mr. Ball: Were you under certain instructions as to how far behind the
car you were to keep?
Mr. Martin: Yes, sir.
Mr. Ball: What were those instructions?
Mr. Martin: They [plural=Secret Service]instructed us that they didn't
want anyone riding past the President's car and that we were to ride to
the rear, to the rear of his car, about the rear bumper.
Mr. Ball: I think that's all, Officer. [?!]
B. "Murder From Within" by Fred Newcomb & Perry Adams (1974), p.33:
Amazing admission--- Martin "said that at morning muster the four
[Presidential motorcycle officers]were ordered that under no
circumstances were they to leave their positions "regardless of
what happened.""
C. To the HSCA:
[11 HSCA 528, 536, regarding Martin's 1/17/78 interview with the HSCA
staff, done on the same day as Baker's, above (JFK document no. 014372)]
JFK did it---
"...Martin stated to the committee that it was at the President's
request that they made no effort to stay in close formation immediately
to the rear of the Presidential limousine...Martin confirms the
Presidential objection to the close positioning of motorcycles."
D. From Martin's alleged paramour, Jean Hill:
["JFK: The Last Dissenting Witness" (1992), pp. 112-114]
Hill, quoting Martin: "...they told us out at Love Field right after
Kennedy's plane
landed...Well, while Kennedy was busy shaking hands with all the
wellwishers at the airport,
Johnson's Secret Service people came over to the motorcycle cops and
gave us a bunch of
instructions...They also ordered us into the damdest escort formation
I've ever seen.
Ordinarily, you bracket the car with four motorcycles, one on each
fender. But this time, they
told the four of us [Martin, Hargis, Chaney, & Jackson] assigned to the
President's car there'd
be no forward escorts. We were to stay well to the back and not let
ourselves get ahead of the
car's rear wheels under any circumstances. I'd never heard of a
formation like that, much less
ridden in one, but they said they wanted to let the crowds have an
unrestricted view of the
president. Well, I guess somebody got an 'unrestricted view' of him, all
right."
III. DPD motorcycle officer H.B. McLain---
A. "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed (1998), p. 162:
"The escort route had been picked out for him [JFK] by the Tactical
Group. Normally we had done
our own scheduling, but they took it upon themselves this time. It was
rather unusual because
they had people working in positions they didn't normally work. We
usually rode side by side
with the senior man riding on the left and the junior man on the right.
In this case, they had
it reversed."
IV. DPD motorycle officer James W. Courson---
A. "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed (1998), p. 127:
"We were given our assignments that morning through our sergeant
[unnamed]which had been
coordinated between the Secret Service and the police department."
V. DPD motorcycle officer Bobby Joe Dale---
A. "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed (1998), pp. 132-133:
"Two or three days prior to the President's visit we'd ridden with the
Secret Service checking
to see where the turns and problem areas might be. We had three possible
routes, but we didn't
know which one we were going to take, and we were not briefed on it. But
by riding during the
week, I kept hearing the phrase "escape routes," which dawned on me
later that should something
happen to any part of the motorcade we had an escape route to either
Baylor or Parkland
Hospitals...Once we were assembled and the President was ready to go, we
started the motorcade
by going out a gate at the far end. At that time, we didn't know which
route we were taking; we
had three: right, straight, or left. As we were leaving, the word came
over the radio that we
would use the particular route that went left."
B. Corroboration for Dale:
[HSCA RIF# 180-10109-10411: WC document, Griffin to Rankin, 4/2/64]
"From an administrative standpoint, (DPD's Charles) Batchelor** believed
that the failure of
the Secret Service to inform the police adequately in advance of the
exact route to be taken
by the president prevented them from adequately organizing their men and
taking the necessary
security precautions."
VI. DPD Sergeant Samuel Q. Bellah---
"Fairfield (TX) Recorder", 11/17/88: based off interview with Bellah
(photo inc.) [provided to the author by Bellah]---"On the night
beforehis assignment, Bellah
reviewed the planned route with his captain. The route was not the
original that was to go
straight through Dealey Plaza,but a revised route. The original plan
would have skirted the
Texas Book Depository building by a block, but the altered plan turned
to pass directly in
front of the building."
VII. DPD motorcycle office Clyde A. Haygood---
[11 HSCA 528-529; see also 6 H 297]
"Clyde A. Haygood...[was] assigned to the right rear of the Presidential
limousine. The
activity of [Haygood] indicated again a departure from standard maximum
security protection.
Haygood, for example, admitted that although he was stationed to the
right rear of Kennedy's
car, he was generally riding several cars back and offred no explanation
for this.
Haygood...was on Main Street at the time of the shooting...Haygood and
Baker were too far from
the Presidential limouisne to afford Kennedy any protection."
VIII. DPD motorcycle officer (Sergeant) Stavis Ellis---
A. "No More Silence" by Larry Sneed (1998), pp. 143-144:
"I was in charge of the actual escort of the President's car. All the
other officers had their
assignments, but some were just assigned to us as surplus. At the
airport, Chief Curry told me,
"Look, you see that double-deck bus up there [one of the Press Busses]?
That's full of news
media. Now they've got to get to the Mart out there where the President
is going to talk, but
we don't want them messing up this motorcade. Just give them one of your
men back there and
tell him to escort them there on time but to keep them out of the
motorcade and not to mess
with us." So I got M.L. Baker*and told him exactly what the chief had
told me. That put him
behind us quite a bit."
IX. DPD Captain Perdue W. Lawrence---
A. To the Warren Commission:
[7 H 580-581; bracketed coments by VP]
Mr. Griffin: At the time of your first meeting with Chief Batchelor were
you given any special
instructions about the protection of the President?
Captain Lawrenc:. None.
Mr. Griffin: When was the next time you received some instructions from
one of your
superiors?
Captain Lawrence: The next time was, to the best of my knowledge, the
motorcade
assignments--possibly 2 days before the President arrived---I asked
how we would escort
this
motorcade.
Mr. Griffin: And with whom did you discuss that?
Captain Lawrence: Chief Lunday and Chief Batchelor.
Mr. Griffin: Was anybody from the Secret Service present at that time?
Captain Lawrence: Not at that time no.
[important to keep in mind]
Mr. Griffin: What were you told about the purpose of the officers that
were being provided,
if anything?
Captain Lawrence: I was told that there would be these lead motorcycle
officers, and that
we would also have these other officers alongside [not to the rear
of]the President's car
and the Vice President's
car, and some of the others that would be in the motorcade, and
approximately how many
officers would be needed for the escort, and at that time I had
prepared a list of 18 solo
motorcycle officers, this included three solo sergeants.
I was also instructed that about this motorcade--that when it
reached Stemmons
Expressway, Chief Batchelor told me that he wanted a solo motorcycle
officer in each
traffic
lane, each of the five traffic lanes waiting for the motorcade, so
that no vehicles, on
Stemmons
Expressway would pass the motorcade at all and he wanted these solo
motorcycle officers to
pull away from the escort and get up there on Stemmons Freeway and
block the traffic, and
some of these officers, he stated, would pull past the Presidential
car.
[...]
Mr. Griffin: When did that conversation take place?
Captain Lawrence: That conversation took place about the 20th of
November---2 days
before.
Mr. Griffin: Now, did you receive another set of instructions or orders
after that?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; on the evening of November 21, this was the first
time that I had
attended any security meeting at all in regards to this motorcade.
At approximately 5 p.m.
I
was told to report to the conference room on the third floor, and
when I arrived at the
conference room the deputy chiefs were in there, there were members
of the Secret
Service--Mr. Sorrels, Captain Gannaway, Captain Souter of radio
patrol, and Capt. Glen
King,
deputy chiefs, assistant chiefs, and Chief Curry, and one gentleman,
who I assume was in
charge of the security for the Secret Service. This was the first
time I had attended any
conferences in regard to the security of this escort, and I listened
in on most of the
discussion
and I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy
did not desire any
motorcycle officer directly on each side of him, between him and the
crowd, but he would
want the officers to the rear. This conversation I overheard as
Chief Batchelor was using a
blackboard showing how he planned to handle this--how plans had been
made to cover the
escort.
[...]
Mr. Griffin: Was there ever any discussion that you heard about taking
precautions
designed to prevent some sort of assault on the President that would
be more severe than
simply placards, picketing, and people throwing rotten eggs and
vegetables, and things like
that?
Captain Lawrence:. Not to my knowledge, other than the fact that the
Secret Service man
in there--when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers
alongside the Presidents
car,
he said, "No, these officers should be back and if any people
started a rush toward the
car, if
there was any movement at all where the President was endangered in
any way, these officers
would be in a position to gun their motors and get between them and
the Presidential car,"
and he mentioned, of course, the security and safety of the
President and those words were
mentioned.
[...]
Mr. Griffin:. Let's go back a little bit and let me ask you--when did
you first give
instructions
to the men who were actually stationed along the route as to what
they should do?
Captain Lawrence: I gave them those instructions on the morning of
November 22 and I
had with me at the time--I had the detail with me and some notes
that I had written...
X. Asst. Chief of DPD Charles Batchelor**, Deputy Chief George L.
Lumpkin, & Deputy Chief
M.W. Stevenson---
A. 11/30/63 report to Chief Curry:
[21 H 571]
"[DPD Captain Perdue] Lawrence then said there would be four (4)
motorcycles on either side of
the motorcade immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle [as
borne out by his 11/21/63
report***]. MR. LAWSON [OF THE SECRET SERVICE] STATED THAT THIS WAS TOO
MANY, that HE
[Lawson]thought two (2) motorcycles on either side would be sufficient,
about even with the
rear fender of the President's car." [emphasis added]
B. ***DPD Captain Perdue Lawrence Exhibit re: motorcycle distribution
DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1963,
the day before the assassination [handwritten comments from 7/24/64; 20
H 489; same as HSCA JFK
Exhibit F-679]:
In addition to DPD motorcycles officers B.W. Hargis and B.J. Martin,
H.B. MCLAIN AND J.W.
COURSON WERE SLATED TO RIDE ON THE LEFT SIDE OF JFK'S LIMOUSINE. Also,
in addition to DPD
motorcycle officers D.L.Jackson and J.M. Chaney, C.A. HAYGOOD AND M.L.
BAKER WERE SLATED TO
RIDE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF JFK'S LIMOUSINE!
XI. DPD Chief Jesse Curry---
A. To the Warren Commission:
[4 H 171; bracketed comments by VP]
(included in the actual transcript is a bizarre error involving a
seemingly deliberate edit)
Mr. Curry. In the planning of this motorcade, we had
had more motorcycles lined up to be with the President's car, but
the Secret
Service didn't want that many.
Mr. Rankin.
Did they tell you why?
Mr. Curry.
We actually had two on each side but we wanted four on each side
and they
asked us to drop out some of them and back down the motorcade,
along the
motorcade, which we did. [this does not answer the question and is
repeated verbatim
below]
Mr. Rankin.
How many motorcycles did you have?
Mr. Curry.
I think we had four on each side of him.
Mr. Rankin.
How many did you want to have?
[Here it is, repeated. Notice that even this does not answer this
particular question!]
Mr. Curry.
We actually had two on each side side but we wanted four on each
side and they
asked us to drop out some of them and back down the motorcade,
along the
motorcade, which we did.
Mr. Rankin.
So that you in fact only had two on each side of his car?
Mr. Curry.
Two on each side and they asked them to remain at the rear fender
so if the
crowd moved in on him they could move in to protect him from the
crowd.
Mr. Rankin.
Who asked him to stay at the rear fender?
Mr. Curry.
I believe Mr. Lawson.
Mr. Rankin.
The Secret Service man?
Mr. Curry.
Yes, sir.
XII. Secret Service Agent Winston G. Lawson---
A. To the Warren Commission:
[4 H 338; bracketed comments by VP]
DULLES: "...do you recall that any orders were given by or on
behalf of the President with regard to the location of those
motorcycles that were particularly attached to his car?'
LAWSON: "NOT SPECIFICALLY AT THIS INSTANCE ORDERS FROM HIM."
[emphasis added---Lawson would go on to say "it was my
understanding
that he did not like a lot of motorcycles surrounding the
car",
something not borne out by very recent prior motorcades from
11/18- 11/22/63]
HSCA Volume 11, page 529:
"The Secret Service's alteration of the original Dallas Police
Department motorcycle
deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security
precautions...Surprisingly, the
security
measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit
(11/21/63) shows that the
deployment of
motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely
insecure...The Secret
Service knew
more than a day before November 22 that the President did not want
motorcycles riding alongside
or
parallel to the Presidential vehicle..."
Yet at least 6 motorcycles surrounded JFK's limousine (inc. 1-2 directly
beside him) on 3/23/63
in Chicago1, on the European tour of June-July 1963 (encompassing
Germany, Italy, & Ireland)2,
the 11/18/63 Florida trip3, and, most importanly, in San Antonio on
11/21/634, Houston on
11/21/635, and Fort Worth on the morning of 11/22/63.6
[see addendum, below, for more on Lawson and the motorcycle issue]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also:
DMN reporter Tom Dillard---"We lost our position at the airport. I
understood we were to have been quite a bit closer. We were assigned as
the prime photographic car which, as you probably know, NORMALLY A TRUCK
PRECEDES THE PRESIDENT ON THESE THINGS [MOTORCADES] AND CERTAIN
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRESS RIDE WITH THE TRUCK. In this
case, as you know, we didn't have any and this car That I was in was to
take photographs which
was of spot-news nature." [Emphasis added]. 7Dillard forcefully said the
same thing on C-Span
on 11/20/93,
telling the TV audience that the flatbed truck was "canceled at the last
minute" and they were put in Chevrolet convertibles "which totally put
us
out of the picture." [all previous trips, inc. Florida, has press/
photographers very close in front and behind JFK's limousine, inc. WH
photographer Cecil
Stoughton, who rode in the SS follow-up car from July 1963 until
11/21/638]
Henry Burroughs, AP photographer (rode in Camera Car #2)---"I was a
member of the White House
pool aboard Air Force One when we arrived with JFK in Dallas on that
fateful day. We, the pool, were dismayed to find our pool car shoved
back to about #11 position in the motorcade. We protested, but it was
too late.
>From Jim Bishop's "The Day Kennedy Was Shot" (1992 edition):
p. 133 "The ninth car was a Chevrolet convertible for White House motion
picture photographers. It was impossible to take pictures in a position
so
remote from the President. Behind it were two more automobiles with
photo-
graphers."
And
pp. 133-134 " The press was displeased with its place in the parade.
Some
felt they could have reported a better story watching the motorcade from
any of the buildings downtown. Even their wire representatives- AP, UPI,
and American Broadcasting- sitting forward in a special car, were six
hundred
feet behind the Kennedys and could see little except the Mayor of Dallas
directly ahead."
And
pp. 109-110;134 "Dr. George Burkley...felt that he should be close to
the Presi-
dent at all times... Dr. Burkley was unhappy...this time the admiral
protested. He could
be of no assistance to the President if a doctor was needed quickly."9
Seth Kantor's notes----"Will Fritz's men called off nite before by SS.
Had planned to ride
closed car w/ machine guns in car behind Pres." [which could mean
someplace behind JFK's car,
as
was the case in Chicago, IL, on 3/23/6310 & New York on 11/15/63] 11
Milton Wright, Texas Highway Patrolman (driver of Mayor Cabell's car)---
"As I recall, prior to
the President arriving at the airport we were already staged on the
tarmac. I do not recall
what position I was in at that time but it was not #1[the number taped
to his car's
windshield]. At the last minute there was a lot of
shuffling and I ended up in the 5th vehicle. My vehicle was the last to
leave downtown after
the shooting because the police set up a road block behind my car."12
General Godfrey McHugh (rode in VIP car)--- was asked to sit in a car
farther back in the
motorcade, rather than "normally, what I would do between the driver and
Secret Service agent
in charge of trip"13- he
admitted this was "unusual";14"Ordinarily McHugh rode in the
Presidential limousine in the
front seat. This was the first time he was instructed not to ride in the
car so that all
attention would be focused on the
President to accentuate full exposure."15
And, as regards the Dallas Police, in keeping with all prior motorcades
in 1963, DPD Captain
Glen King
stated that the Secret Service was primarily responsible for the
President's security, while
the role of the
DPD was a supportive one.16
ASAIC Roy Kellerman, to FBI agents' Sibert & O'Neil on the night of the
murder:
"the advanced security arrangements made for this specific trip were the
most stringent and thorough ever employed by the Secret Service for the
visit of a President to an American city" [[FBI RIF#124-10012-10239;
Kellerman would go on to deny ever saying such a thing: 18 H 707-708]
JFK, to San Antonio Congressman Henry Gonzalez on 11/21/63:
"The Secret Service told me that they had taken care of everything -
there's nothing to worry about." ["High Treason", page 127]
President Kennedy, to a concerned advance man, Marty Underwood on
11/21/63: "Marty, You worry about me too much" [Evening Magazine" video
11/22/88; interview with Marty Underwood 10/9/92]
DPD Chief Curry, "Dallas Morning News", 10/26/63 [22 H 626]:
"LARGE POLICE GUARD PLANNED FOR KENNEDY-Signs Friday pointed to the
greatest concentration of Dallas police ever for the protection of a
high-ranking dignitary when President Kennedy visits Dallas next
month...The deployment of thr special force, he said, is yet to be
worked
out with the U.S. Secret Service."
1 RIF#154-10003-10012: Secret Service Supplemental & Protective Survey
Reports
2 Stoughton films/ photos, JFK Library
3 Stoughton photos, JFK Library
4 RIF#154-10002-10424: Secret Service Final Survey Report. Also
utilized: a police helicopter
along the motorcade route and 40 members of the Military Police from Ft.
Sam
5 NBC video from 11/22/63 (depicting newsreel from previous day); still
photo, "Houston
Chronicle";11 HSCA 529 & 537; Secret Service Final Survey Report (JFK
document No.
014979)---stated that in all motorcade movements "six motorcycles
flanked the Presidential
limousine and an additional 33 motorcycles were used to flank the
motorcade and cover the
intersections."
6 "Texas News" newsreel; Stoughton photo, JFK Library (interestingly,
there is no mention in
the Fort Worth Secret Service Survey Report about the deployment of
motorcycles in the vicinity
of the Presidential limousine. Thankfully, we have the photographic
record [11 HSCA 529 &
537]).
7 6 H 163
8 "The Memories, 1961-1963" by Cecil Stoughton w/ Ted Clifton and Hugh
Sidey (1973), p. 160;
see also Stoughton's motorcade films of the trip to Italy (7/63), as
well as his still photos
from the follow-up car in Tampa, FL (11/18/63) and in Houston, TX
(11/21/63) via the JFK
Library (shown by the author at COPA 1996)
9 Burkley rode in the lead car in Miami on 11/18/63: RIF#154-10002-10422
10 RIF#154-10003-10012
11 20 H 391; see also 4 H 171-172 (Curry); 11 HSCA 530
12 9/3/98 e-mail to the author
13 For example, McHugh rode here in Tampa on 11/18/63:
RIF#154-10002-10423
14 CFTR radio (Canada) interview 1976
15 5/11/78 interview with the HSCA's Mark Flanagan (RIF#180-10078-10465
[see also 7 HSCA 14])
16 20 H 453, 463-465; see also Curry, p. 9
Addendum:
[from John Kelin's "Fair Play": review of the author's Lancer 11/22/97
conference appearance
re: agent being recalled at Love Field]
"This is different angles of [the
Kennedy motorcade] leaving Love Field," Palamara said,
as the video rolled. Using a red "laser light" pointer,
he identified various agents, and supplied narration:
"This is John Ready ... Paul Landis ... here they are,
leaving Love Field ... Henry Rybka --- thinking that
he's going to be doing what he just did the last few
stops --- this is when Emory Roberts rises in his seat
in the followup car ... and we see some hand gestures
... basically tells [Rybka] to cease and desist from
his actions. Paul Landis is even making room for him on
the followup car! And this is when you'll see Henry
Rybka ... I think a picture says a thousand words, well
this is about as close as you can get here ---" And as
the next image flickered on the screen in slow motion,
the Lancer audience rumbled in astonishment --- the
words "Wow!" and "Jesus!" leap out from my tape
recorder. For as Henry Rybka is seen being summoned
from his usual position back to the followup car, he
issues a confused palms-up gesture that seems to say,
"What gives?"
Rybka was left behind at Love Field. "And the most
amazing thing of all," Palamara continued, "is the fact
that there is not one report, not two reports, but
three reports after the fact, placing Rybka in the
followup car! But he wasn't there! Again --- either
they assumed he did hop into the car, or there was a
coverup. Take your pick..."
The clip of Rybka's confusion rolled again; I think
everyone needed to see it at least twice. "When you see
this clip normally, it's normally real time, it goes by
real quick..."
>From Peter Dale Scott's excellent "Deep Politics and the Death of JFK",
pp.
277-278:
"Another army reserve officer in Dealey Plaza may have been Winston
Lawson, the White House Secret Service agent responsible for the choice
of
the Kennedy motorcade route (4 WH 318). Lawson's first three reports of
what
happened on and before November 22 raise considerable questions about
his
performance. For example he reported that motorcycles were used on "the
right and left flanks of the President's car" (17 WH 605; cf. 17 WH 624,
18
WH 741) although photographs show that they accompanied at the rear (21
WH
768-70). Numerous later reports from the Dallas police agreed that at
Lawson's own instructions the proposed side escorts were redeployed to
the
rear of the car (7 WH 581, 3 WH 244, 18 WH 809, 21 WH 571). This change,
ostensibly for the sake of security, would appear to leave the President
more open to a possible crossfire.
Lawson also noted that "the motorcycles cleared a path to the
Parkland
Hospital" (17 WH 629), and later that his own car (the lead car, between
Lumpkin's and the President's) "assisited the motorcycles in escorting
the
President's vehicle to Parkland Hospital" (17 WH 632; cf. 21 WH 580).
These
claims are inconsistent with the radio orders on police channels to
clear a
route to Parkland (and block off the side streets), which had been
issued,
not for the President's car, but for the ambulance summoned by the
psuedo-emergency of the so-called "epileptic seizure" (23 WH 841; cf. 17
WH
368, 395).
Lawson's sworn testimony to the Warren Commission said nothing about
the
motorcycles escort; and it painteda picture even harder to reconcile
with
the orders for a route to be cleared" "We had to do some stopping of
cars
and holding our hands out the windows and blowing the sirens and the
horns
to get through" (4 WH 354). No one on the Commission asked about the
orders
on the police radio transcript, by which other cars had already been
blocked
from the route."