** Topic: Pike and the CIA? **
** Written  9:54 AM  Aug  7, 1996 by rmcgehee in cdp:soc.hist.war.v **

     The following contains some info on Douglas Pike from
CIABASE files. This item also might apply equally to Dawson's
earlier post on the U.S. media and Vietnam.

Ralph McGehee
CIABASE

Vietnam. Preeminent among group of court scholars is former USIA
officer Douglas Pike who tried to downplay NLF achievements.
Gettleman, Franklin, Young & Franklin, (95), Vietnam and America, 188

vietnam, 45-75.  Book edited by Robert Manning, 1988, war in the
shadows: the vietnam experience. a number of scholars and participants
in war wrote individual chapters of the book. the book in many aspects
is the most informative, concise and accurate of many of the books on
clandestine ops in vietnam of the special operating groups (sogs) and
cia's various programs. the u.s.'s leading wartime writer/scholar on
the vietcong, douglas pike, wrote the chapter, "the vietcong secret
war." he states liberation associations of the vc were villagers
molded into tight-knit, self-controlled, self-contained associations.
mao tse-tung of china and vo nguyen giap had called liberation
associations the initial phase and the sine qua non of their
revolutions. in 63, the vc announced that seven million south
vietnamese (generally rural civilians) had joined these associations.
pike's article avoids numbers but those massive figures were intel
community's most sacrosanct secret or most egregious failure. if CIA 
had known and/or reported the seven - million - person - strong
association structure -- it would have invalidated all U.S.
justifications for the war; ergo, no war. liberation association
members -- or to put it another way -- most of the south vietnamese --
and their dedication, caused our defeat in vietnam. victory was never
a possibility. William Colby, CIA's main man on vietnam, called the
liberation associations the skeletal organizations of no real power
that came into existence late in the fighting. (now Colby publishes a
business intelligence newsletter.) ciabase update 1/95

Book, In Retrospect, by McNamara reviewed by Chomsky. "McNamara's
`mistakes' in retrospect: a level of moral blindness that is hard to
capture in words. Chomsky quotes Bernard Fall whom [even McNamara
describes as a renowned indochina scholar and perceptive observer].
"[what changed character of the war] was the decision to wage
unlimited aerial warfare inside [south vietnam] at the price of
literally pounding the place to bits." commenting on mcnamara's
electronic barrier, U.S. government vietnamese specialist, douglas
pike said, the only "truly mass-based political party in south
vietnam" was the NLF, which had the support of about half the
population..." in McNamara's perspective the NLF scarcely exists. as
the facts pass into the elite culture, they are transmuted into the
noble u.s. effort to defend south vietnam. one of the more comical 
parts of the Pentagon Papers is the intel record after the U.S.
decided to back France in recovering its indochinese empire. u.s.
intel was directed to prove that hanoi was the puppet of the kremlin
or peiping. once established, the conclusion -- ho was a loyal slave
-- could no longer be questioned. Z Magazine magazine july/august 95
28-40

vietnam,  70-73  in the book, war in the shadows, pike outlines the
spy networks of the vietnamese communists -- his coverage of
counterespionage operations where mcgehee had a direct role are
generally accurate and detailed. communists penetrated thieu gvt at
every level and a cia study written by the courageous intel analyst
who fought cia at every step, sam adams, said the communists had
30,000 spies in thieu's gvt with a target of 50,000 in a few years.
the chapters, "dawn of the war," and "operation phoenix," are also
detailed. ciabase includes much information from the war in the
shadows. ciabase update 1/95

vietnam,  54-75  the u.s. viewed the nlf order of battle in terms of 
certain number of soldiers and weapons not a mass revolutionary
movement - and consistently underestimated number of troops and money
needed to defeat the enemy. american specialists like lansdale, trager
and pike never [understood] that hundreds of thousands of vnese
peasants would fight and die willingly, for a cause beyond themselves.
senator gravel edition, (1971). pentagon papers v 205-6

vietnam,  68   chief cause of intel failure re vn was degraded image
of enemy. second, pressure from policy-makers reinforced erroneous
assessments of allied progress and enemy capabilities. mission
restriction curtailed necessary collection activity by intel officers
and forced reliance on officers with military responsibility. this
promoted biased interpretations. pike cmttee report in facts on file
75-76, pages 82-90

vietnam,  67  the order-of-battle fight of sam adams and the cia's 
sacrificing its integrity on the altar of public relations and
political expediency. macv excluded village self-defense forces from
vci yet sdf were hardened guerrillas who responsible for 40% u.s.
casualities. pike committee investigation concluded juggling figures
"created false perceptions of enemy of u.s. forces...pressure from
policymaking officials [caused] erroneous assessments..." valentine,
d. (1990). the phoenix program 273-4

  vietnam,  68. Case Officer Ralph McGehee sent memorandum to vietnam 
station chief that documented extent of Thai insurgency and figures of vc
strength (from  books by Pike and Conley) that contradicted cia
estimates. memo was passed around for week or two and returned with no
comment. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 142

vietnam,  68-72  Shackley stuck up friendships with journalists who
sympathetic to war - robert shaplen of the new yorker, keyes beech of
the chicago daily news and later the los angeles times, and bud merick
of u.s. news and world report. douglas pike an embassy expert on the
vc met with beech and shaplen to find out what cia telling them. corn,
d. (1994). blond ghost: ted shackley and the cia's crusades 181

vietnam. douglas pike, indochina archive, 6701 san pablo ave. oakland,
ca 94608, tel: 510-642-6539, fax: 510-643-9930. we have not put any of
our collection onto internet. however, phill coleman did scan back
issues of our quarterly indochina chronology, along with many papers
written by mr. pike, into his american war library bbs. harlan cain,
is working with us to make back issues of our indochina chronology,
along with a current subscription, available on cd-rom. his company is
ropes (read only production for education and sales) based in novato,
california. texas tech vietnam study center received a substantial
part of our collection, the vietnam war section (1954-75) in paper
form, but we already have most of that material on microfiche. the
rest of the material remains here at the indochina archive. includes
among other things, historical vietnam up to 1954, communist vietnam
(drv/srv) from its inception to the present (divided into many
subcategories), cambodia, laos and south vietnam up to the present,
biographical files, graphics of all kinds, audio-visual materials. we
are trying to focus our collection now more on contemporary vietnam,
cambodia and laos, especially in terms of economic development and
prospects. overall we have around 7 million pages (very rough
estimate) of materials in the indochina archive. vietnam war on
microfiche done by university microfilms international (umi) based in
ann arbor, ichigan. sdenney uclink.berkeley.edu 6/21/96

vietnam,  49-75  chapter by douglas pike - u.s. expert on viet cong,
"the viet cong secret war," that discusses [the forbidden topic] the
vc's liberation associations - "tight-knit, self-controlled,
self-contained, sociopolitical organizations called liberation
associations." [what he does not say is that vc liberation
associations claimed membership in millions -  not an improbable
figure given nature of the organizational weapon and subsequent course
of war]. Manning, R., (ed), (1988). war in the shadows: the vietnam
experience 10.

vietnam,  47-68  see article "Douglas Pike and the NLF," by Richard
Minear. Pike an official of USIA - highly critical of Pike's thesis.
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars v2 #1 1969 44-47.

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