National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam

  Former President Dwight Eisenhower in his book, "Mandate for Change,"    
  said "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable 
  in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held 
  at the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would 
  have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader..."   
  
  60-75  Front was creation in early 60 of association of
  Ex-resistance members, formed by those who had survived the diemist
  Exterminations. Later developed into people's revolutionary party. About in
  60 a number of other organizations created - peasants associations,
  Workers, associations, and others representing youth, women, students,
  Writers, etc. Vgw 186. Front's order of battle three types: self-defense
  Guerrillas - local village units usually peasants by day and guerrillas at
  Night; regional troops on a more permanent basis - job to deal with enemy
  Forces in their region; regular army to deal with enemy's mobile reserves
  And to carry out military ops. 184,6,8. One area's land reform program. 192
  At beginning of 64 front claimed control of two thirds of territory and
  Over half population. It is gvt in everything but name with committees of
  Military affairs, external affairs, public health, culture, info and
  Education, etc. 223. Women's Liberation Association one of mass orgs
  Affiliated with NLF...within which virtually everyone from children to old
  people in liberated areas could make a contribution to struggle. Burchett,
  W. (1965). Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War 265

  56-62 Viet Cong organization of population proceeded hamlet by hamlet,
  incorporating ever-larger numbers into associations of peasants [farmers],
  women, youth. Such village organizations meant reduced rent, distribution of
  free land, freedom from both corvee labor and conscription into army,
  protection from extortion and brutality of appointed village chiefs,
  security police or army. Robert Samsom of U.S. Mission found "the Viet Cong
  land reform program possessed the universality and mass appeal that the
  Diem reform lacked." Guerrillas saw themselves "as the legitimate rulers of
  an independent Vietnam." On 12/20/60, at a secret base near Saigon, National
  Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was announced. NLF best described as
  a coalition led by party members but held together by a common program.
  Front committees were established in thousands of villages. In 2/61, PLAF
  formally organized. Southern and central branches of Lao Dong Party
  merged into central committee directorate for the south which U.S. Called
  COSVN. 75% of villagers supported front, 20% trying to remain neutral, and
  5% firmly pro-gvt. By 10/61, front so successful that gvt troops could not
  drive more than a few kilometers outside of any given provincial capital
  without running into sniper fire. M. Young.  The Vietnam Wars 
  1945-1990 pages 67-73.

  Vietnam,  54-75  The U.S. Viewed the NLF order of battle in terms of
  certain number of soldiers and weapons not a mass revolutionary movement -
  and consistently underestimated number of troops and money needed to defeat
  the enemy. American specialists like Lansdale, Trager and Pike never
  [understood] that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese peasants would 
  fight and die willingly, for a cause beyond themselves. Senator 
  Gravel edition, (1971). Pentagon papers Volume V 205-6

  Vietnam,  45-75 The U.S.'s leading wartime writer/scholar on the 
  Vietcong, Douglas Pike, said that the liberation associations of 
  the Vietcong were villagers molded into tight-knit, self-controlled, 
  self-contained associations. Mao tse-tung of China and Vo Nguyen Giap  
  called Liberation Associations the initial phase and the sine qua non 
  of their revolutions.  In 63, the Vietcong announced that seven 
  million south Vietnamese (generally rural civilians) had joined 
  these associations. Pike's article avoids numbers but those 
  massive figures were the intel community's most sacrosanct secret 
  or most egregious failure. If CIA had known and/or 
  reported the 7,000,000 person-strong association structure -- 
  it would have invalidated all U.S. justifications for the war;
  liberation association members and their dedication, caused our defeat in
  Vietnam. Victory was never a possibility.  Ciabase 1/95

  Vietnam,  67  The order-of-battle fight of Sam Adams and the CIA's
  sacrificing its integrity on the altar of public relations and political
  expediency. Macv excluded village self-defense forces from Vietcong 
  yet SDF were hardened guerrillas who responsible for 40% U.S. Casualities. 
  Pike Committee investigation concluded juggling figures "created false
  perceptions of enemy of U.S. Forces...pressure from policymaking officials
  [caused] erroneous assessments..." Valentine, d. (1990). The phoenix
  Program 273-4

  Vietnam,  68   Chief cause of intel failure re vn was degraded image of
  enemy. Second, pressure from policy-makers reinforced erroneous assessments
  of alied progress and enemy capabilities. Mission restriction curtailed
  necessary collection activity by intel officers and forced reliance on
  officers with military responsibility. House of Representatives
  Pike Committee report.

  Vietnam,  54  U.S. Subversion of Geneva agreements began immediately.
  Colonel Lansdale was already in Vietnam. His original mission, 
  to by-pass French and to work with Vietnamese in unconventional war. 
  Now he redirected to "paramilitary ops in communist areas." U.S. 
  imported one million catholic Vietnamese from north that were a resource 
  for Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale's rumors re U.S. use of nuclear weapons 
  in Vietnam. Young, m. (1991). The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990
  page 45

  U.S. Could not acknowledge Vietnam was one country and to
  ensure triumph of its creation, U.S. Sent over U.S. 400,000 combat troops
  to fight in Vietnam. None of this could be acknowledged without irreversible
  Damage to American rationale for intervention. 
  M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 page 179

  Military proceeded to misunderstand Vietnam. But in a sense
  this was necessary - to have acknowledged popular southern base of NLF, to
  Have abandoned diem in favor of a coalition gvt, would have required a
  complete reversal of U.S. Policy. In may 1960, three U.S. Special forces
  Teams arrived in Vietnam to train Vietnamese special forces for 
  counterinsurgency.  U.S. counterinsurgency entirely focused on 
  establishing control over the population. A U.S. Conference said 
  Vietnamese "are willing to support whichever side is in momentary 
  local control." Kennedy's ci experts viewed insurgency as result of 
  a byproduct of disruptive process of modernization, where a
  small band of ruthless outside agitators were able to exploit poverty and
  confusion of a passive population through propaganda and intimidation to
  seize power on behalf of communism. Young, M. 
  The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 74-7

  Vietnam,  65  Liberation (NLF) forces by mid 65 had four-fifths of
  territory and 10 out of vn's 14 million population in liberated zones. 
  There were 4,300 front "fortified villages" in SVN. Exact size of 
  front's armed forces a secret but Dang Thang Chon, v.p. Of liberation 
  youth federation said its youth org had 500,000 young members - this 
  did not include those in the local Self-defense units but half who 
  remained in villages expected to enlist in them. Burchett, W. (1965). 
  Vietnam: Inside story of the Guerrilla War 84