Dear New Dawn: (copies of posts I have made re:Vietnam) Below are copies of posts I have made to various conferences on internet re Vietnam. At the end I discuss current operations aimed at Vietnam. I believe the material after an examination is self-explanatory but if you have problems pls let me know. If necessary you may want me to review what you compile for my comments? Vietnam, Southeast Asia, 50-90. state department Study 23 of 2/48, written by George f. Kennan, stressed the U.S. must retain the lion's share of the world's resources. Policy Planning Study 51 of early 49, in fleshing out the southeast Asian part, formed the basis of U.S. containment policy towards Asia for the next twenty years. Southeast Asia's main function was to provide raw material to and a market for the to-be-reconstructed Japan and Western Europe. The U.S. Was to support Asia's "moderate" nationalists, who would then put their countries mineral wealth at the disposal of the U.S. any country that tried to divert its resources to meet domestic, nationalist needs of its own people threatened to foreclose that portion to U.S. access. The Vietnamese nationalists, however, refused to play the role assigned to them. The U.S. adopted the position "the infidel must be stopped." The Vietnam War turned the U.S. into a debtor nation, and opened the way to a trilateral world order with the European community and Japan emerging from being economic satellites to competing economic blocs. At a time of increasing national debt falling on U.S. Taxpayers, the U.S. has universalized rather than lowered its foreign policy horizons. The collapse of the Soviet anti-Christ set off a frantic search for a host of "enemies" threatening the stability of the new world order, ranging from the war on drugs to international terrorism to Islamic fundamentalism. The commitment to maintain a U.S. Edge is even greater in the face of European and Japanese challengers. Capitalist powers will always be collectively hostile to any nationalist government that attempts to move the resources of its country away from capitalist penetration and control. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, March, 95 pages 79-81. After the published criticisms by DCI Deutch and the Senate Intelligence Committee over the performance of the CIA in the last ten years I planned to write a short paper on how the problems of this decade were little different from an earlier era -- particularly as it related to the Vietnam War. But many of the issues I wanted to cover, I had already addressed in my book. To save time I have used a few extracts from the book that had been entered in CIABASE to make the arguments. (The Book, Deadly Deceits, was published in 1983 and is out of print.) The last entry below is from a book by a scholar on Vietnam -- this entry is one of many that are available on the force structures of the Viet Cong -- a structure that the CIA somehow failed to "discover." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CIA is not now nor has ever been a central intel agency. It is the covert action arm of foreign policy. It overthrows or supports foreign Gvts while reporting "intelligence" justifying those activities. It Shapes its intelligence, even in such critical areas as Soviet nuclear Weapon capability, to support policy. Disinformation is a large part Of its covert action responsibility, and the American people are The primary target audience of its lies. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly deceits page 192 Part of the CIA recruitment process for officers is personality/intel test. Agency bias is towards an "externalized, regulated, adaptive" individual. "According to this personality portrait, the CIA wants active, charming, Obedient people who can get things done in social world but have limited Perspective and understanding, who see things in black and white and don't Like to think too much." McGehee insists that strengths and weaknesses of Agency begin with selection process. Pages 6-7 In early 50's CIA drew many para-military officers from pool of nfl Rejects. Others had prior training in military. Page 13 Case officers operating in foreign countries have insular existence. Because of secrecy demands, officer associations narrow to other CIA Personnel and families. McGehee "wondered how we in the CIA could ever be Expected to understand what was happening in a foreign country when we Existed in such a rarefied world, cut off from those we were ostensibly There to help." pages 51-3 Vietnam. CIA and U.S. Intel community failed to appreciate size and nature insurgency in Vietnam. Even after communists announced the existence of the NLF and its seven million-person-strong liberation associations, CIA estimates failed to mention them. "These omissions reveal a lack of understanding of revolutionary methods and forces." page 137. Note -- in retrospect I believe top CIA officials had to be aware of the nature of the Communist "Peoples' War" but refused to admit such or to allow any reporting re this structure as this would have destroyed all of our justifications for being in Vietnam. The policy of winning in Vietnam was much more important than reporting the truth. Vietnam. "Projectile" op begun circa 68 To gather intel on nvn spy Network that had infiltrated high levels Thieu gvt. Intel from first year Very sketchy. Eventually, CIA had evidence far-reaching infiltration and Convinced U.S. And Vietnamese officials to "roll-up" the net. 50 persons Arrested in all, with 41 eventually convicted. Spies included president Thieu's special assistant for political affairs and close personal friends. This successful op was bad news for policy makers, for it proved the South Vietnamese government was hopelessly penetrated by Viet Cong. Pages 150-6 Vietnam. CIA during Vietnam conflict never got one "clear cut high-ranking Viet cong agent." CIA developed hundreds of "access agents" but many of Them were dropped for fabrication or lack of content. Colby in "honorable Men" insists that CIA gathered valuable intel from "brave" Vietnamese with High ranks in Viet Cong. Claim a sham. Page 156 Vietnam. Colby in 68 Gave speech which illuminates CIA misunderstanding of the insurgency in South Vietnam. Colby insisted the National Liberation front, NLF, the Provisional gvt of South Vietnamese, and liberation committees had made post-tet appearances, failed to attract popular support, and comprised "phantom political skeleton that the communists would use in any negotiation for a peace treaty or a cease fire." Far from being phantom structures, the communists had elaborate revolutionary networks claiming, by outside estimates, 350,000-500,000 communist party members in addition to the military and front groups. Pages 137-8 Vietnam. For chart showing NIE, SNIE, and OCI figures on Viet Cong size 55-64. All figures incredibly inaccurate. Page 136. Vietnam, 74 A few months prior to the communist victory in April 1975, CIA officers sent crucial cables directly to Langley Indicating South Vietnamese gvt disintegrating. Tom Polgar, station chief Saigon, sent priority cables ordering that the reports not be disseminated. Page 188 China, circa 71-74 U.S. Rapprochement with China and increased Chinese Anti-Sovietism caused problems for CIA's China ops. CIA had long seen China As a principal adversary. As result of contradiction, China desk simply Ignored or suppressed intel that painted China in good light. Early 70's CIA obtained Chinese document on long range policy re continents and short Range policy re individual countries. Report indicated China planned to act In way parallel to U.S. Goals. Amazingly, document not recommended for Dissemination. Our operational warriors realized that if they disseminated The report, it might stimulate some gvt leaders to question CIA's Insistence that China be on the top of its operational target list. Pages 120-1 Thailand, 73 CIA sent a forged letter allegedly from Communist Party of Thailand to the Prime Minister containing insulting offer of cease-fire in exchange for autonomy of the "liberated" areas. Initially the letter had intended effect of inciting ther Prime Minister To condemn the communists. However, a journalist traced the letter to the CIA station in Sakorn Nakorn creating barrage of anti-CIA editorials in the press and as well as anti-U.S. demonstrations. Pages 167-8 Thailand, circa 65 CIA estimated 2,500-4,000 Communist Party of Thailand in all of Thailand. The Counterinsurgency team led by McGehee estimated by end of extensive intel op that there might be that many Communists in Sakorn Nakorn Nakorn province alone. Further intel indicated that extensive commie infiltration was probably taking place in 30 Thai provinces, making official estimate highly inaccurate. McGehee who devised newer, more accurate estimates and who communicated intel on extent of the insurgency to Colby was moved off Thai ops in 67. He was punished for intelligence that contradicted high level U.S. Gvt vision of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Pages 108-15 Thailand, circa 65 CIA claimed only 2500-4000 communist insurgents in Thailand, mostly centered in northern hills. "CIA reporting insisted that The communists had no popular support and that they had to use terrorist Tactics to force peasants to cooperate with them." reality was that Insurgency was much larger and that Communist Party of Thailand was very successful in winning peasant support. Page 100 Thailand. To avoid reporting repressive U.S. Backed gvts, CIA prevents Officers from maintaining contact with general population. It sends Officers, most of whom do not know native language, on two year tours. In 30 years CIA never wrote intel report based on interview with farmer, Though Thailand is 80% farmers. Language qualified officers who develop Contacts with working classes are branded as having "gone native" and are Soon dismissed from station. Page 165-6 CIA fabricated propaganda often comes back to CIA for organization and Analyses but is not recognized as such. Net result is that CIA and other U.S. Agencies take CIA lies as truth. Example found re China. CIA broadcast Reports from Taiwan attributed to mainland that talked of thriving Resistance to cultural revolution. Broadcasts picked up by foreign Broadcast information service and included in daily booklets of Transcriptions from mainland. Page 181 Based on secrecy agreement agency may review all writings of current and Prior employees to make sure no classified info is revealed. CIA cited 397 Passages for deletion from original manuscript McGehee's "deadly deceits." Many deletions concerned info already in public domain. Agency made McGehee Produce documentation, finally allowing classified info in public domain to Be put in book. For description legal battle to publish book see McGehee, Pages 196-203 CIA is concerned about congressional committees and takes emergency Measures to forestall investigations. In one case "rising star" Said too much to the committee re Laotian ops and "opted" for early Retirement within the week. Page 84 Eventually McGehee placed on probation for voicing criticism over Southeast Asian ops. Negative comments were added to his file and He was condemned to "Langley's Siberia" doing boring Research in basement filing room. While "in exile" McGehee Composed a memo to Colby (then exec director comptroller of CIA) Outlining CIA's inaccurate and biased intel on Vietnam. Pages 178-9 56-62 Viet Cong organization of population proceeded hamlet by hamlet, incorporating ever-larger numbers into associations of peasants [farmers], women, youth. Such village organizations meant reduced rent, distribution of free land, freedom from both corvee labor and conscription into army, protection from extortion and brutality of appointed village chiefs, security police or army. Robert Samsom of U.S. Mission found "the Viet Cong land reform program possessed the universality and mass appeal that the Diem reform lacked." Guerrillas saw themselves "as the legitimate rulers of an independent Vietnam." On 12/20/60, at a secret base near Saigon, National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was announced. NLF best described as a coalition led by party members but held together by a common program. Front committees were established in thousands of villages. In 2/61, PLAF formally organized. Southern and central branches of Lao Dong Party merged into central committee directorate for the south which U.S. Called COSVN. 75% of villagers supported front, 20% trying to remain neutral, and 5% firmly pro-gvt. By 10/61, front so successful that gvt troops could not drive more than a few kilometers outside of any given provincial capital without running into sniper fire. M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 67-73. CIA and Vietnam and the Future of Intelligence My problem re CIA intelligence on Vietnam has been the belief that key Agency personnel knew of the mass-based liberation associations but deliberately did not include them in its intelligence reporting. The Agency did this as accurate intelligence would undermine its policy of creating a non-communist government in Vietnam. Instead CIA produced reams of propaganda, and propaganda under the guise of intelligence, to justify policy. My first hand encounter with the problem was with Colby when I briefed him extensively on the makeup of the liberation association of farmers in Thailand. I was pulled out of Thailand and the indisputable information on the size and existence of this structure disappeared from CIA and other government reports. This was deliberate, not a failure of intelligence or a lack of information. However, the problem was not so much Thailand, but Vietnam. If the CIA recognized the existence of the liberation association members in Thailand, then it would be forced to do the same for Vietnam -- since Thai communists learned their revolutionary lessons from schools in China and Vietnam. I agitated in Headquarters over the bad intellgience re the Thai Communist Party only to be warned that I was jeopardizing my career. Later in Headquarters I sent a compiled report of the CIA's omissions and malfeasance to the Executive Director, who was then Colby. Of course, it did no good. As I continued to protest -- I was assigned to non-significant positions where I could do little damage to established intelligence postures. In the CI Staff, I wrote a report in January 1975, that it was all over in Vietnam -- this report was ignored. A few months later I watched as we evacuated from the roof of the embassy. and knew that the Vietnam war could have been avoided with accurate intelligence. Even a top war supporter, Robert McNamara claimed that we were "wrong, terribly, terribly wrong" in Vietnam. One of the areas where we were wrong, per McNamara, is that we did not recognize the strength of nationalism motivating the Vietnamese -- a mistake of recognition we can lay directly at the feet of our Central Intelligence Agency. How the CIA could not see or accidentally ignore the sine qua non of the revolutionary forces (written about in books by all Asian revolutionaries from Mao to Amato Guerro [sp]) -- the liberation associations -- over a period of 25 years (or if you back to MAO, about 45 years) defies logic. It had to ignore the liberation associations in order to justify the Agency's policy of winning in Vietnam. I believe the historical record clearly indicates the CIA exists to implement policy and whenever truth gets in the way of that policy, it is distorted or new "truths" created to support policy. As we can now see with the appointment of the new Director of Operations, David Cohen, a man with an established record of manipulating intelligence to the requirements of his superiors, there will be further intelligence failures and foreign policy disasters. I believe until we recognize this and do something about the CIA we are doomed to repeat our failures. Ralph McGehee My name is Ralph McGehee and I am a 25-year decorated veteran of the CIA and am a critic of the Agency. I served in Vietnam in 1968-1970 as chief adviser to the Vietnamese Special Police and after leaving CIA, I wrote the book DEADLY DECEITS: MY 25 YEARS IN THE CIA. My purpose in writing is to comment on the review of Robert McNamara's book, IN RETROSPECT, that appears in The Nation's 12 June 1995 issue. I concur with the general thrust of the book review, "Bombing for the Hell of it," but disagree strongly with the repeated statements regarding the accuracy of CIA intelligence. I served in Vietnam in 1968 through mid 1970 and protested the CIA's intelligence about the war from then until the Vietnamese regained their country in April 1975. Specifically the authors of the review, Carol Brightman and Michael Uhl, state that the CIA accurately predicted the bombing of North Vietnam would not stem the flow of troops and supplies to the South. I note that the Agency at that time was merely recording that the bombing, which had gone on for some time, had proved ineffective. Not a surprising or particularly prescient conclusion in view of North Vietnam's undeniable ability to support the war in the South. Earlier, the Agency made similar claims about the bombing being ineffective -- but then urged increased bombing. The authors further argue that only the CIA had any sense of the determination and capabilities of the opposing armies. This I find an appalling statement - I have railed for over two and a half decades about the Agency's incompetence and blindness about the forces of the opposition. For my sins I was banished to "Siberia," the International Communist Branch of the Counterintelligence Staff. There, I composed a study on Asian Communist Revolutionary Structures based on the writings of Chinese, and Vietnamese leaders -- structures virtually unrecorded in CIA intelligence. I was not alone in protesting the grotesquely inaccurate intelligence. Sam Adams an intelligence analyst covering the Viet Cong vehemently protested the CIA's undercounting of their forces. His superiors threatened to fire him on thirteen occasions. He finally left the Agency in disgust and wrote an article in the 5/75 issue of Harpers magazine, "Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War with Numbers, A CIA Conspiracy Against its Own Intelligence." In one of history's most egregious intelligence failures he notes that four hours after the start of the Viet Cong's nation-wide 1968 Tet offensive, the CIA's Watch Office reported "military activity has slackened...there is nothing of significance to report." David Corn's book, BLOND GHOST, inter alia, notes that when Shackley was Chief of Station in Saigon from 1969-1972, one of his top officers complained that the CIA Station did not know what the "f..." was going on. John Stockwell, a CIA case officer said that in 1974-1975 the CIA's Chief of Station was ordering officers not to report on the failure of Nixon's Vietnamization policy. Frank Snepp, an intelligence analyst in Saigon, reported that the same Chief of Station, Tom Polgar, delayed the evacuation because he believed the Communists would allow a decent interval for the U.S. to pull out of Vietnam. This led to our final ignominy -- the helicopter evacuation off the Embassy roof. As a rebuttal I offer another review of McNamara's book -- IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM. The book is a superficial and selective mea culpa. The former Secretary of Defense claims he had little understanding of the Vietnamese and the war -- and from the perspective of 25 years -- explains all that he did (does) not know. McNamara decries the Vietnamese lack of resolve to fight, he still does not realize that they won, repelling the world's strongest military force. McNamara was the best and brightest of the "best and brightest," but his book does not cite a single communist source. The shallowness of his analysis exposes the intellectual prostitution demanded of America's elite. Asian communist leaders set forth in their writings the plans and programs of their revolutions but I doubt if any member of the best and brightest, or any officer of the CIA, ever read those writings. Sam Adams, said the Agency in undercounting the VC refused to use until late, what should have been its primary source -- captured enemy documents. In my own experience I discovered that the CIA buried any information that did not support its pro-war policies. The CIA recruited and paid agents to tell it what it wanted to hear, ignoring the mass of overt information that so disproved its rationales for the war. This practice to a major degree epitomizes CIA policy-supporting intelligence from 1947 to the present. 9/5/95 Dear Ed Moise: Thanks for the clarification - I knew that it was not a Sixty Minutes program but was produced by those who produce Sixty Minutes - have made that change. Also thanks for a copy of your excellent review of Sam's book - which I will summarize for CIABASE -- I would appreciate the date of the Journal issue and page numbers. [the documentray was "The Uncounted Enemy"]. I had talked to Sam [Sam Adams an Agency analyst on Vietnam who protested the CIA's intelligence on Vietnam and whose book was "War of Numbers" was published postumously in 93] several times over a period of years - after we both left the CIA. My argument was that no one recorded the existence of the liberation associations - the essential element of Mao's, Ho's, and the NLF's revolutions. I have appended some info re these formations. Sam could not credit the existence of these associations as he saw virtually no reporting on them. I myself have seen a few scattered references in literature by I believe, the U.S. military and CIAers, that they were told to ignore or not count the liberation associations members - and I saw no reporting on them in CIA intelligence. I believe Sam's book and documentary focused on the CIA/military OB battle. His earlier article in the May 1975 issue in Harpers blamed, appropriately I believe, the CIA for grossly underestimating the forces of the VC. The Agency was a quite reluctant apostatic participant in the conference that ended with the severe undercounting of the VC. Sam had first battled with the CIA's hierarchy to little avail. I believe the Harpers' article to be the more accurate expression of what happened. My own experience began in Thailand where I developed a project that produced information in detail about the Thai Farmers' Liberation Association - which increased the TCP's numbers many fold and showed an aspect of the TCP never before covered in CIA reports. After being credited by all - the undeniable information was buried. I did not realize it until a few years later that the Agency could not accept these reports of the mass-based revolutionary organizations without undermining all U.S. stated positions re Vietnam. I fought internally from 1967 until I left in 1977 to change our reporting on Thailand and Vietnam. To prove my case I composed a study on revolutionary structures based primarily on the writings of Asian revolutionaries - Mao, Ho, Amado Guerro, Kaysone Phomvihane and others. All essentially described building a revolutionary structure first in the villages by forming liberation associations of women, farmers, youth and others. While in tHE Agency I poured over CIA intelligence forward and backward until 1977, looking for references to liberation associations - none were to be found. The only reference I believe I ever saw of an Agency person mentioning these associations was a claim in Colby's book that the liberation associations were skeletal organizations of little consequence that made their appearance late in the war. This was the same Colby that I had briefed in Northeast Thailand on the liberation associations of the TCP, the same Colby that I protested to when he was exo of the CIA, and in my eyes a major miscreant in drawing us into and keeping us in the Vietnam war. He was not alone of course, the Agency in my view, exists to implement policy and when intelligence interferes with policy - it is either buried or bent, or created, to support policy. Many want to blame President Johnson for refusing to accept bad news. But the history of CIA's involvement began in the early 50s with lies and never ended - Johnson was trapped by the world's view -- to a major degree the product of CIA propaganda and intelligence operations. I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on this matter. Regards, Ralph McGehee The below is from CIABASE files: Vietnam, 54-75 The U.S. Viewed the NLF order of battle in terms of certain number of soldiers and weapons not a mass revolutionary movement - and consistently underestimated number of troops and money needed to defeat the enemy. American specialists like Lansdale, Trager and Pike never [understood] that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese peasants would fight and die willingly, for a cause beyond themselves. Senator Gravel edition, (1971). Pentagon papers Volume V 205-6 Vietnam, 45-75 The U.S.'s leading wartime writer/scholar on the Vietcong, Douglas Pike, said that the liberation associations of the Vietcong were villagers molded into tight-knit, self-controlled, self-contained associations. Mao tse-tung of China and Vo Nguyen Giap called Liberation Associations the initial phase and the sine qua non of their revolutions. In 63, the Vietcong announced that seven million south Vietnamese (generally rural civilians) had joined these associations. Pike's article avoids numbers but those massive figures were the intel community's most sacrosanct secret or most egregious failure. If CIA had known and/or reported the 7,000,000 person-strong association structure -- it would have invalidated all U.S. justifications for the war; liberation association members and their dedication, caused our defeat in Vietnam. Victory was never a possibility. Ciabase 1/95 Vietnam, 67 The order-of-battle fight of Sam Adams and the CIA's sacrificing its integrity on the altar of public relations and political expediency. Macv excluded village self-defense forces from Vietcong yet SDF were hardened guerrillas who responsible for 40% U.S. Casualities. Pike Committee investigation concluded juggling figures "created false perceptions of enemy of U.S. Forces...pressure from policymaking officials [caused] erroneous assessments..." Valentine, d. (1990). The phoenix Program 273-4 Vietnam, 68 Chief cause of intel failure re vn was degraded image of enemy. Second, pressure from policy-makers reinforced erroneous assessments of alied progress and enemy capabilities. Mission restriction curtailed necessary collection activity by intel officers and forced reliance on officers with military responsibility. House of Representatives Pike Committee report. Vietnam, 54 U.S. Subversion of Geneva agreements began immediately. Colonel Lansdale was already in Vietnam. His original mission, to by-pass French and to work with Vietnamese in unconventional war. Now he redirected to "paramilitary ops in communist areas." U.S. imported one million catholic Vietnamese from north that were a resource for Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale's rumors re U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Young, m. (1991). The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 page 45 56-62 Viet Cong organization of population proceeded hamlet by hamlet, incorporating ever-larger numbers into associations of peasants [farmers], women, youth. Such village organizations meant reduced rent, distribution of free land, freedom from both corvee labor and conscription into army, protection from extortion and brutality of appointed village chiefs, security police or army. Robert Samsom of U.S. Mission found "the Viet Cong land reform program possessed the universality and mass appeal that the Diem reform lacked." Guerrillas saw themselves "as the legitimate rulers of an independent Vietnam." On 12/20/60, at a secret base near Saigon, National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was announced. NLF best described as a coalition led by party members but held together by a common program. Front committees were established in thousands of villages. In 2/61, PLAF formally organized. Southern and central branches of Lao Dong Party merged into central committee directorate for the south which U.S. Called COSVN. 75% of villagers supported front, 20% trying to remain neutral, and 5% firmly pro-gvt. By 10/61, front so successful that gvt troops could not drive more than a few kilometers outside of any given provincial capital without running into sniper fire. M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 67-73. U.S. Could not acknowledge Vietnam was one country and to ensure triumph of its creation, U.S. Sent over U.S. 400,000 combat troops to fight in Vietnam. None of this could be acknowledged without irreversible Damage to American rationale for intervention. M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 page 179 Military proceeded to misunderstand Vietnam. But in a sense this was necessary - to have acknowledged popular southern base of NLF, to Have abandoned diem in favor of a coalition gvt, would have required a complete reversal of U.S. Policy. In may 1960, three U.S. Special forces Teams arrived in Vietnam to train Vietnamese special forces for counterinsurgency. U.S. counterinsurgency entirely focused on establishing control over the population. A U.S. Conference said Vietnamese "are willing to support whichever side is in momentary local control." Kennedy's ci experts viewed insurgency as result of a byproduct of disruptive process of modernization, where a small band of ruthless outside agitators were able to exploit poverty and confusion of a passive population through propaganda and intimidation to seize power on behalf of communism. Young, M. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 74-7 Vietnam, 60-75 Front was creation in early 60 of association of Ex-resistance members, formed by those who had survived the diemist Exterminations. Later developed into people's revolutionary party. About in 60 a number of other organizations created - peasants associations, Workers, associations, and others representing youth, women, students, Writers, etc. Vgw 186. Front's order of battle three types: self-defense Guerrillas - local village units usually peasants by day and guerrillas at Night; regional troops on a more permanent basis - job to deal with enemy Forces in their region; regular army to deal with enemy's mobile reserves And to carry out military ops. 184,6,8. One area's land reform program. 192 At beginning of 64 front claimed control of two thirds of territory and Over half population. It is gvt in everything but name with committees of Military affairs, external affairs, public health, culture, info and Education, etc. 223. Women's Liberation Association one of mass orgs Affiliated with NLF...within which virtually everyone from children to old people in liberated areas could make a contribution to struggle. Burchett, W. (1965). Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War 265 Vietnam, 65 Liberation (NLF) forces by mid 65 had four-fifths of territory and 10 out of vn's 14 million population in liberated zones. There were 4,300 front "fortified villages" in SVN. Exact size of front's armed forces a secret but Dang Thang Chon, v.p. Of liberation youth federation said its youth org had 500,000 young members - this did not include those in the local Self-defense units but half who remained in villages expected to enlist in them. Burchett, W. (1965). Vietnam: Inside story of the Guerrilla War 84 THE CIA AND VIETNAM [book reviews by McGehee] McNamara, Robert Strange. (1995). IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM. NY: Times Books. A superficial and selective mea culpa. The former Secretary of Defense claims our governing elite had little understanding of the Vietnamese and the war -- and from the perspective of 25 years -- explains all that they did (do) not know. McNamara decries the Vietnamese lack of resolve to fight, he still does not realize that they won, repelling the world's strongest military force. McNamara was the best and brightest of the "best and brightest," but his book does not cite a single communist source. The shallowness of his analysis exposes the intellectual prostitution demanded of America's academic elite. Asian communist leaders set forth in their writings the plans and programs of their revolutions but I doubt if any member of the best and brightest, or any officer of the CIA, ever read or, if so, understood those writings. Sam Adams, a CIA analyst, who fought the CIA at every step, said the Agency in undercounting the VC refused to use until late, what should have been its primary source -- captured enemy documents. In my own experience I discovered that the CIA buried any information that did not support its pro-war policies. The CIA recruited and paid agents to tell it what it wanted to hear, ignoring the mass of overt information that so disproved its rationales for the war. This practice epitomizes Agency operations from the beginning to the present. David Corn, BLOND GHOST: TED SHACKLEY AND THE CIA'S CRUSADES, published by Simon & Schuster in New York in 1994. This is one of the few excellent books on the CIA. Corn follows the career of Theodore Shackley from the environs of Cold War Berlin, to various other world hot spots as he tries to overthrow Castro's Cuba and we end up in a near nuclear conflag- ration with the Soviets; to Laos where he directs CIA's hilltribe Hmong guerrillas to act like regular troops -- leading to their destruction; to Vietnam where after three years of Shackley-declared "intelligent successes" [one high-level officer says "it seems pretty obvious Saigon (CIA) doesn't know what the fuck's going on"] he leaves for another adventure elsewhere. His can-do persona convinces the CIA's hierarchy of his ability and he progresses up the career ladder. Shackley's legacy lives today in the CIA's like-thinking, can-do, tunnel-visioned, rigid-thinking, team players. One of the more disturbing aspects of Corn's book is the claimed recognition at the time by various high-level CIA officials that our intelligence on Vietnam was at best, of no value, and at worst manipulated to show non-existent progress -- yet none of these officials protested. Robert Manning, (Editor-in-Chief, 1988). WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE. Boston Publishing Company, Boston, MA. A number of scholars and participants in the war wrote individual chapters of WAR IN THE SHADOWS. The book in many aspects is the most informative, concise and accurate of many of the books on Vietnam in regard to the clandestine operations of the Special Operating Groups (SOGs) and the CIA's various programs. The United States' leading wartime writer/scholar on the Vietcong, Douglas Pike, wrote the chapter, "The Vietcong Secret War." He states the liberation associations of the VC were villagers molded into tight-knit, self-controlled, self-contained associations. Mao Tse-tung of China and Vo Nguyen Giap of Vietnam called liberation associations the initial phase and the sine qua non of their revolutions. In 1963, the VC announced that seven million South Vietnamese (generally rural civilians) had joined these associations. Pike's article avoids numbers but those massive figures were the intelligence community's most sacrosanct secret or most egregious failure (one that I have rallied against for a quarter of a century). If the CIA had known and/or reported the seven-million-person-strong association structure -- it would have invalidated all U.S. justifications for the war and revealed that the war was an American invasion of that country. Liberation association members -- or to put it another way -- most of the South Vietnamese -- and their dedication, caused our defeat in Vietnam. Victory was never a possibility. William Colby, the CIA's main man on Vietnam, called the liberation associations the skeletal organizations of no real power that came into existence late in the fighting. In WAR IN THE SHADOWS, Pike outlines the spy networks of the Vietnamese communists -- his coverage of counterespionage operations where I had a direct role are generally accurate and detailed. The communists penetrated the Thieu Government at every level and a CIA study written by the courageous intelligence analyst who fought the CIA at every step, Sam Adams, said the communists had 30,000 spies in Thieu's government with a target of 50,000 in a few years. The Chapters, "Dawn of the War," and "Operation Phoenix," are also detailed. Recent info The National Endowment for Democracy in Vietnam. On 14 august 1995, Vietnam sentenced nine pro-democracy activists, including two U.S. Citizens, to prison for subversion. One was Nguyen Dinh Huy who led a U.S.-based group called the Movement to Unite the People and Build Democracy. Huy, was a former newspaper editor and activist in the zealously Anti-communist Dai Viet Party (A Dai Viet Party was funded by the CIA during the war). His group organized a conference on development and democracy to be held in Hanoi in 11/93. He and six others were arrested the day before the conference was to begin. Two other defendants were arrested this year. The conference enraged Vietnam's leadership because some of the top U.S. officials during the war were invited: William Colby (of CIA's Phoenix Program), General William Westmoreland and retired General John Vessey. The Washington Times 8/15/95 A1,6.October 2, 1995 No I am not saying that human rights violations listed by Amnesty International do not exist. The National Endowment for Democracy is using human rights violations as a catch phrase for intervening in other governments for the purpose of modifying or overturning those governments -- just as NED's counterpart the CIA used "communist conspiracies" as an excuse to overthrow even anti-communist governments. NED is most rigorous in its operations where the U.S. has a key interest in changing targeted governments. In the past the CIA removed popular governments in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, and numerous other countries while proclaiming it operated to fight the "International Communist Conspiracy," or related themes -- and then empowered despotic rulers which were horrendous in their violations of human rights. We did not generate an outcry of human rights violations once we achieved our goals. I do not include a case by case statement which is well-documented in William Blum's book, "Killing Hope," and in other numerous studies. The evidence is all there, but an open mind and the courage to examine old perceptions is required as well as the determination to penetrate the ideological fog of generations of propaganda. Ralph McGehee 9/30/95 "Human Rights the New International Communist Conspiracy." To justify all of the multiple and massive covert operations of the CIA during the Cold War, it used the "International Communist Conspiracy," etc. as an excuse for overturning governments. With the end of the that war, another excuse had to be found -- and that, of course, is the violation of human rights. Such violations apparently occur everywhere but in the U.S. and its associated governments. To continue our briefly interrupted policy of defeating China's government, the U.S., inter alia, sponsors Harry Wu's Laogai Foundation. Harry ends up being arrested by the Chinese authorities as a U.S. agent. Hillary's visit rescues him from a 15-year prison term. To improve policies in Vietnam, we send William Colby (of Phoenix fame), (Search and Destroy) Westmoreland and General John Vessey. The U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy, a surrogate CIA, per its latest newsletter, awarded 300 grants for programs in some eighty countries. It is my guess that we find human rights abuses in virtually all eighty countries. Ralph McGehee CIABASE