The below debate follows from the op-ed given herewith. The responses and rebuttal are at the end. Ralph McGehee CIABASE COLBY'S VIETNAM: HISTORY MISREPRESENTED The following are excerpts from my op-ed that ran in the Washington Post on 5/1/81. It is being posted now in light of efforts to eulogize Colby. More importantly the details represent programs for action that the CIA follows, to one degree or another, in most of its political operations: empowering a foreign group that sells itself to the CIA and creates a government subservient to the United States. Agency operations generally empower a small minority group -- this could be military leaders, the rich, ethnic or religious minorities, or some leader or group responsive to CIA subversion. The below information also demonstrates how the CIA writes politicized intelligence in support its operations. This is standard operating procedure and a primary reason for its long record of intelligence failures. Since the CIA is basically a covert action agency, efforts to reform it, as demonstrated recently following the Aldrich Ames and other scandals, are pre-ordained to fail. COLBY'S VIETNAM: HISTORY MISREPRESENTED Former CIA director William Colby's article "El Salvador: Which Vietnam"? [op-ed, 4/20/81] describes the various stages of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and offers the period 1968 to 1972--the era of the CIA "Phoenix" assassination teams--as a model for use in El Salvador. In addition to this heinous recommendation, his article ignores the massive evidence of the Pentagon Papers and grossly distorts the facts. According to Colby, a prime architect of U.S. policy in Vietnam, America's role in that country began in 1960. This "first" stage lasted until 1963. This era "marked the start of Hanoi's effort to overthrow the South." Colby's statement contains two major misrepresentations. U.S. involvement started in 1945, not 1960, when we sponsored French attempts to reimpose their colonial rule over Indochina. The second major misstatement relates to Hanoi's role in 1960. All objective Vietnamese experts attest to the great reluctance of the North Vietnamese to challenge U.S. power in South Vietnam. However, both the CIA's intelligence and a State Department white paper claimed the opposite was true. From that point forward until April 1975, the war, in U.S. intelligence reports, was portrayed as a North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam. Colby forgets to mention that the CIA created the Diem regime. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in early 1954, the CIA plucked Ngo Dinh Diem out of obscurity in the United States and established him as the ruler of South Vietnam. He arrived in Saigon in mid-1954, controlling nothing except the complete dedication of CIA's covert action warriors. Even President Eisenhower questioned Diem's viability and admitted that Ho Chi Minh and his government commanded the loyalty of 80 percent of all Vietnamese. Using the 1954-1955 Geneva-Conference-imposed cease-fire, the CIA ran propaganda and covert operations in North Vietnam--including the implied threat of nuclear destruction--to scare and lure the minority Catholic population to migrate south. Once in South Vietnam, the CIA and the U.S. military formed them into an army, police force and government for Diem. Catholic Vietnamese never represented more than 10 percent of South Vietnam's total population but under Diem, a co-religionist, that small group enjoyed all status and privileges. Through a series of operations the CIA managed to capture control of Saigon for Diem, and the Agency issued a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that omitted any reference to it role in Diem's success. The SNIE proclaimed that Diem alone was responsible for his victory. Concurrent with the release of that false information, the CIA conducted a worldwide disinformation campaign portraying Diem as the miracle worker who saved South Vietnam. From 1955 to 1960 Diem, pushed by his U.S. advisers, attempted to assert his authority over rural South Vietnam. His minions killed, tortured and imprisoned tens of thousands who resisted his unfair rule. It was this vicious repression that eventually forced the North Vietnamese to join with their compatriots in the South to fight against Diem and his U.S. backers. Colby's second "Vietnam" from 1964 to 1968 is the common perception of Vietnam. "Instructed to find, fix and fight the enemy [American servicemen] reacted with frustration and frequently fury before an enemy that only occasionally could be found." One cannot disagree with that alliterative statement. The third "Vietnam" appears between 1968 and 1972. Colby, giving himself all credit, reserves his praise for this era--a time when he served as director of the multi-agency Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) mission. He states the rural countryside was "rebuilt and pacified by a reliance upon village participation in defense and development....The combat was turned on the secret political enemy..." Here he is referring to the CIA's Phoenix program that sought out and killed or captured political opponents of Thieu's U.S.-backed dictatorship. Colby forgets to mention other realities of that era, the free-fire zones, the napalming, the bombing, the search-and destroy missions, and all the other attendant horrors of the U.S. fighting politicized civilians. The fourth "Vietnam" appears from 1973 until 1975, "when South Vietnamese tactical errors...led this time to the total collapse before the oncoming North Vietnamese armor, artillery and regular forces...." Colby's article does not question the legitimacy of the current El Salvadoran government or remark on the cause of opposition to that government. Colby, on the basis of his incomparable experience and research, goes on to recommend a program for action in El Salvador offering the "Vietnam" of 1968 to 1972 as a positive model. In other words, bring back the CIA assassination teams, bomb, napalm, search and destroy. One can but wonder at his suggestion. End of the op-ed. Ralph McGehee Today the CIA is trying to overthrow the governments of China, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Vietnam again, and numerous other countries. Details of these operations are provided in CIABASE -- a computerized data base on the CIA. For further information please send an e-mail query to rmcgehee@igc.apc.org Response 1 of 2 The often cited 80% support enjoyed by Ho Chi Minh was no guarantee that his government would not subsequently make mistakes or engage in abuses of power. Nor does that figure shed much light on how that level of support had been obtained and would be maintained. RMG> Using the 1954-1955 Geneva Conference imposed cease-fire, the CIA RMG> ran propaganda and covert operations in North Vietnam--including the RMG> implied threat of nuclear destruction--to scare and lure the minority RMG> Catholic population to migrate south. Once in South Vietnam, the CIA RMG> and the U.S. military formed them into an army, police force and RMG> government for Diem. Catholic Vietnamese never represented more than RMG> 10 percent of South Vietnam's total population but under Diem, a RMG> co-religionist, that small group enjoyed all status and privileges. If those Catholics had stayed in the North, they would have likely added to the number of those executed or otherwise victimized in the Land Reform. What do you think of that hypothesis? I do not doubt that the CIA conducted propaganda operations in the North between 54-55, just questioning the necessity and effectiveness of those operations. In other words, many who were politically not in agreement with Ho Chi Minh's government were not necessarily incapable of autonomous judgement, nor were they for that reason necessarily subservient to foreigners such as the U.S.. Minhtri Truong response 2 of 2 June 26, 1996 by EEMOISE@CLEMSON.EDU in cdp:soc.hist.war.v ** COLBY'S VIETNAM: HISTORY MISREPRESENTED . . . RMG> Even President Eisenhower questioned Diem's RMG> viability and admitted that Ho Chi Minh and his government commanded RMG> the loyalty of 80 percent of all Vietnamese. Ralph - This is a slight exaggeration of what Eisenhower admitted. He said that in a two-way race against the Chief of State of the government the US was supporting, Bao Dai, the Viet Minh would have won, getting "possibly" as much as eighty percent of the votes. But one must bear in mind that in a two-way race, there will be some who dislike both sides. Getting eighty percent of the votes in a two-way race would not have implied that Ho Chi Minh commanded the loyalty of eighty percent of the total population. Certainly Ho did have the loyalty of a large majority of the population. Ed Moise In response to both Minhtri Truong and Ed Moise - I quote from Eisenhower's book, "Mandate for Change," page 372. This re the 1953-1954 period in Vietnam. "I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military situation in Vietnam. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the fighting, possibly 80% of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among the Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for." Ironically the CIA-sponsored and manipulated plebiscite of 1955 ran Bao Dai against Ngo Dinh Diem -- and Diem won with a "98%" plurality. Bao Dai was out of country at the time and was not permitted to return to campaign. Ho Chi Minh of course was not on the ballot. Minhtri Truong states that [some Vietnamese] were not necessarily incapable of autonomous judgement. The Pentagon Papers describe the CIA's assortment of propaganda and other campaigns to lure and scare the Catholic Vietnamese to the South. One was the threat of U.S. nuclear bombing of the North. The many rural Catholics, or many people, were or are, unaccustomed to the CIA's sophisticated deceptions -- an undoubtedly believed what they were being told. [I living in the U.S. and millions of other Americans were equally deceived by the same sort of propaganda that found its way into our media]. The Land Reform excesses of Communist North Vietnam may have been exaggerated beyond belief. It has been reported that the CIA was behind publications that posit the theme of land reform abuses. There has been a long-standing debate over this issue which is too complicated and long for this short message. One scholar, Gareth Porter, wrote an informative monograph: "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered," published by Cornell University's IREA Project. Professor Moise makes the point that getting eighty percent of the votes in a two-way race would not have implied that Ho Chi Minh commanded the loyalty of the eighty percent of the total population. I agree. But what course did we follow -- we ran a relatively unknown, Ngo Dinh Diem, in a two-man race, and manipulated and probably dictated the 98 percent results. So although Ho Chi Minh may not have commanded the total loyalty of 80 percent of the people, Diem in reality probably commanded the loyalty of only tiny minority -- maybe less than 10 percent. Ralph McGehee