From: Ralph McGehee Subject: CIA and the Fall of Saigon Date: Fri, 31 Oct 1997 ------------------------------------------ Response to the below: >From lde421@aol.com Thu Oct 30 15:22:45 1997 >Newsgroups: soc.history.war.vietnam >To: rmcgehee@igc.apc.org (Ralph McGehee) >Subject: Re: Request for Information >What in particular in January 1975, while a Congressional delegation was > visiting Vietnam and visiting various outposts, what was it that month that > caused you almost alone to predict what would happen. Did Bill Johnson or Pat > Johnson agree with you at that time at the base in Bien Hoa? Did Polgar at > the Station in Saigon? Did Pete McCloskey or Millicent Fenwick or any of the > visiting delegation -- did you speak with any of them? Did you know that Van > Tien Duong was moving three divisions into position around Ban Me Thuot more > than a month later? What was it at that time, what special antenna did you > have that in that particular month gave you that feeling? By the way, more > people were evacuated by commercial and military airplanes from Tan Son Nhut > and by boat and barge than from the roof of the US Embassy, if it matters. > Far far far more. To: Anon -- LDE421: From page 187-188 of my book: "In November 1974 two draft intelligence reports came across my desk indicating the South Vietnamese government was disintegrating. The reports originated from the station's southern regional base called ROIC IV....But in this case, in order to avoid the station chief's censorship, two brave case officers, supported by the ROIC, cabled reports directly to Headquarters....I read them in amazement, as they contradicted everything the station was trying to sell...The first report gave a year's statistics on the number of South Vietnamese military and civilian government employees from one province who either defected to the Viet Cong or deserted -- one-third in a year. The second report said government forces in one southern province controlled only the capital of the province, with all the remaining area controlled by the communists. When he heard what happened, Tom Polgar, the Chief of Station, fired off priority cables to Headquarters virtually ordering it not to disseminate the information; it did not. He also wrote cables to the authors of the reports, ridiculing them for submitting unsubstantiated, poorly sourced, gloomy, inaccurate information and laying out guidelines that would make further such reporting impossible. Among the guidelines was an instruction that the case officer must personally travel to every area he claimed was controlled by communists to verify his statement. Of course, [if he did] he would have been captured or killed. When I saw the intelligence and Polgar's angry reaction....I did try to call attention to the information in the reports. I extrapolated it to apply to a lesser or greater degree to other areas of Vietnam and included my own assessment of the strength of the South Vietnamese Communist organizations and North Vietnamese forces. I put all of this in an end-of-year report that was disseminated only to the DDO and the Chief of the East Asia Division. My report said the government of South Vietnam was in grave danger of imminent collapse." For additional information on Polgar's actions in that period please see Frank Snepp's book, Decent Interval. Ralph McGehee CIABASE --------------------------- end --------------------------------------