From: Ralph McGehee Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 ========================================================================== Review and Commentary by Ralph McGehee Mark Moyar's book, "Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong." Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. The book presents a thorough description of the development of the Phoenix program and its administrative structure. I served in the program in Vietnam and never understood all the lines charts and control channels which were extremely complicated. Mr. Moyar's presentation of this seems generally accurate and is the most detailed available. But his reliance on William Colby raises serious questions of objectivity: "The late William Colby read through my thesis carefully and offered valuable suggestions for improving it." Colby, once the Chief of Station in Saigon, and later the head of the Phoenix program and then DCI of CIA, in my estimation was a number one propagandist or misinformationalist for the war -- making parts of the book suspect. The description of the period from 1945 to 1955 generally ignores the massive U.S. role assisting the French to re-colonize Vietnam. His coverage of the creation South Vietnam, in the mid-1950s, barely mentions the overriding role played by the United States in generating the migration of the North Vietnamese Roman Catholic Vietnamese to South Vietnam and in creating the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. The book portrays rather effectively the revolutionary procedures of the Viet Cong in organizing the rural population into liberation associations -- but his presentation implies those developments occurred much later and were more limited than claimed by the National Liberation Front. The Communists openly declared in 1963 that they had seven million people in the various liberation associations throughout South Vietnam -- a figure never acknowledged by the CIA and other intelligence agencies, nor apparently by Mr. Moyar. (Comment: This is one reason why the CIA today is so resistant to using open-source information -- the results cannot be controlled as is information from recruited agents.) Interestingly Colby in his book, Honorable Men, gave a different history of the NLF and said: In (1968?) Komer asked me to prepare a briefing for the September MACV commanders conference, with all leading American military and civilian chiefs in attendance, describing the nature of the war in the countryside and the enemy there. To that audience I set forth something different from the usual rundown of communist main- and local force battalions....I outlined instead the structure and functions of the Lao Dong Party and its southern section, named the People's Revolutionary Party, the National Liberation Front, the Provisional Government of South Vietnam, the liberation committees and the National Alliance of Democratic Forces, which had made post-Tet (1968) appearances. I pointed out that these failed to attract much popular support, but they nevertheless were the phantom political skeleton that the Communists would use in any negotiation for a peace treaty or cease-fire. Colby also, in congressional testimony denied -- to some degree that the Phoenix program was an assassination program -- something contradicted by details in Mr. Moyar's book. Mr. Moyar describes the CIA's leading agent in Vietnam, "Hackle," whom as I recall passed CIA many leading party documents. Hackle declined to leave Vietnam as the war ended and some CIA officers suspect that he was a Communist double-agent. If so he resembles the World War II agent for the German's, "Cicero," who proclaimed he merely provided the Germans with a description of the noose that was going to hang them. Indeed the CIA did acquire Secret Communist proclamations all outlining their assurances of final victory. I suspect strongly that these documents were meant by the Communists to be read and understood by the Americans. The book's discussion of the Communist penetration agents of the Viet Cong to me is very misleading and inaccurate. He announces that those who claim the U.S. or the South Vietnamese did not have many penetrations into the Communist movement are wrong. He then goes on to describe how Sam Adams estimates that the Communists had 30,000 spies in Thieu's Government was also wrong: CIA officer Rudolph (Rudy) Enders a CIA officer in Vietnam from 66-72, examined Sam Adams calculations that their being 30,000 Communist agents in the GVN. "Sam got this information from reading the captured documents but those documents were worthless. The Communists lied to their superiors." My own experience was quite different -- my group rounded-up nearly 40 spies in Thieu's Government -- from his Foreign Affairs Adviser, to his National Catholic representative who was one of Thieu's closest confidants. The round-up and interrogation of this net, led to the round-up of other Communist espionage nets in South Vietnam. We operated only in Saigon -- extrapolating from these numbers to apply to all of South Vietnam, gives credence to the 30,000 figure. The book makes sweeping statements re the loyalties of the South Vietnamese "I discovered that the majority of villagers actually favored the Saigon government over the Viet Cong during the latter years of the war." This ignores the realities of the war -- and a point by point rebuttal is warranted but would take too much time. Extracts from the book: 47-97 Vietnam war was an exercise in gentility (sic). Viet Cong had almost no part in the North VNese offensive of 75. Moyar "discovered that the majority of villagers favored the government over the VC in latter years of war." William Colby read through my thesis carefully and offered valuable suggestions for improving it. 47-75 one of the VCI's first tasks in gaining control was the recruitment of villagers into mass political organizations, such as the Liberation Farmer Association, Liberation Youth Association, or People's Committee or into the guerrillas. Liberation Farmer Association was the most important, for the Party distributed land through it. Most VC personnel came from mass organizations. They tried to get most of the young males to joint the local forces -- a stepping stone to the main and local forces. The VCI employed women, children and the elderly to carry out menial tasks. Between 1961 through 1964 the VC depended almost exclusively on recruits from the South Vietnamese rural population. Only at the end of 1964 did the North VNese Army enter South Vietnam in force. The VCI recruited and utilized many informants and agents in the GVN armed forces, police, and civil service. Many VC had relatives serving in the GVN, and they were invariably the most willing and most reliable spies. Legal and Illegal cadres explained. More details in the Chapter -- The Shadow Government and the People. Comment: The Communists openly declared in 1963 that they had seven million people in the various liberation associations throughout South Vietnam -- a figure never acknowledged by the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Sam Adams, a CIA analyst on Vietnam found a Communist document that said they controlled six-million people -- this figure was ignored.) 47-75 Diem's Cong An -- later called the Special Police. The CIA advised and supported the Special Police and USAID advised other elements of the police. The territorial forces advised by CIA. The "agrovilles," program abandoned in early 1961. In 1962, the strategic hamlet program begun had short-lived success. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) funded by CIA and staffed with Special Forces soldiers. After Diem was gone the CIA assumed responsibility for the burgeoning pacification programs. One CIA innovation was the Static Census Grievance Program. The CIA established a provincial Interrogation Center in each province. The Special Police staffed the centers under the supervision of CIA advisers. CIA's Revolutionary Development Cadre. The RD cadres did not accomplish much. Counter-Terror Teams, which the CIA controlled completely captured or killed the VCI. In late 66, the teams renamed the Provincial Reconnaissance Units. The PRU program was the only one over which the Americans had direct command authority. The Kit Carson Scouts, the National Police Field Forces, the Marine Combined Action Platoons. The GVN stood no chance of mobilizing the rural masses through political action. 63-75 Chapter, The New Attack on the Shadow Government. Komer, Colby -- CORDs created in May 1967 -- Civil Operations and Rural Development Support -- it became part of Westmoreland's MACV. CORDS reached its peak size at the end of 1969 with 6,400 military personnel and 1000 civilians, then shrank and gradually disappeared at the end of 1972. CIA's province officers in charge and region officers in charge maintained independent control of CIA pacification advisers. Komer did share control of CIA's pacification division -- known as RD Cadre Division - with John Hart, the COS in Saigon. Lewis Lapham was the Division head. Other CIA personnel Robert Wall, Nelson Brickham, Evan J. Parker, Jr. The creation of Intel Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) the responsibility of CIA. DIOCCs At the end of 1967, 39 provinces had ICEX committees. One hundred three Districts had District Intelligence and Operations Centers - DIOCCs. In early 1968 the program renamed Phoenix. After Tet 68 and by the end of 1968, most of SVN's 239 districts had Phoenix Centers. The formation of Province Intel and Ops Coordination Centers (PIOCCs). All provinces had PIOCCs by the end of 69. Thieu issued a supporting decree late - not until July 1968. At the end of 68, the CIA began reducing its direct involvement in Phoenix wile MACV took increasing control. On 1 July 1969, the CIA relinquished responsibilities to the staff of CORDS, and made only minor contributions thereafter. By the middle of 1972, the Phoung Hoang advisers all departed. 55-75 the best CIA agent in the VC was "Hackle," in Tay Ninh Province. He now suspected of being a double agent for he chose not to leave after the war. CIA case officers recruited agents within the GVN who gave them info about VC in the villages and GVN intentions. Many had good contacts with others in the GVN in the villages and served as principal agents. Tom Polgar, CIA station Chief from 72- to the end. A large number of CIA's agents in the GVN worked for the Special Police. CIA advisers recruited single members of the police. Lew Lapham, who replaced John Hart as CIA station Chief from 68-69 said "recruiting agents unilaterally was almost impossible." Informants and agents seldom were willing to disclose all of their knowledge about the secret government. Bruce Lawlor, a CIA case officer who spoke Vietnamese fluently, saw this when he was in I corps during the early 70s. Daniel Mudrinich, CIA's IV Corps region officer in charge from 69-71 re informants. Daren Flitcroft top CIA officer in III Corps from 68-70 said the Special Police were less interested in penetrations than CIA. Rex Wilson, a CIA officer in An Xuyen and Bac Lieu from 70-72, said using money alone for agents did not make for reliable sources. 55-75 James R. Ward, the CIA's region officer in charge in the Mekong Delta during 67-68, said the Census Grievance Program produced a heck of lot of good intelligence. RD cadres, some were intel specialists who reported to CIA. From 69 on, they interviewed the people more often as they took over many functions of the Census Grievance Program which the CIA dissolved that year. Warren Milberg, the CIA's province officer in charge in Quang Tri re sources. Robert (Rob) Simmons was a CIA adviser in Phu Yen Province on the leadership of the Special Police determining their successes. John S. Tilton, Phoenix director from mid-71 to late 72 and subsequently CIA's deputy station chief for a year complained of the lack of trained and experienced people in the Special Police. 54-75 Chapter, Prisoners: Interrogation, Torture and Execution. Lybrand and Johnstone report on II Corps, said "The truncheon and electric shock method of interrogation were in widespread use, with almost all advisers admitting to have witnessed instances of the use of these methods." Special Forces/PRU adviser, Yoshia K. Chee said -- "One of the favorite things was popping one of their eyeballs out with a spoon....You could do anything -- like skinning the bottom of their feet and beating them with a bamboo rod....[The South Vietnamese would] use K-bars to saw on people till they got down to bone. One side of the K-bar is serrated, so they'd keep sawing until they got down to the marrow....or chopping fingers off, that was very Vietnamese." Questions re Chee's credentials. 54-75 A few CIA advisers bugged GVN offices to gain access to info hidden from the Americans, but this method required more time and effort than CIA wanted to invest. 65-75 CIA disengaged in mid-1969 from the Phoenix Program. Chief of Station Shackley's emphasis on penetrating the VC diminished the interest of the Special Police and CIA case officers in tactical intel. The CIA maintained close ties with the Special Police and the PRUs, still quite effective weapons in the village war, but used them independently from Phoenix. Fleeing the negative publicity of Phoenix, the CIA continued to fight the shadow government. 65-75 CIA and U.S. military intel organizations often shared info directly with each other. CIA provided intel re the VCI to U.S. units, particularly the SEALS and the Special Forces. Phoenix. 65-75 The PRU's concentrated most of their efforts on eradicating VC cadres in the rural areas. PRU's consistently killed more Communists than they captured. PRU National Director, William Redel said at the end of 68 that the PRUs have been responsible "for approximately seven thousand Vietcong killed per year for the past four or five years. The author estimates that the PRUs captured or killed 700 to 1,500 Communists during most months from 67 to 72. Phoenix. In October 1969: 75% to 90% of all captured VCI reported neutralized have continued to be released ...[for lack of evidence.] 67-73 Details of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). 68-75 The only person I interviewed who considers the attack on the VCI or the entire Allied war effort to be morally repugnant is Ralph McGehee.... McGehee's chief complaint about the Allied effort in Vietnam is that the VC was popular and the GVN was not. "We were there to impose a US-controlled regime over Vietnam....We refused to admit the real strength of the South Vietnamese Communists. Had we ever done it, then we would have to come up with totally new justifications for being there or just pulled out. The South Vietnamese Communists organized the villagers probably by the millions. The most we ever recognized in the Agency estimates...was about six hundred thousand guerrillas...." This from the Postlude of Moyar's book. Ralph McGehee CIABASE --------------------------- end ----------------------------------------