A Number of Book Reviews by Ralph McGehee Wedge:The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA by Mark Reibling Alfred A. Knopf, 1994 at first glance this seemed to be an impressive book with considerable new information on CIA/FBI ops and the problems between the two organizations. on closer examination it appears to be so rife with unsupported data and conclusions -- it loses all credibility. CIABASE update 1/95 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed Jewish People Loftus and Aarons St. Martin's Press, 1994 the authors are far too opinionated and rhetorical for their info to be considered reliable. their info on iran-gate is at odds also with massive other gvt and research data. CIABASE update 1/75 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards Roy Godson U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads Edited by Godson, May and Schmidt (CIABASE comment -- i consider all roy godson books to be useless). washington times 12/23/95 c3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Beartrap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 1992 the book outlines CIA's support operation for the mujaheddin in Afghanistan via pakistan's inter-service intelligence (isi), pakistan's CIA. isi funneled 70 per cent of all material aid -- money, uniforms, weapons, including stinger missiles, and demolitions -- to radical islamic fundamentalists. now radical islamic fundamentalism is one of our major problems. Mohammad Yousaf repeats that he tried to convince the CIA to channel most of their suplies to the moderate Moslem organizations -- a move resisted by the CIA. CIABASE report, crisis of democracy. 5/1/95 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Spyworld Frost and Gratton Doubleday, 1994 book describes how the canadian communications security establishment (cse) is used as an arm of u.s.'s national security agency while also illegally monitoring canadians. book provides one of the most detailed and descriptive accounts of how close-in technical intel ops are conducted, their successes and their threats to the security of us all. CIABASE update 1/95 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Blond Ghost: Ted Shckley and the CIA's Crusades by David Corn this is one of few excellent books on the CIA. corn follows the career of theodore shackley from the environs of cold war berlin, to various other world hot spots as he tries to overthrow castro's cuba and we end up in a near nuclear conflagration with the ussr; to laos where he directs CIA's hilltribe hmong guerrillas to act like regular troops -- leading to their destruction; to vietnam where after three years of shackley-declared "intel successes" [one high-level officer says "it seems pretty obvious saigon (CIA) doesn't know what the fuck's going on,"], he leaves for another adventure elsewhere. his can-do persona convinces CIA's hierarchy of his ability and he progresses up the career ladder. one of more disturbing aspects of corn's book is the claimed recognition at the time by various high-level CIA officials that our intel on vietnam was at best, of no value, and at worst manipulated to show non-existent progress -- yet none of these officials protested. CIABASE update 1/95 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared, the early years of the CIA by E. Thomas Simon and Schuster 1995 david wise said "this was a jewel of a book re the inside the CIA. CIA men felt survival of the free world depended on them. born to privilege, they all were arrogant, and enormously self-confident which often greatly exceeded their competence." the book focuses on the "eastern elite," leadership of CIA via primarily four men - frank wisner, richard bissell, desmond fitzgerald and tracy barnes. during their ascendancy, the policies of the agency came more from the drawing rooms of georgetown, than headquarters planning sessions. allen dulles, the father of the CIA, said it was necessary to read the society pages for most important information. what becomes clear is how little this "elite" dwelt on the consequences of their actions and how much they accepted the cold war-contrived excuses for overthrowing popular governments. one of more frightening aspects was their willingness to defy the CIA's charter re domestic politics -- influencing public opinion in presidential elections and discrediting individuals using dirty tricks. one officer said, "we were not in the least inhibited by the fact that CIA had no internal security role..." this statement epitomizes the agency's on-going threat to our constitutional form of government. CIABASE 10/23/95 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- McNamara:In Retrospect by Robert Strange Times Books, 1995 a superficial and selective mea culpa. the former secretary of defense claims our governing elite had little understanding of the vietnamese and the war -- and from the perspective of 25 years -- explains all that they did (do) not know. McNamara decries the vietnamese lack of resolve to fight, he still does not realize that they won, repelling the world's strongest military force. McNamara was the best and brightest of the "best and brightest," but his book does not cite a single communist source. the shallowness of his analysis exposes the intellectual prostitution demanded of america's academic elite. asian communist leaders set forth in their writings the plans and programs of their revolutions but i doubt if any member of the best and brightest, or any officer of the CIA, ever read or, if so, understood those writings. sam adams, a CIA analyst, who fought the CIA at every step, said the agency in undercounting the vc refused to use what should have been its primary source -- captured enemy documents. in my own experience i discovered that the CIA buried any information that did not support its pro-war policies. the CIA recruited paid agents to tell it what it wanted to hear, ignoring the mass of overt information that so disproved its rationales for the war. this practice epitomizes agency operations from the beginning to the present. CIABASE report, crisis of democracy. 5/1/95 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------