>After the kurdish debacle, the CIA will probably find >it increasingly difficult to persuade the U.S. Congress >to fund similar operations in Iraq and all but >impossible to recruit new operatives. >Because covert operations are usually kept secret, it >is unlikely that any public hearing will ever be held >to determine how many CIA associates were killed in >Iraq. But this much is clear: the agency's reputation >has been demolished. "It may be that the CIA actually >made tremendous efforts to protect its people," says >Baram. "But the perception among Iraqis is that having >anything to do with Americans is dangerous to your >health." The rout will make the CIA's future tasks in >the Middle East--and perhaps the rest of the >world--harder still to achieve. >Wayne McGuire >wmcguire@cybercom.net >http://www.cybercom.net/~wmcguire/ ------------------------------------------------- I disagree with Mr. McGuire's statements that CIA will find it increasingly difficult to persuade the Congress to fund similar operations in Iraq and all but impossible to recruit new operatives. We recently experienced the terrible consequences of CIA operations in Guatemala, the Aldrich Ames debacle, details of the CIA disseminating intelligence from known KGB double agents, plus a number of other problems. Those situations created a spate of "investigations" of the CIA -- the more prominent by the Council on Foreign Relations, by the House Intelligence Committee and by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. All investigations generally avoided discussing the damaging evidence and all came down on the side of increasing the CIA's role. In addition you have the popular new Director Deutch calling for more covert operations. He appointed the Gung Ho David Cohen to be his Director of Operations -- this Gung Ho attitude is apparently reflected in the chain of command via the Chief of Division for the Near East Operations and CIA's Iraqi Chief of Station "Bob." In the specific case of Iraq we have the two earlier examples. One was the arming the Kurds at the request of the Shah -- to unseat Saddam, but when Iran and Iraq made up, CIA support was withdrawn and the Kurds decimated. Another similar type operation apparently occurred in 1988-1991. In my own experience - the failure of a CIA covert operation in Vietnam led directly to sending in the troops along with greatly expanding the CIA's role in Vietnam - and the Vietnam War. We now see more U.S. troops and weaponry being sent to the area. Below are a few citations re earlier events in Iraq. Ralph McGehee CIABASE Iraq, 91 United States: no comment on charges CIA urged Kurdish revolt. U.S. gvt declined comment on charges by Kurds in d.c. and london that the CIA urged Iraq's Kurds to revolt via saudi radio broadcasts. state dept spokesman refused comment in nyt article of 4/6/91 that expatriate Kurds were recruited by saudi intel to record broadcasts for "radio of free Iraq" which they believe was supported by CIA. allegations repeated d.c. at press conference of Kurdish national congress. knc reps charged that the CIA tried to recruit hundreds of Kurdish guerrillas (pesh mergas) who had taken refuge in turkey after the Iraqi 88 campaign against an Iran-backed Kurdish rebellion. bush did sign at least two presidential findings since august 90 authorizing covert action against Hussein including psychological ops. inter press service international news 4/8/91 Iran. Kurds. after supporting Kurds with shah against Iraq. in 75 shah made deal with Iraq and ordered Iranian army cut supplies to Kurds. close to 700,000 Kurds killed or displaced. earlier in jordanian-CIA op in 70 liberation war of dhofari people in oman set back by shah's troops backed by U.S. fleet. etc. counterspy 4/82 30 Iran, with israel, 72-75 U.S. supplied arms to Kurds until 3/6/75 when Iran reached agreement Iraq and all aid canceled. Kurds attacked. peterzell, j. (1984). reagan's secret wars footnote 7 all too often the CIA has recruited `freedom fighters' around the world and then let them fend for themselves when things got tough: Hungarians in 56 sumatrans in 58 Cuban exiles in 61 Kurdish rebels in 72 meo tribesmen and montagnards; most recently the Nicaraguan contras. wp 7/20/89 outlook 15 Iran, Iraq, 68-72 savak began supporting the Kurds' red mullah, barzani in 68. by 1970 he received support from the U.S. and mossad. a tripartite committee of savak, CIA and mossad, organized the channeling of arms to the Kurds and exercised overall political control. taheri, a. (1988). nest of spies 60 Iraq, Iran, 72-75 United States had organized a Kurdish insurrection against Saddam Hussein as a favor by president nixon to the shah of Iran, only to abandon the Kurds to destruction when the Iranian and Iraqi leaders settled their border dispute. Account appears in the leaked version of the house of representatives pike committee report of 1976. washington post 4/7/91 d3 Iraq, Iran, 72-75 "Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way, with silence from everyone. we feel, your excellency, that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our people, who have committed themselves to your country's policy." written by mustafa barazini, to secretary of state kissinger on 3/10/75. letter could have been written to bush by massoud barazani, leader of the devastated Kurds in 91 article 1975: background to betrayal; how kissinger, nixon and the shah rallied--then shrugged off--an uprising. washington post 4/7/91 d3