From: Ralph McGehee Subject: Intel vs policy Date: Fri, 18 Oct 1996 05:34:23 -0700 (PDT) =========================================================================== >J. Ransom Clark >Political Science Department >Muskingum College (much info deleted) >Interestingly, Mr. McGehee and I arrive at the same point -- a less than >positive attitude toward the current DDO -- but our reasoning reflects the >divergence in our views of the roles and functions of intelligence. While >accepting that it is the height of arrogance to quote yourself.... >Notice that none of this is related to Mr. McGehee's analysis that Cohen is >suspect because he has a history, in Mr. McGehee's words, "of distorting >information to support policy." >Issues surrounding the policy-intelligence interface are more complicated >than either Mr. McGehee or the late Sam Adams, both honest and sincere >individuals, seem to want to recognize in their criticisms. Neither seems >to take into account that at any given moment there are multiple streams of >thought on any contentious issue; and, over time, one stream or a >combination of streams tends to drive out the others. That does not make >it the "correct" answer, but the process does make it the "accepted" >answer. >Certainly, there is a narrow line between intelligence in support of >policymaking and intelligence in support of a particular policy or set of >policies. The former is the purpose of intelligence; the latter negates >that purpose. Was that line crossed during the Vietnam War? Yes, at >times. Was supporting (justifying) administration policies with regard to >Southeast Asia the sole goal or purpose of CIA and other intelligence >collection and analysis entities during that period? No, at least not in >my opinion. --------------------------------------------------------------- My response is in two parts. Immediately below are some citations from CIABASE re David Cohen. The citations speak for themselves. The second part of the response discusses Professor Clark's reasoned presentation of the role of intelligence in support of policymaking. Ralph McGehee CIABASE ------------------------------------------------------------------- 77-95 the new DO David Cohen began his CIA career in the east Asia division, responsible for the disastrous estimates of viet cong strength in Vietnam, and fought off internal critics such as Sam Adams and Ralph McGehee. Per "intelligence" sources, Cohen apparently "bent with the wind" and supported agency-biased estimates. "u.s. news & world report" said Cohen was "a company man ... Who will find out what way the wind is blowing and then go with it." His most noted role as analyst was as senior intel directorate manager and reviewer of the April 1985 CIA assessment supporting KGB involvement in ali agca's 1981 attempt to assassinate pope Jean Paul ii. The report was "ordered" by CIA director William Casey and his assistant, Robert gates, and was so biased that the CIA itself criticized it in its July 1985 "Cowey Report". Cohen was also one of six CIA analysts to testify before the senate select committee on intel during the 1991 confirmation hearing of gates as CIA director. Cohen supported gates and became associate director of intel. His appointment as DDO in no way spells reform and "scrubbing down" the DO. Intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France 9/11/95 15 USSR, 81-85 CIA's papal task force issued "Cowey Report," a critical analysis of CIA's April 85 report outlining Soviet involvement in pope's assassination. CIA analysts noted that "calling paper `the case for Soviet involvement'" and marshaling evidence only for that side `stacked the deck' in favor of Soviet involvement. Analysts thought report lacked qualifications, especially in area of source reliability. Ops directorate's reservations about sourcing of raw intel was serious enough to stop them from distributing reports, if not for high interest in subject. Dci Casey was known to support idea of Soviet involvement. Cowey Report noted that in analysts view, "the paper was deliberately skewed to make case for Soviet complicity look more solid than it is; they thought authors had been `manipulated.'" [ciabase comment: the director of ops as of 8/1/95, David Cohen, in a 91 prepared statement for senate committee said he was the senior manager and reviewer for "the case for Soviet involvement" and associated research]. Washington post 10/4/91 a8 91 senate intel committee called on six former CIA analysts to testify in both closed and open sessions with regard to charges of politicization against Robert gates in Sep/Oct confirmation hearings. They were: Melvin Goodman, graham fuller, Hal ford, Larry gershwin, Jennifer glaudemans and Douglas maceachen. Committee also asked sworn written statements of following people: carolyn mcgiffert ekedahl, kay Oliver, mark Matthew's, lance haus, David Cohen, john hibbits, Thomas barkesdale, Paul limberg and john mclaughlin. Sic, (10/24/91). Nomination of Robert m. Gates 99 in a prepared statement to the senate intel committee David Cohen records he was one of intel directorate managers directly involved in the April 85 intel assessment re possible Soviet involvement in agca's assassination attempt on the pope. He was the senior directorate manager and reviewer for that paper and associated research. Senate intel committee report nomination of Robert m. Gates, 10/91 vol. iii 110-116 USSR, 81-91 five analysts who wrote a report on Soviet involvement in the 1981 assassination attempt against pope john Paul ii have denied charges by a former analyst that the assessment was politically slanted. They said new information led to a study in 1985 on the Kremlin's role in the shooting after an 83 estimate dismissed such involvement. Former CIA analyst Melvin goodwin charged in senate testimony that analysts "were ordered" to implicate the Soviets. Kay Oliver, lance w.haus and Elizabeth t. Seeger testified. David Cohen [just named director of operations] an intelligence manager who worked on the report, denied any effort to influence, slant or bias the analysis. Washington times 10/5/91 a4 95 defense dept has merged covert intel ops of individual services and plans to expand espionage abroad, starting with establishment of phony businesses overseas as cover. This partly a result of pressure from congress on CIA and military intel to send more agents overseas to work on terrorism and weapons proliferation that cannot be covered by satellites. CIA's DO under fire re aldrich Ames and [Guatemala]. Uniting military spies once spread thru army, navy, air force and marines led to establishment of over past 3 years of defense humint service (dhs). This part of dia and has more than 1,000 uniformed and civilian personnel. CIA has roughly 4,500 in DO, of whom 900 called case officers. CIA is national manager of spying, but has uncertain control. David Cohen heads interagency group coordinating humint so CIA can monitor the dod ops. Earlier scandal re yellow fruit. CIA working with dhs personnel to help plan establishment of cover companies. Cohen's responsibilities to ensure relationship avoids redundancy and activities and ops are appropriately coordinated. Washington post 10/30/95 a17 95 David Cohen, new deputy director for clandestine operations, is a career economic analyst who once headed agency office that monitors trade and technology trends. Cohen's July 31 appointment underscores a concerted move by CIA to elevate what had been a backwater mission -- economic intel. under president Clinton, scope and volume of economic tasks by CIA is unprecedented. A recent example: the agency briefed u.s. negotiators on Japan's position in recently concluded auto talks. Business week 8/14/95 50 95 David Cohen named new director of operations. Cohen to be assisted by four deputy directors - army general David barrato will continue to handle military affairs; David edger for operations; Paul Redmond for ci; and, Christine wiley for personnel issues. Intelligence newsletter 8/31/95 8 91 senate intel committee hearings on nomination of gates to be DCI. testimony of Robert gates; prepared statements of Charles e. Allen; David Cohen; lance w. Haus; carolyn ekedahl; john hibbits; kay Oliver; and Elizabeth t. Seeger. Supplemental material from Robert gates; grey hodnett; and mark Matthew's. Vote on gates to be DCI. Senate intelligence committee. (1991). Nomination of Robert m. Gates to be director of central intelligence volume iii 318 pages 95 "after 15 years, CIA obeys order to give congress sensitive secrets." CIA has established internal procedures for flagging intel goof-ups and embarrassments and triumphs that to be provided lawmakers weekly. Congress notified for first time about some serious human rights abuses committed by CIA informants, and some sensitive liaison ops. Policy designed to comply with a 1980 notification law ordering CIA employees to advise congress [details of such]. David Cohen new DO an enthusiastic supporter of directive. CIA sends 8 to 10 briefs to congress each week. Washington post 10/11/95 a7 93 CIA beginning effort to use university personnel, including undergraduates, to DO classified intel work now done by CIA's hqs. Idea prompted by budget squeeze, is to have students trained to analyze intelligence about particular countries for which CIA is short of staff. David Cohen of the directorate of intel says he hopes universities can provide "surge capacities." Cohen in his remarks to an audience at Smithsonian institution, said he had talked to officials at Florida a&m, a mostly african-american school about contract work for CIA. A&m had accepted a 1.7 million defense department grant in November to teach languages. CIA spokesman said this is a program in the works. He said the CIA for years operated a cooperative program with universities in which students work full time at CIA hqs for half a year and attend school the other half. Part of "surge" effort is to provide more analysis on such problems as ethnic conflict and weapons proliferation. No analysis would be done on campuses. Part of effort to help CIA recruitment - CIA pays part of college tuition fees for students. About 70% of those who participate later become regular staff members. Los Angeles times 2/26/93 a4 95 acting DO jack devine taking very cushy job overseas. Short list for new DO is David Cohen and Leo hazlewood plus a few others. Washington post 7/14/95 a19 95 an article by peter maas on DCI john Deutch and the reforms he implementing. Photos of Deutch, Nora slatkin, executive director and David Cohen, do. A correction in the post says the photo is of George tenet not David Cohen. Washington post parade 11/19/95 95 David Cohen appointed deputy director of ops 7/31/95. He previously was associate deputy director for intelligence beginning 11/18/91. Cohen entered on duty on 3/20/66. He worked in the office of research and reports and the office of economic research, where he worked primarily on east Asian economic matters. He became deputy dir of office of economic research in 77 and deputy director of the office of global issues four years later. In 87 became chief of the do's national collection division and presided over merger of the national collection div. and the foreign resources div. into the national resources div. He returned to the directorate of intel in 11/91. He has a bachelor of arts in political science from northeastern u in 63 and an ma in political science from Boston u in 66. He is married and has two sons. CIA public affairs 9/15/95 95 David Cohen named new director of operations. Cohen to be assisted by four deputy directors - army general David barrato will continue to handle military affairs; David edger for operations; Paul Redmond for ci; and, Christine wiley for personnel issues. Intelligence newsletter 8/31/95 8 95 David Cohen named to be new DO. Cohen a former high-ranking DI officer, gained some espionage experience running the CIA's domestic collection ops which spies on foreign gvts in the u.s., specifically the U.N. DCI Deutch made announcements at a rare press conference at CIA hqs. Paul Redmond to be associate deputy director for counterintel. John gannon, until recently director of European analysis, to be deputy director of intel - in charge of all analysis. Ruth David, director of advanced info technology at sandia national laboratory, to be deputy director for science and technology. Leo hazelwood, former CIA executive director, to be deputy director for administration. Re Cohen he is "an outsider who is not very well liked within the do" but is "hardnosed." He wont take a lot of crap. two new associate deputy directors of ops are David edger, a respected case officer who was Ames supervisor at the time of his arrest, to be senior deputy for espionage ops. Christine wiley, former chief of human resources staff, to be top deputy for human resources in the do. John mclaughlin, a senior analyst in the Russian section, appointed number 2 official at the national intel council, and jay castillo was named director of office of personnel security. Washington times 8/1/95 a4 95 David Cohen to be new director of ops. He was acting deputy of DI. He created the national resources div. out of separate domestic and foreign collection services. He practices "management by fear." "a company man from the word go - who will find out what way the wind is blowing and then go with it." Some mid-level and senior employees conclude the DCI Deutch is not serious about reform. U.s. news & world report 7/31/95 20 95 DCI Deutch appointed four new deputy directors, all named were longtime CIA employees, completing his sweep of eight top executives. New appointees selected with help of a panel headed by former deputy DCI mcmahon. David Cohen new do. Washington post 8/1/95 a17 95 DCI Deutch appointed last month a 30-year agency veteran David Cohen to the politically-sensitive post of deputy director of operations (ddo) where he will oversee ops. Deutch was given good marks by the press for picking "an agency man" and for putting an "analyst" rather than a "covert operator" in charge of the "dirty tricks" directorate. Cohen will be working with four associate deputy directors: u.s. army general David barrato (who will continue as head of covert actions), David edger (intel ops), Paul Redmond (counter-intel) and Christine wiley (personnel). That gen. Barrato has kept his job is to be a clear indication that Deutch is not going to "scrub down" CIA dirty tricks, to maintain and reinforce CIA-pentagon ties, and to "box in" Cohen at his new post. Redmond is a "forced" appointment since he was instrumental in pursuing the aldrich Ames case as a senior official of the CIA counter-intel center, and the CIA has had to acquiesce to FBI demands for a larger role in counter-intel in the CIA. Intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France 9/11/95 15 95 DCI Deutch filled one of most politically sensitive posts in u.s. intel community, naming David Cohen, a 53-year-old career CIA official, to head agency's clandestine espionage arm. Cohen's appointment as CIA's deputy director of ops is a modest break with tradition, since he has spent most of his career on analytical, rather than clandestine, side of CIA. Cohen is a Boston native who joined CIA in 1966. He put in a stint in clandestine ops earlier in his career but most recently has been serving as CIA's associate deputy director for directorate of intel. Turnover in management ranks at CIA gave Deutch a chance to put his own people in almost every top position. Deutch said john gannon would take over as head of intel directorate. With a ph.d. in history, gannon has been director of CIA's office of European analysis. Deutch went outside agency to fill top spot at CIA's science and technology arm, naming Ruth David, director of advanced info technologies at sandia national laboratory in Albuquerque, n.m. he also named Leo hazlewood, formerly CIA's executive director, to be deputy director for adm. Los Angeles times 8/1/95 a9 Italy, Bulgaria, USSR, 81-86 attempted assassination on the life of the pope -- CIA did not know who behind the plot. In 84-85 CIA began receiving info about the Bulgarian and Soviet role. Gates ordered a paper analyzing terrorism assessing the Soviet role - paper titled "agca's attempt to kill the pope: the case for Soviet involvement." Paper circulated widely inside CIA and elicited a very negative reaction. Anne Armstrong sent the DCI a memo critical of the handling of the "papal plot." Gates commissioned an independent review. The paper on the assassination attempt was published in 5/85 -- we never did get additional info from CIA sources, even after the collapse of the USSR. CIABASE comment the "Cowey Report," was a critical analysis of CIA's April 85 report outlining Soviet involvement in pope's assassination. CIA analysts noted calling paper the case for Soviet involvement and marshaling evidence only for that side stacked the deck. "the paper deliberately skewed to make case for Soviet complicity look more solid than it is." The Deutch appointed director of ops, David Cohen, was manager of "the case for Soviet involvement." Gates, r. (1996). From the shadows 354-6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- There are many points raised by Ransom Clark re the role of intelligence. In my experience, William Colby, the Agency's point man for Vietnam, cut off the production of relevant information that challenged United States involvement in the war. The finer points that Professor Clark outlines had no chance to play -- just block out most non-supportive information and continue the war. At one point probably to make the intelligence more positive, the CIA created the Special Assistant Vietnam Affairs Office, headed by George Carver -- a half-way home for operations and intelligence. There are many ways to excuse the CIA's gross failure of intelligence re Vietnam but there is no way to avoid the truth (The Pentagon Papers) -- its intelligence and operations created the Vietnam War and initially and after the U.S. made a full commitment to this action, its intelligence failed and failed miserably, e.g., the 1968 Tet Offensive. I have heard and read many sophisticated arguments about the role intelligence (in support of policymaking and policy). My main point is that the CIA exists to implement policy through its covert operations. Inconvenient intelligence that challenges such policies is ignored, buried, resisted, not collected, etc. The tragedy of this reality is that the American people and its leaders tend to believe the intelligence and support or continue polices based on that information. To create the necessary tunnel-visioned institution, the CIA must recruit individuals who will not "see" the reality, and if they do, are such team players, they will not protest. Now we have the challenge of international terrorism. Targeting that threat you have the Agency's officers who in the case of Vietnam could not see either the trees or the forest. Can we expect that this severely flawed institution will be able to deal with this dangerous, and diffuse challenge. We cant. (The various examinations of intelligence prior to the terrorist bombing in June 1996 at the air base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia give no credit to the CIA. One study praises State Department and Defense Department intelligence.) My observations may seem overly naive -- but I believe any examination of the CIA's horrendous intelligence record from 1947 to the present demands the conclusion that the CIA writes intelligence to support policy. My goal is to see the United States have the best intelligence possible -- intelligence that will avoid future Vietnams -- but I also fear that the Agency has moved in the opposite direction -- and future "Vietnams" loom. Ralph McGehee CIABASE --