Michael McClintock, (1992). INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT: U.S. GUERRILLA WARFARE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND COUNTER TERRORISM, 1940-1990. NY: Pantheon Books. This overlooked book is a finely researched examination of the use of the covert arms of the U.S. Government in subverting or sustaining foreign governments. It details the first counterinsurgency operation in Greece, and quotes an official report stating the campaign's success depended upon "the total command of the operation by the Americans." The paramilitary operation against the Huks in the Philippines is defined to a much greater and franker degree than that provided by Colonel Lansdale in his autobiography. [Lansdale after the Philippines, directed the CIA's early efforts in Vietnam and was involved in the planning for operations against Cuba in the Sixties]. The intermeshing of regular and irregular forces in the operation in the Philippines is of particular relevance to today's constellation of paramilitary forces and their role in counterinsurgency. The CIA's universal compilation of "Watch Lists" or "Enemy Lists" resulted from a 1954 NSC directive. McClintock quotes a 1962 secret report that states the "CIA financed and directed police assistance programs in turkey, thailand and indonesia which had overt as well as covert aspects and which sought to develop investigative mechanisms capable of detecting subversive individuals and organizations, collecting and collating information...and neutralizing their effort." (CIABASE Comment -- These lists frequently became assassination lists for local security services). The systematic use of terror and death squads against the Huks set the standard for counterinsurgency and anti-terror operations around the globe. Ralph McGehee CIABASE Some of CIABASE's entries from "Instruments of Statecraft" are: greece, 47-49 a national defense corp established 10/47 with a force of 50,000 to eliminate guerrillas. paramililtary militia system persisted after collapse of the national people's liberation army (elas) forces in 49. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 14-15 greece, 46-49 u.s. intervention in civil war in greece was the first counterinsurgent campaign of the cold war. state dept report of americans there were "over 100 military personnel, 220 civilians in the economic mission, 100 diplomatic and intel officers, and 80 administrators." white house report of 61 gave larger figures - 1,500, some 800 military. 61 report stressed as essential the total command of the op by the americans and the presence of advisers on combat missions - conditions that would remain from vietnam to el salvador. general james van fleet was the "de facto senior tactical officer of the greek national army." massive ops in 48 combined artillery and airpower with infantry sweeps. most significant op of the ci campaign was the forcible relocation of people to create no-man-lands. this seen to be the most successful measure. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 10-16 philippines, 46-54 in war against huks use of hunter-killer counterguerrillas: small, mobile units with seemingly total freedom to use assassination and terror. the "nenita" unit was an elite force with four officers and fifty men - in action sometimes reinforced by two or three companies of the regular constabulary. commander of the nenita force was napoleon valeriano. in lansdale's journal in 1947 he describes valeriano's style -- notes that contrast from his sanitized writing for the public. "all this killing during a peace is getting rather sickening. bondoc, the accused mayor...was captured by major napoleon valeriano's commando force of philippines mps. valeriano is a friend of mine who heads a special hqs intel team for mpc (pa) [military police command (philippines army)]. these filipinos run around central luzon with skull and crossbones flags flying from their jeeps and scout cars...cruelty and lust for murder are commonplace. philippine army mps take but a few prisoners. they merely shoot their newly captured huks, often in the back of the head..." another account said of nenita "the special tactic of these squadrons was to cordon off areas...when i was stationed in the candaba area, almost daily you could find bodies floating in the rivers, many of them were victims of valeriano's nenita unit. in their book, bohannan and valeriano acknowledge the scattergun approach of nenita terror tactics. they state that on balance the tactics were necessary for the counterinsurgent. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 120 the philippines paramillitary op, then a seemingly effective deployment of civilian irregular forces, left a clear mark on subsequent deployment of civilian irregular forces, left a clear mark on subsequent american doctrine and provided prototypes for u.s.-sponsored ci programs around the world in the 60s. ci studies stressed that the paramililtary organization could significantly increase the manpower available where regular forces were few in number; the systems were cost effective; that they released regular forces for aggressive patrolling by undertaking static defense duties; and that they had enormous political potential. the intermeshing of regular and irregular forces, a hallmark of such systems, was of particular relevance to today's constellation of paramililtary forces and their role in counterinsurgency. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 125 philippines, 53 magsaysay election. a massive domestic and international campaign pumped up magsaysay's image and assured his election -- the campaign was orchestrated by his american friends in the inner chamber of the military advisory group. in a 72 interview lansdale recounts being offered $5 million by allen dulles to arrange the election, and claims to have said he only needed one million. lansdale later acknowledged having raised funds from american corporations in the philippines. dirty tricks side of election per cia station chief, general ralph b. lovett, included drugging president quirino so he would appear incoherent. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 110-11 europe, 50-60 emigres were recruited to fledging cia, and army's psy-war/unconventional warfare establishment. they were fanatic anti-communists. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 77 philippines, 46-54 major valeriano because of his terror squads, was promoted to lieutenant colonel and in 7/50 assumed command of an elite bct, that would develop a reputation like that of the nenita between 50 and 54. bohannan and valeriano date the nenita op only to 46-49 period. after that the terror component remained, but was applied in a more studied manner by the seventh bct and other special units after 1950. nenita became a model for the counterinsurgeny org in the 60s. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 120-1 54 a 12/54 nsc action memo ordered a study of u.s. programs to strengthen the internal security forces of friendly foreign countries and to [strengthen the police forces]. the first of the public safety programs was set up in sukarno's indonesia and later that year in korea, iran and cambodia. by 58 program set up in 21 countries; and by mid-61, 27, with ten in latin america and eight in east asia. a secret 62 report described long-standing unilateral police programs in interagency assistance: the agency has personnel integrated in aid police programs in 10 of the 17 countries...its tasks since the 1950s have covered areas of police assistance subsequently brought under the ci brief: "cia provides the latest info on developments in sino-soviet strategy and techniques to its personnel in aid police programs who are working as advisers in the ci, counterespionage, counterguerrilla, and other counter subversive fields."; "CIA financed and directed police assistance programs in turkey, thailand and indonesia which had overt as well as covert aspects and which sought to develop investigative mechanisms capable of detecting subversive individuals and organizations, collecting and collating information...and neutralizing their effort." mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 188-89 61-68 a series of nsc action memorandum re counterinsurgency was launched in 61. nsam 114 11/61 set in motion a review and reorganization of public safety, and nsam 177 8/62 assigned aid the principal responsibility for a new integrated program; the new look public safety program was run by a semi-autonomous office of public safety (ops) within aid. by 68, its peak year, ops fielded 458 advisers in 34 countries, with a budget of 55 million dollars. from inception in 11/62 to end of the program in 75, it trained some 7,500 senior officers in u.s. facilities and from 500,000 to one million foreign police overseas. byron engle headed the ops program from 11/62 to 4/73. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 188-190 76-80 jimmy carter's human rights policy, which might have led to a radical reassessment of covert u.s. policy, failed in face of political pressure and the intransigence of the military and foreign-policy establishments. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft xviii philippines, 46-54 a 3/49 cia situation report on huks notes filipino policy of gradual extermination of the huks. lansdale in a 3/14/46 cable said huks "were true disciples of karl marx." he claimed they their mass following was won through terror. for the official record "the huks were commies and the job was to eliminate them." a small cadre within jusmag, headed by lansdale. he returned in 50 to assume control of the unconventional side of the counter insurgency. lansdale recruited into oss for wartime service in 43 as a lieutenant. when war ended he was in the philippines from 45-48 as head of the intel division of the philippines command. charles bohannan, was a member of the team. he better versed on guerrilla war than lansdale. "bo" bohannan had been a crack anti-japanese in new guinea and philippines in wwii. he later associated with lansdale in vietnam. he played a key role in organizing filipinos in formation of operation brotherhood, the freedom company, and the technical services company. he probably was lansdale deputy of the covert saigon military mission. a.c. ellis, a commo specialist was a daily routine adviser to the psy-ops section. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 108-9 guatemala, 53-55 cia op to overthrow govt [pbsuccess] involved some one hundred cia agents and contract personnel. agency enlisted scores of recruits mostly mercenaries, from guatemala and neighboring central american countries. whiting willauer, in charge of air war. a pilot, jerry delarm, said he blew up govt oil reserves and the main powder magazine of the army. when some planes lost, air force planes were quickly reflagged and put in use. a memo to eisenhower explained the op. the entire effort depended upon psychological impact. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 140-1 philippines, 50-53 bohannan and napoleon valeriano said: psywar ranged from one-shotters designed to destroy credibility of an opponent ...to sustained ops to create distrust or enmity between huks and the mass base. some later became standards of u.s. counterinsurgency. the dissemination of cartridges loaded with dynamite, designed to blow up when fired. deliberate use of terror in psywar figured prominently in 60 reassessment. mcclintock, m. (1992). instruments of statecraft 104-5