CIA - Past and Present As a measure of the current state of the CIA we note that the Director, John Deutch, calls for more and larger covert operations (while a surrogate CIA, the National Endowment for Democracy, runs operations in ninety countries -- which have generated complaints and counter-actions from numerous countries). Deutch appoints David "Blow With the Wind" Cohen to the extremely important job as Director of Operations. The Chief of Division for Middle East Operations, Steve Richter, is censured for failing to keep senior management informed (and for failing in Iraq), while the Chief of Station in Iraq, "Bob," proves to be the typical Agency gung-ho Cold Warrior. All of those factors predict further disasters for the United States. In response to an earlier thoughtful posting re "The Failure of Intelligence," which uses the Vietnam War as a prime example to defend the CIA, I must comment. I served in the CIA from 1952 until 1977. From 1967 on I protested within the CIA about its flawed reporting on Viet Cong strengths with my first protests aimed at defending U.S. policy on the war. I soon discovered that the Agency could not or would not recognize the nature of this "People's War, People's Army." Its intelligence had little to do with reality. I protested this terribly flawed reporting during a tour in Vietnam, and later at CIA Headquarters. In a Headquarters assignment I saw highly classified reporting from around the world and soon realized that supporting policy with intelligence was a common if not universal practice. I continued my protests by complaining to the Inspector General, Gordon Stewart; the Executive Director Comptroller, William Colby; and, other Agency authorities. I also wrote numerous memos to the Chief of the East Asia Division -- Theodore Shackley; and, composed a study on Asian revolutions. All these experiences taught me the CIA is a policy-implementing Agency that uses its intelligence to sell and defend its operations. Its personnel are recruited for attributes that will not clash with this goal. In disgust, I opted for early retirement and spent the next five years writing a book about what happened. Inter alia, I poured over all three editions of "The Pentagon Papers," and the numerous intelligence and policy directives in those eighteen volumes. Clearing the manuscript through the CIA took two years with the CIA fighting it every step of the way -- insisting on about 400 deletions running in length from a few words to a complete chapter. Clearing the manuscript through the CIA's Publication Review Board showed that by citing published information, I could use citations to already published material to defeat claims of secrecy and retain much material. (Bill Casey at the final stage tried to "re-classify" all previously published information about the CIA averring that the material had been released by mistake. I went on a PR and legal effort and his move died aborting). The realization that published information could be used to expose CIA operations plus the hard-to-find, scattered, and fragmented nature of the then extremely limited data, was the germ of the idea for my data base. Another reason for building the data base was that the CIA has always been one of the least responsive to FOIA requests. They currently are withholding from historians working for the State Department on the "Foreign Policy of the United States," series that began in the eighteenth century, details of its operations of the 1950s. One scholar said the CIA's position on this amounts to "fraud." This in the face of numerous claims by Agency officials that they are now more open and cooperative. To depict the extent the CIA through its "intelligence" and propaganda paints an illusion to justify its operations, below I include brief items on the true nature of the South Vietnamese enemy forces. When reading this, consider how the Agency now writes "intelligence" when in the process of overthrowing governments. Ralph McGehee CIABASE National Liberation Front Former President Dwight Eisenhower in his book, "Mandate for Change," said "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader..." Vietnam, 54-75 The U.S. Viewed the NLF order of battle in terms of certain number of soldiers and weapons not a mass revolutionary movement - and consistently underestimated number of troops and money needed to defeat the enemy. American specialists like Lansdale, Trager and Pike never [understood] that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese peasants would fight and die willingly, for a cause beyond themselves. Senator Gravel edition, (1971). Pentagon papers Volume V 205-6 56-62 Viet Cong organization of population proceeded hamlet by hamlet, incorporating ever-larger numbers into associations of peasants [farmers], women, youth. Such village organizations meant reduced rent, distribution of free land, freedom from both corvee labor and conscription into army, protection from extortion and brutality of appointed village chiefs, security police or army. Robert Samsom of U.S. Mission found "the Viet Cong land reform program possessed the universality and mass appeal that the Diem reform lacked." Guerrillas saw themselves "as the legitimate rulers of an independent Vietnam." On 12/20/60, at a secret base near Saigon, National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was announced. NLF best described as a coalition led by party members but held together by a common program. Front committees were established in thousands of villages. In 2/61, PLAF formally organized. Southern and central branches of Lao Dong Party merged into central committee directorate for the south which U.S. Called COSVN. 75% of villagers supported front, 20% trying to remain neutral, and 5% firmly pro-gvt. By 10/61, front so successful that gvt troops could not drive more than a few kilometers outside of any given provincial capital without running into sniper fire. M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 67-73. 60-75 Front was creation in early 60 of association of Ex-resistance members, formed by those who had survived the diemist Exterminations. Later developed into people's revolutionary party. About in 60 a number of other organizations created - peasants associations, Workers, associations, and others representing youth, women, students, Writers, etc. Front's order of battle three types: self-defense Guerrillas - local village units usually peasants by day and guerrillas at Night; regional troops on a more permanent basis - job to deal with enemy Forces in their region; regular army to deal with enemy's mobile reserves And to carry out military ops. At the beginning of 64 NLFSVN claimed control of two thirds of territory and over half of the population. It is government in everything but name with committees of Military affairs, external affairs, public health, culture, info and Education. Women's Liberation Association one of mass orgs Affiliated with NLF...within which virtually everyone from children to old people in liberated areas could make a contribution to struggle. Burchett, W. (1965). Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War 265 Vietnam, 45-75 The U.S.'s leading wartime writer/scholar on the Vietcong, Douglas Pike, said that the liberation associations of the Vietcong were villagers molded into tight-knit, self-controlled, self-contained associations. Mao tse-tung of China and Vo Nguyen Giap called Liberation Associations the initial phase and the sine qua non of their revolutions. In 63, the Vietcong announced that seven million south Vietnamese (generally rural civilians) had joined these associations. Pike's article avoids numbers but those massive figures were the intel community's most sacrosanct secret or most egregious failure. If CIA had known and/or reported the 7,000,000 person-strong association structure -- it would have invalidated all U.S. justifications for the war; liberation association members and their dedication, caused our defeat in Vietnam. Victory was never a possibility. Ciabase 1/95 Vietnam, 67 The order-of-battle fight of Sam Adams and the CIA's sacrificing its integrity on the altar of public relations and political expediency. Macv excluded village self-defense forces from Vietcong yet SDF were hardened guerrillas who responsible for 40% U.S. Casualties. Pike Committee investigation concluded juggling figures "created false perceptions of enemy of U.S. Forces...pressure from policymaking officials [caused] erroneous assessments..." Valentine, d. (1990). The phoenix Program 273-4 Vietnam, 68 Chief cause of intel failure re vn was degraded image of enemy. Second, pressure from policy-makers reinforced erroneous assessments of allied progress and enemy capabilities. Mission restriction curtailed necessary collection activity by intel officers and forced reliance on officers with military responsibility. House of Representatives Pike Committee report. Vietnam, 54 U.S. Subversion of Geneva agreements began immediately. Colonel Lansdale was already in Vietnam. His original mission, to by-pass French and to work with Vietnamese in unconventional war. Now he redirected to "paramilitary ops in communist areas." U.S. imported one million catholic Vietnamese from north that were a resource for Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale's rumors re U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Young, m. (1991). The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 page 45 U.S. Could not acknowledge Vietnam was one country and to ensure triumph of its creation, U.S. Sent over U.S. 400,000 combat troops to fight in Vietnam. None of this could be acknowledged without irreversible Damage to American rationale for intervention. M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 page 179 Military proceeded to misunderstand Vietnam. But in a sense this was necessary - to have acknowledged popular southern base of NLF, to have abandoned diem in favor of a coalition gvt, would have required a complete reversal of U.S. Policy. In may 1960, three U.S. Special forces Teams arrived in Vietnam to train Vietnamese special forces for counterinsurgency. U.S. counterinsurgency entirely focused on establishing control over the population. A U.S. Conference said Vietnamese "are willing to support whichever side is in momentary local control." Kennedy's ci experts viewed insurgency as result of a byproduct of disruptive process of modernization, where a small band of ruthless outside agitators were able to exploit poverty and confusion of a passive population through propaganda and intimidation to seize power on behalf of communism. Young, M. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 74-7 Vietnam, 65 Liberation (NLF) forces by mid 65 had four-fifths of territory and 10 out of vn's 14 million population in liberated zones. There were 4,300 front "fortified villages" in SVN. Exact size of front's armed forces a secret but Dang Thang Chon, v.p. Of liberation youth federation said its youth org had 500,000 young members - this did not include those in the local Self-defense units but half who remained in villages expected to enlist in them. Burchett, W. (1965). Vietnam: Inside story of the Guerrilla War 84 ---------------------------- end ---------------------------------