Oswald in Mexico City by Dave Reitzes

The Warren Commission tells us that in late September and early October
of 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald made a trip to Mexico City where he visited
the Cuban Consulate and the Russian Embassy, seeking visas to travel to
Cuba and/or Russia. Warren Commission records declassified over the years
reveal that the Commission was aware of problems in this area, problems
which the Commission saw no harm in sweeping under the carpet. The
Commission members could -- and would -- at least cite the weak argument
that the CIA hadn't cooperated with them, in fact, outright lied to them.

The House Select Committee on Assassinations couldn't make the same
excuse with regard to the Mexico City evidence; the Committee received
enough assistance to enable staff member Edwin Lopez to compose a
300-page report entitled "Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City,"
detailing all that was known about the episode. It was the decision of
HSCA Chief Counsel Robert Blakey to classify the report (along with all
evidence drawing upon CIA files) in the National Archives for 50 years,
and to lie about the report's conclusions in the HSCA's Final Report. The
Final Report informed the reader that the Warren Commission had reached
the correct conclusions about Oswald in Mexico City. As researchers have
known all along, this couldn't be further from the truth. Thanks to the
JFK Records Act of 1992, we now have most of the Lopez Report, as well as
hundreds of related CIA and FBI documents.

The Lopez Report states, "Someone who identified himself as Lee Harvey
Oswald called the Soviet Consulate at least once. Other evidence from the
CIA [DELETED] and witness testimony indicates that the individual visited
the Soviet and Cuban Consulates on five or six different occasions. While
the majority of the evidence tends to indicate that this individual was
indeed Lee Harvey Oswald, the possibility that someone else used Lee
Harvey Oswald's name during this time in contacts with the Soviet and
Cuban Consulates cannot be absolutely dismissed" (Lopez Report, 6). As we
will see, even the censored report has understated the case.

Historian and intelligence analyst John Newman writes, "The Soviet
Embassy, which also housed the Soviet Consulate, is two blocks from the
Cuban Consulate and Cuban Embassy which, although in different buildings,
are inside the same compound. Thus, it would have taken Oswald more time
to leave one consulate, find a phone, and call the other consulate than
it would have to simply walk there. As we will see, this detail is
crucial in sorting out which of the six or seven visits and as many phone
calls were Oswald's and which were not" (Newman, Oswald and the CIA,
354). Our task is more difficult, as we can't afford to ask merely which
calls or visits were Oswald's -- we must decide which Oswald, if it's
Oswald at all.

"Lee Harvey Oswald himself probably visited the Cuban Consulate at least
once since his application for a Cuban in-transit visa bears his
signature. Though the Cuban Consulate allowed visa applicants to take
blank applications out of the Consulate to be returned when completed,
Silvia Duran, a Consulate official, stated she was certain that Oswald
signed the application in her presence. Oswald's signature on the Cuban
visa application, however, does not by itself rule out the possibility
that someone impersonated Oswald in contacts with the Cuban and Soviet
Embassies. An analysis of the telephone conversations [DELETED] reveals
that someone, later identified by the CIA as Oswald visited the Cuban
Consulate at least two times and the Soviet Consulate at least three
times" (Lopez, 243).

"Three calls that . . . occurred early on September 27, 1963, may have
been an impostor. At approximately 10:30 am, a man called the Soviet
Military Attache looking for a visa to Odessa and was referred to the
Soviet Consulate. [CENSORED] At 10:37 am, a man called the Soviet
Consulate and asked for a visa to Odessa. He was told to call back at
11:00 am. At 1:25 pm, a man called the Soviet Embassy and was told the
Consul would return between 4:00 pm and 5:00 pm that day" (Lopez, 248).

At least the 10:37 am call was recorded by the CIA, which was tapping
certain phone lines at the Soviet Embassy. The caller and official both
spoke Spanish, and the CIA transcriber does not mention if the caller's
Spanish was less than fluent or if he had a noticeable accent, as was
routinely done (Newman, 355). After the Lopez Report had been buried, the
CIA studied it intensely, and concluded in an internal memorandum that,
despite the original CIA identification, these calls were unrelated to
Lee Harvey Oswald (Ibid.). John Newman, the most ardent student of the
recent CIA releases, writes, "The most prudent interpretation is,
therefore, that these calls were not made by Oswald or an impostor"
(Ibid.)

The caller was told at 10:37 am to call back at 11:00 am, but did not
call back until 1:25 pm. Only he knows what took him so long. But at
11:00 am, a man identifying himself as Lee Harvey Oswald walked into the
nearby Cuban Consulate, and requested an in-transit visa to Cuba from
employee Silvia Duran. He stated that he intended to travel to Russia via
Cuba. The man presented her with numerous proofs of both his identity and
his pro-Castro convictions -- including a membership card for the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee of New Orleans signed "Lee H. Oswald," a
Communist Party of America membership card (which Oswald is not known to
have ever possessed), and assorted newspaper clippings describing Lee
Harvey Oswald's street demonstrations and arrest in New Orleans during
the summer of 1963. Silvia Duran described the man as being about 5'6",
blonde, and over 30 years of age. The Lopez Report comments, "Silvia
Duran's description of Oswald did not resemble Oswald's true physical
appearance" (Lopez, 245).

Duran told Oswald that she needed passport-style photographs of him in
order to process the visa. Oswald left the Consulate and returned at
12:15 pm with the photos. One photo was stapled to his application form,
which we have today. The photo in the record is indeed Oswald. Gerald
Posner argues that the Cuban Consulate photo proves this man was the
"real" Oswald. But Consul Eusebio Azcue, who would soon meet Duran's
caller himself, says that Duran could have easily been preoccupied enough
not to notice the difference. Interestingly, US investigators combed
every establishment within several miles' radius of the Consulate where
Oswald could have had the picture made; the photo stapled to his visa
application came from none of them.

Duran filled out his application in duplicate, which she says Oswald
signed in her presence, which was required. She reported later that some
of the ID he presented puzzled her. As he showed a membership card to the
American Communist Party, she couldn't understand why Oswald hadn't
arranged for his visa through the Party, which had an agreement with the
Cuban Communist Party allowing approved Americans to get visas
immediately, unlike others who faced considerable waiting periods.


Mrs. [SILVIA DURAN] TIRADO. What I said is that when he said he was a
member of the [American] Communist Party . . . I said why don't they
arrange [your visa] with the Cuban [Communist] Party, and he said he
didn't have time to do it. . . . It was strange. I mean, because you are
a Communist and you're coming from a country where the Communist Party is
not very well seen, and in Mexico City [where] the Communist Party WAS
NOT LEGAL AT THE MOMENT -- CROSSING THE BORDER WITH ALL OF HIS PAPER
[emphasis added] it was not logical. I mean if you're Communist, you go
with . . . nothing, just your passport, that's all. And that [state of
affairs] was something that I didn't like . . . but . . . (3 HSCA 34-35).


Oswald showed Silvia Duran a card showing him to be a member of the
Communist Party of the USA, an item that Oswald never obtained
legitimately, and is never known to have possessed in any circumstance;
it was not in his wallet when arrested in New Orleans on August 9, 1963,
or in Dallas on November 22. But the Oswald that visited the Cuban
Consulate did. He proudly displayed it to Silvia Duran as proof of his
loyalties to Communist ideals, but it only aroused her curiosity. She
couldn't understand why a Communist would be foolish enough to cross the
border into Mexico with such a card in his possession nor flagrantly
flash it at an official of the Cuban Consulate. It was odd enough that
she later mentioned it to the Consul (3 HSCA 35).

She explained to Oswald that regardless of his "credentials," a Cuban
in-transit visa application could not be processed without proper
authorization from Havana unless he already possessed a Soviet visa, in
which case the visa to Cuba could be processed immediately. Grumbling
about the "bureaucracy" he was encountering, Oswald left for the Soviet
Consulate (3 HSCA 36; Newman, 357).

In 1963, Colonel Oleg Nechiporenko was Vice Consul, and -- like the other
senior officers at the Consulate -- was an agent of the KGB. The retreat
of the Cold War has allowed us to belatedly hear Colonel Nechiporenko's
tale straight from the source.


"On Friday, September 27, 1963, at approximately twelve-thirty in the
afternoon, someone rang a buzzer outside the Soviet embassy gate. . . .
Upon entering the embassy grounds, the stranger turned to the sentry and
said in Russian, 'I'm an American and would like to speak to someone from
the consulate.' . . . Valery Vladimirovich Kostikov was one of the
consulate employees . . . receiving visitors . . . When asked in English
the purpose of the visit, the stranger looked skeptically at Kostikov and
said, 'I would like to speak with one of the SOVIET consular officers.' .
. . Amused by the stranger's request, [Kostikov] pulled out his
diplomatic ID and showed it to the visitor. . . . He then invited him
into his office.

". . . The young man spoke first, announcing that he had come to Mexico
from the United States to ask for a visa to the Soviet Union. He said
that he had lived there a few years ago and had married a Soviet citizen
who was now in the United States with their child. He explained he was
under constant surveillance in the United States by the FBI, and as a
result, he wanted to return to the USSR. He then said that the 'local
authorities' were also persecuting him and his wife, making life in
America unbearable.

"To support his claims, the stranger presented his American passport,
issued in the name of Lee Harvey Oswald, and pulled a rather hefty
package of other documents from his jacket. . .  Kostikov saw certain
papers that corroborated the visitor's claim of having lived in the
Soviet Union" (Col. Oleg Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, 66-67).


Kostikov excused himself and phoned Nechiporenko's office, as Kostikov
was in a hurry to leave at that time, and besides, he added, "It seems to
be more in your line of work" (Ibid., 68). The Colonel writes:


"As I approached the small building that housed the consular division, I
saw a stranger, apparently twenty-five to twenty-seven years old,
standing on the steps and leaning against the doorpost. He appeared to be
European or American. He was of medium height, with a longish face, a
narrow chin, and a high forehead that clearly tended toward baldness. I
would have called him a brunet.

"The first impression I had of this stranger was his aloofness. He seemed
to be looking beyond me, absorbed in his thoughts, and did not even react
as I approached him. He was clad in a light jacket, a sport shirt with an
unbuttoned collar, and either gray or brown slacks that were wrinkled. I
greeted the stranger with a nod. He responded in kind. [Their meeting
would be conducted primarily in Russian.]

". . . The visitor, who appeared to be in a state of physical and mental
exhaustion, accepted my offer to sit down. But he suddenly became more
focused as he explained to me the reason for his visit. He repeated
everything he had already told Valery [Kostikov] Over the course of our
conversation, the visitor's mood changed from discomfort to a state of
great agitation, creating the impression of a high-strung, neurotic
individual. In order to give him a chance to calm down, I paused in my
questioning and looked over his documents. Everything seemed to be in
order regarding his American passport. Other documents testified to his
stay in the Soviet Union. One of them was a marriage certificate to
Marina Prusakova. Among the others, one that stood out was a letter to
the Soviet embassy in Washington that had something to do with travel for
his family to the USSR and, it seems, the embassy's refusal to grant his
request. Seeing that Oswald had cooled off a bit, I renewed our
conversation.

"When I asked him to provide specific information about the FBI's
following him, he replied that it all began after his return from the
USSR, where he had gone as a Marxist sympathizer. When the couple
returned to the United States, both were interrogated. His wife was still
being questioned in his absence, and he claimed that the FBI had even
been in contact with his friends. When I asked him the reason for his
return, Oswald fidgeted, changed the subject, and avoided answering the
question. I realized that he did not want to state the reason, which put
me on my guard.

". . .  Oswald maintained that as a result of the FBI's activities he
could not find a good job and that the situation at home had become
intolerable. Even though I had seen the letter to our embassy in the
United States, I nonetheless asked him if he had appealed to the Soviet
embassy in Washington. Oswald said that he had already sent a letter
there and been turned down. He later mentioned his fear that the FBI
would arrest him for establishing contact with our Washington embassy. So
as not to give the FBI additional cause to seize him, he decided to come
to Mexico to follow through on his plan. Moreover, in the event that he
should be allowed to return to the Soviet Union, he wanted to travel to
Cuba first. In Mexico he could obtain visas to both countries at the same
time" (Ibid.).


Oswald is apparently telling one lie after another to Nechiporenko. The
FBI and "local authorities" appear to not only have left the Oswalds
virtually in peace, but given their existence as a "defector" and a
Russian national in Cold War-era Texas, it is shocking how little
difficulty the couple had in that most Southern of Southern states. The
Oswalds, to the best of our knowledge, were not "interrogated" upon their
arrival from Russia -- one CIA debriefing (with content utterly unknown)
and two questioning sessions with the FBI hardly constitute harassment --
and NO ONE in law enforcement, as far as we know, ever spoke to Marina
Oswald until November 1963. Study of the Warren Commission volumes
reveals that several of the Oswalds' Russian acquaintances in Dallas and
Fort Worth contacted the FBI about Oswald THEMSELVES, and none are known
to have been approached by the Bureau. Most curiously, Oswald himself
REQUESTED an interview with an FBI agent following his New Orleans arrest
of August 9th. Oswald, furthermore, in all probability had no interest in
returning to Russia. He'd written to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, he
and Marina had NOT been turned down -- the Embassy simply informed the
Oswalds of the first steps they would need to take in the process of
application for a visa, and the Oswalds had not taken any of them -- nor,
according to Marina, did her husband ever discuss taking any of them. Of
course, Oswald is not generally known for his candor.

Nechiporenko found Oswald's spiel rather tedious, and informed him that
as a US resident, he should be dealing with the Soviet Embassy in the US.
He offered to make an exception and give Oswald the necessary papers to
fill out, but these would have to be approved by Moscow. The decision
would take about four months (Ibid., 70)

Oswald leaned forward and practically shouted in Nechiporenko's face,
"This won't do for me! This is not my case! For me, it's all going to end
in tragedy!" The Colonel shrugged and stood up. Oswalds hands were
trembling as he put his documents back into his jacket, and departed in
an agitated state (Ibid., 70-71).

Nechiporenko told historian Peter Dale Scott that he had not the
slightest doubt that the man he met at the Soviet Embassy was Lee Harvey
Oswald -- or else "his identical twin" (Scott, Deep Politics II). There's
only one problem. Although the Colonel notes, "overall [Oswald] was able
to express his thoughts in our language," he writes, "Oswald, possibly
from the strain of being overly excited, often experienced difficulties
in finding the proper Russian word and would switch to English. His
pronunciation was bad, and he really mangled the grammar . . ." (Ibid.,
71).

The record is nearly unanimous: Oswald spoke fluent Russian; some, such
as George De Mohrenschildt, considered his mastery of the written and
spoken language exceptional -- much better than his English.
 
Oswald's meeting with Nechiporenko took just under an hour. It had begun
after Oswald and Kostikov met for a short period of time following 12:30
pm (Ibid.). It was while Oswald was with Nechiporenko the 10:30 and 10:37
am caller initially identified by the CIA as Lee Harvey Oswald made the
1:25 pm phone call to the Soviet Consulate, and was told to call back
between 4 and 5 pm. This is why the CIA had to retract their earlier
identification; the Warren Commission didn't look too closely at the
Mexico City incident -- but the HSCA did . . . for a while.

The Cuban Consulate closed at 2 pm everyday. At some time after closing,
Lee Harvey Oswald rang and asked for Silvia Duran. A guard escorted him
in. Oswald told Duran that the Soviets were processing his visa
application, and there would be no trouble with it. Duran was suspicious.
At 4:05 pm, the CIA intercepted a phone call from the Cuban Consulate to
the Russian Embassy. According to the CIA transcript, Duran said, "There
is an American here who has requested an in-transit visa because he is
going to Russia. I sent him to you thinking if he got a Russian visa that
I could then issue him a Cuban visa without any more processing. Who did
he speak to? He claims he was told there were no more problems" (Newman,
358).

"The unidentified Soviet asked Duran to wait and then could be heard in
the background explaining to someone that Silvia Duran was calling about
an American who said he had been to the Soviet Embassy. 'Please leave
your name and number,' the voice from the Soviet Embassy instructed, 'and
we will call you back'" (Ibid.). In a conversation recorded by the CIA,
the Soviet Embassy returned Duran's call at 4:26 pm, informing that they
were seeking information from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the
earliest a visa would likely be issued was in four to five months. Duran
thanked them, apologized for bothering them, and hung up. The
conversation was in Spanish (Newman, 359). Oleg Nechiporenko and Valery
Kostikov later remembered the phone call (Nechiporenko, 74). John Newman
notes that the female caller identified herself as Silvia Duran, but
neither she nor the unidentified Soviet official used Oswald's name at
all in the course of the conversation; he was simply referred to as "an
American" (Newman, 359). Therefore someone who happened to be listening
in surreptitiously -- say, someone in the CIA installation nearby --
wouldn't necessarily know Oswald's name. This seemingly trivial detail
will become vitally important shortly.

Oswald flushed bright red and argued loudly with Duran. He demanded that,
as a friend of the revolution, he had every right to a visa. When she
informed him that it had to be approved in Havana and it would take at
the very least several weeks, he shouted that he didn't have several
weeks -- that his tourist visa for Mexico would expire in three days. He
called her a petty bureaucrat and complained that a representative of
Fidel Castro would behave in such a way. He caused such a disturbance
that Consul Eusebio Azcue stepped out of his office to intervene. After
the Consul reiterated the regulations for obtaining an in-transit visa to
Oswald, the two engaged in a bit of shouting match, with Oswald
brandishing his newspaper clippings and shouting about his proven loyalty
to the Cuban revolution, and that such evidence should merit his being
granted a visa. Azcue grew weary of arguing, finally informed Oswald
that, in his opinion, someone such as he could only do the revolution
harm, and had him escorted out (Lopez, 204-05; Newman, 361*).

(*The Lopez Report and John Newman disagree on the sequence of some of
the above events. Lopez places the altercation with Azcue during one of
Oswald's earlier visits that day. Newman places it during the last due to
Silvia Duran's recollection that the incident with Azcue occurred after
the Consulate had officially closed for the day.)

The Warren Commission did not interview Duran, Azcue, or any other
Mexicans about Oswald's visit, relying on CIA and DFS (Mexican police)
reports that we now can see with our own eyes are heavily edited and in
many cases altered. Robert Blakey of the House Select Committee
interviewed several of the witnesses. When asked about Lee Harvey Oswald,
Eusebio Azcue said, "[T]he person that came to the embassy and told me he
was Oswald and the person that I later saw on TV when he was assassinated
at that Dallas police station. . . . IT LOOKED LIKE TWO DIFFERENT PEOPLE
[emphasis added]" (Blakey-Azcue interview, p. 18; all of Azcue's
statements are translated from the Spanish).


BLAKEY. When you saw the passport, did you see any difference between the
picture in the passport and the person standing in front of you?

AZCUE. No, no. . . . You see, it's usually the secretary that deals with
all these matters. But the difference I noted was between the man who
came to the consulate and the one that was assassinated [by Jack Ruby]
(Ibid.).


Blakey showed Azcue a number of photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald and
asked if the man looked familiar. Indicating one, Azcue said, "No. 57
represents Oswald, but the Oswald assassinated. But frankly, THE IDEA
THAT'S IN MY MIND OF OSWALD -- THE ONE THAT I SAW AT THE CONSULATE -- IS
NOT SO SIMILAR TO THIS PHOTO [emphasis added]. I recognize him because I
remember the television clips shown on [television] of him when he was
killed. If I had not seen those clips on television, I would not have
recognized him as THE Lee Harvey Oswald [emphasis added] for the memories
that I have of Oswald are SIMILAR to what appear[s] on these photographs
[emphasis added]. Pictures RESEMBLE the man [emphasis added] but I insist
that [the Oswald at the Consulate's] nose is more aquiline, that his
eyelashes [sic: eyebrows] were straighter, his look was more cold, and
his cheeks seemed older -- that of an older man. His cheeks were sunken
like that of an older man; also much older than this photo. This man in
the photo would be at the most 30 years old and the man I saw in the
consulate was 35, 36, 37: you know, this man in the picture is much
younger. You see, it was many years ago, so -- but I remember, I saw the
photo, the Oswald that had been assassinated. I DID NOT RECOGNIZE HIM AS
THE SAME MAN THAT VISITED ME AT THE EMBASSY [emphasis added] -- so
different features . . ." (Ibid., p. 19)

In his testimony before the HSCA, the Committee asked him over and over
about this point.


Mr. CORNWELL. Do [these photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald] appear to you
to be the same individual who visited the consulate in Mexico City on the
occasions you have previously described to us?

Seor AZCUE. Fifteen years had gone by so it is very difficult for me to
be in a position to guarantee it in categorical form. But my belief is
THAT THIS GENTLEMAN WAS NOT, IS NOT, THE PERSON OR INDIVIDUAL WHO WENT TO
THE CONSULATE [emphasis added].

Mr. CORNWELL. . . . [T]he day of the assassination or the day after the
assassination, did you . . . have an occasion to see pictures of the
alleged assassin in the newspapers or to observe on television the man
identified at that time as Lee Harvey Oswald?

Seor AZCUE. . . . [I]t was in mid-December approximately -- I saw at that
time the film in which Ruby appears assassinating THE OSWALD WHO WAS
THERE [in Dallas], and I was not able to identify him and only two months
had gone by since I had seen THE OSWALD WHO APPEARED AT THE CONSULATE
And I HAD A CLEAR MENTAL PICTURE because we had had an unpleasant
discussion and he had not been very pleasant to me and I did not
recognize him when I first saw him. I did not recognize Oswald. The man
who went to the consulate was a man over 30 years of age and very thin,
very thin-faced. And the individual I saw in the movie [of Ruby shooting
Oswald] was a young man, considerably younger, and a fuller face [all
emphasis added].

Mr. CORNWELL. What color hair did the individual have to the best of your
memory who visited the consulate?

Seor AZCUE. He was blond, dark blond.

Mr. CORNWELL. . . . Did the individual who visited the consulate look
like that individual [in JFK Exhibit F-434, Oswald's passport photo]?

Seor AZCUE. No.

Mr. CORNWELL. What differences were there?

Seor AZCUE. Many differences. The individual who visited the consulate is
one whose physiognomy or whose face I recall very clearly. He had a hard
face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight eyes. His
cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed. This gentleman
[in the passport photo] looks like he is somewhat heavier, more filled
[fuller face?], his eyes are at an angle with the outside of his eye, at
an angle with his face. I would never have recognized him. I believe I
can recall with fairly good accuracy the individual in such a way that I
could recognize him NOW [emphasis added] in a group of 100 [. . .] that
is better than a photograph of him because obviously during a period of
15 years he might change. I think I could recognize him, and this is not
him. . . . It is a question of personal evaluation on my part. But it is
very clearly imprinted.

Mr. CORNWELL. The staff of the committee has had an opportunity to speak
to Mrs. Silvia Duran, and during the interview with her she expressed no
doubt about the fact that the person who was killed in Dallas by Jack
Ruby was the individual who visited the consulate. Do you have any reason
to question her memory or the reason that her memory might differ from
yours?

Seor AZCUE. Categorically, I could not affirm it without any doubt.
However, it is possible that she might be more susceptible to impression
or impressionable than I. I remember what I saw on TV later or maybe
before. I remember that moment when he was killed and I remember I did
not recognize him. I did not have any prejudices or preconceptions (3
HSCA 138-9).

Mr. PREYER. Well, in the photographs on the application, and also in the
passport, Oswald appears to have on a tie and a sweater. How was he
dressed when he came to the Embassy, to the consulate?

Seor. AZCUE. I always imagine him or visualize him as wearing a suit,
coat and pants, trousers, with a pattern of crossed lines, not very clear
design. Blue, some reddish. I never conceived of him or visualized him
wearing a light sweater [like the one in the application photograph].
When I saw this photograph in April of this year, I also noticed that THE
CLOTHING HE WAS WEARING WAS NOT THE SAME [emphasis added].

Mr. PREYER. So that the clothing he was wearing in the photographs was
not similar to that which he was wearing when he actually visited you in
the Embassy.

Seor AZCUE. I am almost in a position to assure that.

Mr. PREYER. When he returned with the photographs and with his
application . . . would you have looked at the pictures on the visa
application and on the passport?

Seor AZCUE. No, I did not see the photograph at that time. . . . I was
never present during the preparation of this form nor of the affixing of
the photograph.

Mr. PREYER. . . . You have indicated to us that you don't believe the man
whose photograph appears on the visa application and the passport was the
same man who appeared before you in the consulate. Have you ever seen a
photograph of the man you believed to have appeared before you in the
consulate?

Seor AZCUE. Never. . . .

Mr. PREYER. . . . If analysis of that handwriting, of that signature on
the visa application showed it to be Lee Harvey Oswald's signature, would
you still believe that the man who visited the consulate was not Oswald?

Seor AZCUE. Under such circumstances I would have to accept that I was
being influenced or that I was seeing visions (3 HSCA 143-45).


Eusebio Azcue was an honest man; he had no ax to grind against the US
government, as is shown by his candor as above. He was not seeing
visions; he was lucid and observant. Even when told that Silvia Duran did
not support his claim, and even was it was strongly implied that Oswald's
handwriting on the application had been authenticated (which indeed it
was), he only reiterated that he could be mistaken, but he was
nevertheless certain it was not the Lee Harvey Oswald shot and killed in
Dallas by Jack Ruby who he had exchanged words with at the Cuban
Consulate on September 27, 1963.

HSCA Deputy Counsel Gary Cornwell was correct in his assertion about
Silvia Duran Tirado; she told the Committee she had no doubts whatsoever
that the man in the Consulate had been Lee Harvey Oswald, the Lee Harvey
Oswald shot and killed in Dallas by Jack Ruby (3 HSCA 79). Her testimony
has to be read further to understand that Cornwell was incorrect in
implying that Duran's testimony NECESSARILY contradicted Azcue's.

While interviewing Duran, Cornwell had his tape recorder turned off for
five or ten minutes while Duran examined two albums of photographs of
Oswald and numerous others. Duran's initial reactions are therefore not
in the record, but Cornwell was careful to prompt her to repeat her
earlier remarks.


CORNWELL. [Y]ou also pointed to number 57 when you went through the book.

TIRADO. Yes.

CORNWELL. And who do you think that is?

TIRADO. Oswald.

CORNWELL. Lee Harvey Oswald. Now, many of the pictures in the book are
not that clear, of course. When you saw him for the first time in the
book, you indicated that that LOOKED LIKE HIM EXCEPT THAT AS YOU RECALLED
HIM, HE HAD EITHER BLUE OR GREEN EYES AND BLOND HAIR [emphasis added].
Correct?

TIRADO. Yes.

CORNWELL. When you say blond hair, what color is that? Is it very light?

TIRADO. Light (3 HSCA 69).

She reaffirmed this impression several times (3 HSCA 69-71).

Gerald Posner argues that Oswald's photograph and signature on the visa
application proves that there could have been no impostor. It's a
respectable opinion, but there are still too many reasons for doubt.

The HSCA authenticated Oswald's signature on the application, which
Silvia Duran saw him sign at her desk in the Consulate. This author does
not challenge this identification, though handwriting analysts admit that
their work is not an exact science; it is an act of interpretation.

The CIA routinely photographed visitors to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban
Consulate. Had Oswald visited the Embassy, they would have been routinely
photographed -- despite the CIA's pitiful claim that the cameras were
inoperative when Oswald made his appearances -- and those photographs
would be in the record. There are NUMEROUS photographs in evidence of a
stocky, light-haired man photographed over several days at both
consulates who was initially identified by the CIA as the man who used
the name "Lee Harvey Oswald" at both locations. This man remains
unidentified. The Mexico City "mystery man" may have been misidentified
innocently as claimed, unlikely as that seems. However, it cannot be
stated with certainty that Oswald visited the Russian or Cuban
consulates, or was even in Mexico City at all.

There were also recordings of Oswald's voice made. Several Warren
Commission staffers listened to them after the assassination. Yet the CIA
claims they were routinely erased and reused BEFORE the assassination.

During a public debate with Mark Lane in September 1977, David Atlee
Phillips - the CIA officer in Mexico City responsible for much of the
disinformation that would be transmitted from Mexico about Oswald - made
the following statement: "[W]hen the record comes out, we will find that
there was never a photograph taken of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City.
We will find out that Lee Harvey Oswald never visited, let me put it,
that is a categorical statement, there, there, we will find out there is
no evidence, first of all there was no proof of that. Second, there is no
evidence to show that Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy"
(Lane, Plausible Denial, 82).

This is not quite the "categorical statement" we would hope for
concerning Oswald's visit, but it is an admission that there is no
evidence that Oswald was there, and in all probability, there never was.

The next day, September 28, 1963, was a Saturday. The Cuban and Soviet
Consulates were closed (3 HSCA 50-51, 133; Nechiporenko, 75). Remember
that; it will be important.

Nechiporenko relates that Saturday mornings were generally reserved for
"intense volleyball games on the embassy grounds" (Nechiporenko, 75).
(KGB agents playing weekly volleyball games -- who'd've believed it?)
Pavel Yatskov was the first to arrive at the embassy on Saturday morning,
September 28, a little after 10 am. Before long the sentry on duty
informed Yatskov that there was a visitor who insisted upon speaking with
the consul. The sentry had explained. that the embassy was not open to
the public on Saturday, but Yatskov said he would make an exception
(Ibid.).

Yatskov recalls, "A thin subject, of medium height and nondescript
appearance, age twenty-five to twenty-seven, appeared in the doorway. He
was carelessly dressed, in a gray suit. His pale features and the
extremely agitated look on his face were especially noticeable. I told
him to take a seat . . . without waiting for any questions [he] spoke to
me in English. My limited knowledge of English nonetheless allowed me to
understand that my guest was an American, a Communist, pro-Cuban, and
that he was asking for a visa to Cuba and the USSR. I was also able to
discern that someone was persecuting him and that he feared for his life.
When I asked him if he spoke Spanish, he shook his head no. The
conversation was strained due to the language difficulties. Then the door
opened again, and Valery [Kostikov entered] . . . I was happy to see him,
since I knew Valery spoke English" (Ibid., 75-76).

Kostikov described the visitor as "disheveled, rumpled, and unshaven. He
had the look of someone who was hounded and he was much more anxious than
the day before. . . . Without engaging Oswald in conversation, and it WAS
he [emphasis in original]," Kostikov explained to Yatskov the events of
the previous day. Oswald jumped in and began retelling his story: "he had
been discharged from the US Army a few years before [probably Kostikov's
error], had traveled to the Soviet Union as a tourist, where he had
remained for political reasons [technically true -- he'd entered with a
tourist visa], and had lived for a while in Belorussia where he married a
Russian and returned to the United States. HE EVEN DROPPED SOME HINTS
THAT HE HAD SUPPOSEDLY CARRIED OUT A SECRET MISSION [emphasis in
original]. He announced that he was a Communist and a member of an
organization that defended Cuba. Pavel [Yatskov] interrupted his
monologue and said, since he had been in the Soviet Union, lived and
worked there, that he could probably explain himself in Russian and
looked at him disapprovingly. Without answering, he switched over to
broken Russian, in which the rest of the conversation was conducted,
except in a few instances when Oswald experienced difficulty in
expressing certain thoughts in Russians and inserted English words"
(Ibid., 76-77).

It was Oswald, Kostikov assures us. But he speaks only BROKEN RUSSIAN; he
is uncomfortable with Russian and resists speaking it until challenged;
he "experienced difficulty" speaking Russian, and had to insert English
words on occasion to make himself understood. This was NOT Oswald.

Oswald went through his story again, emphasizing the persecution he
suffered in America, the surveillance he was under, the way his life and
that of his family was disrupted, how the authorities harassed and
interrogated his friends and neighbors. He complained about the FBI; he
said he feared for his life; he dreamed of his old home in the Soviet
Union, and wished he had his old job in Russia back again. "Throughout
his story," Kostikov continues, "Oswald was extremely agitated and
clearly nervous, especially whenever he mentioned the FBI, but he
suddenly became hysterical, began to sob, and through his tears cried, 'I
am afraid . . . they'll kill me. Let me in!' Repeating over and over that
he was being persecuted and that he was being followed even here in
Mexico, he stuck his right hand into the left pocket of his jacket and
pulled out a revolver, saying, 'See? This is what I must now carry to
protect my life,' and placed the revolver on the desk where we were
sitting opposite one another (Ibid., 77).

Kostikov writes, "I was dumbfounded and looked at Pavel [Yatskov], who
had turned slighly pale but then quickly said to me, 'Here, give me that
piece.' I took the revolver from the tableand handed it to Pavel. Oswald,
sobbing, wiped away his tears. . . . [Yatskov] opened the chamber, shook
the bullets into his hand, and put them in a desk drawer. He then handed
the revolver to me, and I put it back on the desk. Oswald continued to
sob, then pulled himself together and seemed indifferent to what he had
done with his weapon" (Ibid., 78).

Yatskov poured Oswald a glass of water, and Oswald's hand shook as he
reached for it. His eyes were wet with tears. Yatskov explained to him,
in Russian, that as bad as things might seem to him, the reasons for his
feeling that way were not clear to the officers. "Valery repeated a few
of my sentences on English," he recalls (Ibid.). When he appeared to have
calmed down, Yatskov reiterated the regulations regarding the issuance of
a visa. He said that he and the other officials would do what they could
to speed the process, but it was Moscow which made the decisions; Oswald
simply could not have a visa as quickly as he was demanding. Around this
time, Col. Nechiporenko entered with his athletic bag, saw the three men
engrossed in conversation, and quickly beat a retreat to another office
(Ibid., 78).

As Oswald had expressed an interest in Cuba, Yatskov suggested he try to
obtain a Cuban visa instead. Oswald, understandably, didn't respond with
enthusiasm. He mentioned his correspondence with the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, and complained of the bureaucratic employees who didn't
understand him. He calmed down, "drooped," as Yatskov put it, and seemed
to sink into "depression." When it became clear that he would not get
what he was requesting, Oswald stood up, picked up his revolver, stuck it
inside his jacket, and pocketed the bullets that Yatskov offered back to
him. He said something again about being followed, then sullenly
departed. Nechiporenko rejoined the group just as the men were nodding
goodbyes; "At that moment I distinctly heard Oswald say that he was
afraid to return to the United States -- where he would be killed. 'But
if they don't leave me alone, I'm going to defend myself.'" Valery
Kostikov confirmed to Nechiporenko almost thirty years later that he too
remembered those same words (Ibid., 80).

What was going on?


The three Russian officials spent the remainder of the morning filling
out reports of their unsettling encounter. They missed their volleyball
game. However, the action wasn't over yet.

The Lopez Report: "September 28, 1963: At 11:51 am, Silvia Duran called
the Soviet Consulate. She said that there was an American citizen at the
Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. The
Soviet asked Silvia to wait a minute. Upon his return to the telephone,
Silvia put the American on the line. At first the American spoke in
Russian and the Soviet spoke English. The conversation then proceeded in
English until the Russian discontinued it and put another Soviet on the
line. The Soviet spoke in English, but the American, speaking in broken
Russian, asked him to speak Russian. The conversation resumed in Russian
at this point. It also became incoherent and is thus quoted in its
entirety:

RUSSIAN. What else do you want?

AMERICAN. I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.

RUSSIAN. I know that.

AMERICAN. //speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian// I did not know
it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because
they have it.

RUSSIAN. Why don't you come again and leave your address with us; it is
not far from the Cuban Embassy.

AMERICAN. Well, I'll be there right away (Lopez, 76-77).


No American returned to the Soviet Consulate that day.

The above conversation was transcribed by a CIA wiretapper, in whose own
words were the descriptions of the man's Russian "terrible" and "hardly
recognizable." There was a bigger problem, however. It was Saturday; the
Cuban Consulate was closed.


Mr. CORNWELL. Is it possible that [Oswald] also came back . . . on
Saturday morning?

Mrs. TIRADO. No.

Mr. CORNWELL. How can you be sure of that?

Mrs. TIRADO. Because I remember the fight [on Friday]. So if he [came]
back, I would have remembered.

Mr. CORNWELL. Did Azcue work on Saturdays?

Mrs. TIRADO. Yes, we used to work in the office but not for the public.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was there a guard [outside] on Saturdays?

Mrs. TIRADO. . . . Yes, but on Saturday he never let people --

Mr. CORNWELL. Never let people in.

Mrs. TIRADO. No.

Mr. CORNWELL. Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak
Spanish? And were very insistent?

Mrs. TIRADO. No . . .

Mr. CORNWELL. They could do that on Friday, though. . . . Are you saying
that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during
the week but not on Saturday? . . . Is that correct?

Mrs. TIRADO. Yes.

Mr. CORNWELL. Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to
telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it
more than one call?

Mrs. TIRADO. Only one (3 HSCA 49-51).

Mr. CORNWELL. . . . Did at any point in that conversation
Russian-speaking people get involved? Did anyone at the Russian Embassy
speak Russian to you?

Mrs. TIRADO. I don't speak Russian.

Mr. CORNWELL. Well, I understand that. Did you at any point put Oswald on
the phone and let him talk?

Mrs. TIRADO. No, no.

Mr. CORNWELL. The reason I am asking of course is to try to jog your
memory. Did he at any point in that transaction speak Russian? Did Oswald
speak Russian that you recall?

Mrs. TIRADO. No (3 HSCA 114).


The Lopez Report: "October 1, 1963, Tuesday: At 10:31 am, an unidentified
man called the Soviet Military Attache and, in broken Russian, said that
he had visited the Consulate the previous Saturday and had spoken to the
Consul. The man wanted to know if the Soviets had received an answer from
Washington. At that point, the Soviet official gave the man the Consulate
phone number and asked him to call there. . . . (Lopez, 78)

"At 10:45 am, a man who, according to the translator's comment, had
phoned a day or so before and had spoken in broken Russian, called the
[Soviet] Consulate and spoke to an employee named Obyedkov. The man
calling introduced himself as 'Lee Oswald' and stated that he visited the
Soviet Consulate the previous Saturday. He told Obyedkov that he spoke
with the Consul on that day. Oswald added that the Consul had stated that
they would send a telegram to Washington and he wanted to know if they
had received an answer. Oswald also said that he did not remember the
name of the Consul with whom he had spoken. Obyedkov asked if it had been
Kostikov and described him as 'dark.' The man outside replied
affirmatively and repeated that his name was Oswald. Obyedkov asked
Oswald to hold on a minute while he inquired. When Obyedkov resumed the
conversation, he stated that the Soviet Consul had not yet received an
answer but the request had been sent. Obyedkov then hung up as Oswald
began another sentence with the words, 'And what . . .' (Lopez, 78-79).

"October 3, 1963, Thursday: An unidentified man called the Soviet
Military Attache and spoke in broken Spanish and then in English. When
the man inquired about a visa to Russia, he was given the Consulate phone
number. The man then inquired if they issued visas at the Consulate. The
Soviet stated that he was not certain but that the caller should call the
Consulate nonetheless" (Lopez, 79).

John Newman points out there is reason to be more Oswald phone calls to
the Soviet Embassy were intercepted than are in the record. Mexico City
CIA Chief of Station Winston Scott retired a few years later and began
work on a semi-fictionalized memoir, the mere idea of which troubled some
highly placed souls at the Agency. The minute that CIA
Counter-intelligence chief James Jesus Angleton flew to Mexico City
immediately upon hearing of Scott's death in 1971, "removed the contents
of Scott's safe, and demanded that the family turn over Scott's papers to
him. Angleton returned to Washington with, among other things, a
manuscript" (Newman, Oswald and the CIA, 369). The manuscript was
classified and buried, and even when Scott's family later clamored for
its return, only a handful of chapters were turned over. Some of it has
now been declassified due to the JFK Records Act of 1992. Newman quotes
this passage:


Oswald told a high-ranking officer of the Soviet Embassy that the officer
should have had word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington about his
visit and its purpose, after he had spelled out his full name, slowly and
carefully, for the Soviet. He further told this Soviet that he should
know that Oswald, his wife and child wanted to go to the Crimea,
urgently, and that he (Oswald) had learned that he would have to go by
way of Cuba. Oswald was then directed to the Cuban Embassy by the Soviet,
who told Oswald that he would need a Cuban transit visa (Newman, 369).


Newman also quotes from the Lopez Report's summary of an interview with a
female CIA employee identified only as "Mrs. T," who transcribed some of
the Mexico City intercept tapes. She described one conversation she
recalled transcribing, but which was no longer in the record: "According
to my recollection, I myself have made a transcript, an English
transcript, of Lee Oswald talking to the Russian Consulate or whoever he
was at that time, asking for financial aid. Now, that particular
transcript does not appear here and whatever happened to it, I do not
know, but it was a lengthy transcript. It was a lengthy conversation
between him and someone at the Russian Embassy. . . . [T]he caller
IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS LEE OSWALD [emphasis added]" (Lopez, 85; cited in
Newman, 371).

This dovetails nicely with Mexico City Cuban propaganda chief David Atlee
Phillips, who testified that "Oswald indicated in his discussions with
the Soviet Embassy that he hoped to receive assistance with the expenses
of his trip" (Lopez; cited in Newman, 376).

"Mr. T," the husband of "Mrs. T," was also an employee of the CIA; he
personally transcribed the phone call of Tuesday, October 1st, 10:45 am.
He was shown the transcript by the HSCA, and immediately recognized it
because of the way the name "Lee Oswald" was underlined: "We got a
request from the station to see if we pick up the name of this person
because sometimes we had a so-called 'defector' from the United States
that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on them. Not I --
the Station. Consequently they were very hot about the whole thing. They
said, 'If you can get the name . . .' [so] I put them in capitals. . . .
because it was very important to them" (Lopez, 85; cited in Newman, 371).
Curiously, despite the Agency's interest, the record is devoid of even a
single photograph of Oswald, despite the fact that visitors to both the
Cuban and Soviet Embassies were routinely photographed from CIA posts in
nearby buildings. (The official excuse was -- and is -- that the cameras
happened to break down at the times Oswald is believed to have made his
visits. It could happen.)

We may never make sense of all of this, but John Newman may have
illuminated part of the puzzle. From recently declassified documents,
Newman relates an interesting story which may be relevant to the subject
at hand.


Eldon Hensen was a cattleman from Athens, Texas. On July 19, [1963] he
tried -- for the second time in a week -- to make contact with the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico City. He spoke by phone with Maria Luisa Calderon, but
did not state his business and refused to go the Cuban Embassy because of
the possibility that an "American spy might see him." At 6 feet 4 inches
and over 200 pounds with a "powerful build" and a "Bob Hope ski nose," he
probably had a point. Hensen did state that he was staying in Room 1402
at the Alameda Hotel and was leaving for Dallas the next morning on
American airlines.

Hensen was in luck -- or so it seemed. Miraculously, that same afternoon
Hensen received a telephone call from a man who identified himself as a
Cuban Embassy officer who suggested a meeting in a restaurant. Happy to
have avoided American intelligence, Hensen agreed. When the two met,
Hansen gave his Athens, Texas, phone number as OR5-4787, and offered to
"help" the Castro government "in the US," traveling, providing "good
contacts," and moving "things from one place to another." Hensen said he
wanted money in exchange for his cooperation and said that he was under
"financial pressure." The Cuban "played cagey," made no commitments, told
Hensen he would check him out, and warned Hensen "never again" to phone
the Cuban Embassy because it was "too dangerous."

The reason it was too dangerous was that the CIA was always listening in,
as they had been to Hensen's calls. Unfortunately for Hensen, the Cuban,
while possibly from the Cuban Embassy, was not representing the Cubans at
all. His loyalties were to the CIA, and he was probably a defector in
place or double agent. Hensen walked straight into a web of deceit. The
station's cable to headquarters afterward explained how they had pulled
off this sleight of hand:


At Station request [CIA agent, name censored] posing as Cubemb [Cuban
Embassy] officer made contact on house phone [on the ] afternoon [of] 19
July, alluded to call [of Hensen's] to Embassy, lured Subj [Subject,
i.e., Hensen] to Hotel restaurant. . . . Said that his second trip [to]
Mexi[co] specifically to establish contact with Cubemb. Agreed [to]
accept [a] phone call with key word "Laredo" as call from [censored]
contact. . . . [A second CIA agent, name censored] witnessed meeting from
nearby table. . . . [word censored, probably FBI] informed 20 July, will
pick up hotel registration card and handle stateside investigation.


The Mexico City CIA station said that the Cuban was available for further
contact with Hensen in Mexico City if headquarters wanted the game to
continue.

What the CIA station in Mexico City did to Eldon Hensen in July 1963 was
to "step into" his reality and direct it a way designed to achieve the
Agency's objectives -- in this instance, to see what he was up to. This
CIA capability, to enter surreptitiously into someone's life to control
or manipulate it, was made possible in this case by the telephone taps.
In other cases it might have been photo surveillance, bugs, or agents and
informants who provided the data necessary to play the game. The Hensen
case makes it clear that this capability existed and was used in Mexico
City in July 1963. It would be used again in September and October of
that fateful year. Hensen's case certainly bears no striking resemblance
to Oswald's; but there is much we can learn from it.

At approximately 10:30 to 10:45 am, Oswald, his revolver back in his
pocket, left the Soviet Consulate. Kostikov and Yatskov, instead of going
to the volleyball game, stayed to write the cable to KGB Central in
Moscow. An hour later, 11: 51 am, the CIA intercepted a telephone call
purporting to be from the Cuban Consulate. This was strange: The Cuban
Consulate was always closed on Saturdays. Moreover, the woman doing the
calling was not identifiable to the transcriber of the tape made from the
call. It was not until "later" that she was identified as "Silvia Duran,"
although just how much later is not revealed. Stranger still is the CIA
transcript, which the Lopez Report describes as "incoherent" . . . Mr.
"T" (for 'transcriber'), who transcribed this intercept, claims the male
speaker is identical with the man who would, in a telephone call three
days later [Tuesday, October 1st], state, "My name is Oswald."

We know from the Hensen story that the CIA station routinely and
successfully impersonated people. The September 28 transcript should
therefore be examined from two possible perspectives. From the first
perspective, the call WAS both Oswald and Duran calling the Soviet
Consulate. In this scenario, the Soviets were incorrect in their earlier
conclusion that Oswald had "reconciled himself to the fact that he was
not about to get a quick visa." Between the time of Oswald's visit to the
Soviet Consulate and Duran's call an hour later, he had regained hope and
had managed to get the Cubans to call Silvia Duran . . . and admit him
into the consular offices, and then persuaded her to call the Soviet
Consulate with whom she had just eighteen hours earlier, reached the
mutual conclusion that Oswald could not receive a visa inside of four
months. From the second perspective, the speakers were NOT Oswald and
Duran, but two impostors who had stepped into Oswald's "reality" and were
trying to acquire intelligence information.

Let us examine the first sentence spoken by the Duran character: "There
is an American here who says he has been to the Russian consulate." Less
than twenty-four hours previously Duran had sent Oswald to the Soviet
Consulate to get a Soviet visa and, when he had returned with his phony
claim that it had been approved, Duran had telephoned the Soviets.
Kostikov had confirmed Oswald's visit there. Why would the real Duran
state the following day that Oswald "says he has been" if she already
knew it to be a fact? On the other hand, if this "Duran" character had
not yet seen any transcripts or listened to tapes of the previous day,
she might not know that the real Duran had already verified Oswald's
September 27 visit.

. . . After the Soviet said, "Wait a minute," the Duran character put the
Oswald character on the line. He said, "I was in your Embassy and spoke
to your Consul." This was true, Oswald had just spent over an hour with
the consul, Yatskov. Since Yatskov had, in all likelihood, entered the
consulate overtly, an impostor could have had this information. This
sentence, along with the Soviet reply, "What else do you want?" is
consistent with what either the real Oswald or an impostor knew. Since
Oswald's business was finished and because he had not even bothered to
fill out the paperwork for a visa, it made no sense for Oswald to call
back. But in a wrap-around operation, the impostor would have no way of
knowing that Oswald had decided against submitting the application forms.
. . . When the Soviet asked the Oswald character "what else" he wanted,
his answer was not responsive. He said, "I was just now at your Embassy
and they took my address." [This] seems too trivial to warrant the Cubans
[participation]. No wonder the Soviet reply was, "I know that." [The
statement] was consistent with the perspective that the male voice
belonged to an impostor who, with limited information, was winging his
way, trying to keep the conversation going for some unknown (to us)
purpose. It should also be pointed out that an impostor might well have
assumed that the real Oswald had given an address, as would the Soviet
speaker because he, too, presumably, had no personal knowledge of what
Oswald and Yatskov had done. Apparently, the impostor presumed that it
was safe to say that the Soviets had taken an address for Oswald. It was
an educated guess that was wrong.

The Soviet's acknowledgment was perfunctory. At this point the Oswald
character had to come up with something more substantive to justify his
apparent presence in the Cuban Consulate and this telephone call. Here is
what the Oswald character devised: "I did not know it then. I went to the
Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it." This is
possibly what the Lopez Report was referring to with the remark that this
transcript was "incoherent." How had the Soviet Consul managed to take
Oswald's address without him knowing it? . . . "Why don't you come by and
leave it then," said the Soviet, "we're not far." The Soviet must have
hoped this would put an end to this seemingly aimless and pointless
conversation. Indeed, the Oswald character was out of things to say,
except, "Well, I'll be there right away."

Should it then come as a surprise if Oswald did NOT return to the Soviet
Consulate -- that day or ever -- to drop this address off? But he WOULD
call again -- and would drop the whole matter of the address.

There's nothing necessarily sinister about the "false Oswald and Duran"
scenario. It simply demonstrates that someone within the CIA station was
keeping an eye on a suspicious American -- one who clearly had been
identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, defector to Russia, or "so-called
'defector'" as "Mr. T," with admirable skepticism, put it. If one
overlooks the thorny issue of surreptitious (and illegal) wiretapping,
the Agency was acting well within its jurisdiction in watching this
potential security threat making contact with "hostile" foreign
governments on Mexican soil. One thing is clear, though: For reasons not
known, a good deal of the evidence of Oswald's alleged visits would
vanish down the memory hole by early 1964. The CIA would deny for a solid
thirty years that it had any prior knowledge of Oswald's alleged
September 27, 1963, visits to the Cuban and Soviet Consulates, something
the Warren Commission could have refuted had it the interest, or the
House Committee, had it the guts (as the HSCA had most of the facts we
have today).

The question is, is that the only reason the CIA torched evidence, lied
to a presidential commission and a Congressional committee, and impeded
numerous public investigations of the assassination (as well as countless
privately undertaken ones)? It could be. But knowing what we know now, it
is difficult to concede the Agency the benefit of the doubt. Every single
member of the Warren Commission and their staff who has spoken on the
record regarding the CIA's (and, incidentally, FBI's) crucial position in
the Commission's work, has stated categorically that the investigation
would have been handled differently were it known then what the CIA (and
FBI) had to conceal.* Even Commission attorney David Belin, the
Commission's most vocal and unwavering champion for the last 35 years,
has stated publicly that he wouldn't trust the CIA, knowing what he knows
now, because he later found that they did not have "clean hands" (ARRB
Los Angeles meeting transcript).

(*Those who have NOT spoken on the record about the hazards of staking
all one's reliance on investigative agencies with vested interests in a
superficial investigation include President Gerald Ford [then a
congressman], who served as J. Edgar Hoover's unofficial and unauthorized
eyes and ears on Commission activities -- Marina Oswald would later
recall Ford's tendency to leave the hearing room following especially
interesting bits of her lengthy testimony -- and the late Allen Dulles,
who of course was the former Director of the CIA and had been with the
Agency since the very beginning and back through its predecessor, the
OSS. When the existence of the CIA assassination plots against Castro and
other foreign leaders was exposed in the early '70s, more than one member
of the Commission publicly expressed considerable shock that Dulles had
withheld information of such obvious relevance from the Commission.)

As the Lopez Report states, on the morning of November 23, 1963 -- the
day after the assassination -- J. Edgar Hoover wrote this memorandum to
FBI Special Agent James J. Rowley: "The Central Intelligence Agency
advised that on October 1, 1963 [after the alleged first visit], an
extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified
himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have
conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the
individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his
voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to
individual WAS NOT LEE HARVEY OSWALD" [emphasis added]. Two members of
the Warren Commission's legal staff, David Slawson and William T. Coleman
quietly journeyed to the CIA's Mexico City field office where they, too,
listened to the tape. At the time they concluded that it was probably
Oswald's voice -- though they admitted they did not compare it to any
available recordings of Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans or Dallas. We
have learned -- only from documents declassified for release in 1996 --
that Robert F. Kennedy was so upset by the CIA's inability to resolve the
issue that he PERSONALLY JOURNEYED to the Mexico City CIA station to
inspect the evidence and interrogate the station's personnel for himself.
We do not, however, know what conclusions he reached.

We now also now have transcripts of President Lyndon B. Johnson's phone
calls from November 23, 1963. Here we see a glimpse of President Johnson
on the first full day of his presidency, and he's already been briefed on
Oswald's trip to Mexico City, and worried enough about it to be talking
to J. Edgar Hoover. He asked Hoover, "Have you established any more about
the visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico in September?" Hoover replied,
"No, that's one angle that's very confusing for this reason. We have up
here the tape and the photograph of the man who was at the Soviet Embassy
using Oswald's name. That picture and the tape DO NOT CORRESPOND to the
man's voice nor to his appearance. In other words, IT APPEARS THAT THERE
IS A SECOND PERSON who was at the Soviet Embassy down there" [emphasis
added].

The "extremely sensitive source" mentioned in Hoover's memo above was not
a person; it's a euphemism for wiretaps; the CIA was tapping the Soviet
Embassy's phone lines. That is where the recording of "Oswald's" voice
originated. When the House Select Committee attempted in 1976 to obtain a
copy of the tape, the CIA informed them that, regrettably, the tape had
been routinely erased and "recycled" only days after it was recorded.
Several people on the HSCA staff wanted to ask them how it was possible,
then, that members of the FBI and the Warren Commission had been able to
listen to the recording several months later -- after the assassination.
The Committee would not allow them to press the issue.

The photograph in question, however, the Warren Commission published; and
nearly a dozen others of the same man, taken over the span of about a
week, have since appeared. The man is clearly not Lee Harvey Oswald. When
the CIA had only photographs from one visit to the Soviet Embassy to
explain, they explained it this way: They photographed the man at the
time that their bugging devices at the Soviet Embassy (more "extremely
sensitive sources") picked up a man claiming to be Lee Harvey Oswald;
however, they made a mistake -- they photographed the wrong guy. When it
was pointed out to CIA officer David Atlee Phillips -- who directed the
agency's response to "Oswald's" appearance in Mexico City -- that there
were known to be photographs of the man who wasn't Oswald taken over a
period of several days, Phillips assured them it was only because
Oswald's CIA surveillers didn't have any photographs of Lee Harvey
Oswald, and didn't know what he looked like. It was all a mistake, he
said; they thought they were photographing Lee Harvey Oswald all along.
At least one highly placed member of the HSCA staff -- Robert Tanenbaum
-- wanted to cite Phillips for contempt or indict him for perjury. The
Committee accepted Phillips' answers despite the fact that it was known
that Oswald did have CIA files in Mexico City, and they did contain at
the very least several newspaper clippings detailing Oswald's so-called
defection, complete with studio photographs of the young "defector."

On November 9, 1963, Oswald allegedly typed a letter referring to his
recent visit to the Embassy. It was sent to the Soviet Embassy with a
November 12, 1963, postmark. If Oswald hadn't been in Mexico City, he was
at least aware that he was supposed to have been at the Soviet Embassy
and the Cuban Consulate, and was supposed to have been rebuffed. After
the assassination these visits were used to further establish his alleged
communist tendencies.

His letter of November 9, in fact, caused the Warren Commission some
trouble, as it referred to Oswald having spoken to a "Comrade Kostin,"
believed to be Valeriy Kostikov, an officer at the Soviet Embassy who the
CIA suspected of being a KGB specialist in espionage and assassinations.
In order to reinforce their portrait of Oswald as a lone assassin, the
Commission had to eradicate any connection to Kostikov. Therefore the
Commission concluded, based on other alleged falsehoods in the letter --
including the rather intriguing statement that had Oswald wanted to
remain in Mexico longer, he would have had to apply for a new visa "and
use my real name" -- that Oswald was embellishing on the truth when he
wrote that he'd actually spoken to "Kostin."

They may have been right. Or they may have been more right than they
knew.